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ABSTRACT
FACULTY OF SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE
Doctor Scientiarum Informaticarum
by InSeon Yoo
Currently, the Internet is not a privilege for specific groups any more. The wide coverage
of the Internet brought lots of risks as well as convenience. Network security problems
are the familiar loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability. One of the solution
technologies is a defence system to protect network-connected resources, which is called a
firewall. The more serious network threats are, the more important the role of the firewall
is. As high technologies have developed, the ways of attacks are getting even more
serious. To prevent new attacks, new defence mechanisms also need to be developed.
This thesis looks for defence mechanisms against network attacks, which use vulnera-
bilities in network protocols, and risk assessment of data packets, then apply them to
network security systems, in particular, to a firewall system, which is called Janus. The
start of this research is based on the MPhil thesis, “An Intelligent Firewall Architec-
ture Model to Detect Internet-Scale Virus Attacks”. With the concept of an intelligent
firewall in mind, research on potential technologies applicable to Janus has been con-
ducted. The goal of this research is to extend the abilities of packet-filtering firewalls
aiming to reduce possible problems and attacks by improving firewall technologies. Janus
is an adaptive firewall architecture based on a packet-filtering firewall, which can deal
with protocol anomaly detection and verification, and email classification. Furthermore,
Janus can conduct virus detection in attached files without the use of virus signatures.
The non-signature-based virus detection approach currently is capable of detecting 84%
of the virus-infected files in the sample set, which includes polymorphic and encrypted
viruses. At the moment, the false positive rate is 30%. The combination of the classical
virus detection technique for known viruses and this SOM-based technique for unknown
viruses can help systems even more secure. The contribution of this work is to pro-
pose various approaches for building defence mechanisms, and developing the adaptive
firewall model further based on the proposed defence technologies.
UNIVERSITA¨T FREIBURG (CH)
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
MATHEMATISCH-NATURWISSENSCHAFTLICHE FAKULTA¨T
DEPARTEMENT FU¨R INFORMATIK
Doctor scientiarum informaticarum (Dr. sc. inf.)
vorgelegt von InSeon Yoo
Heutzutage ist das Internet kein Privileg mehr fu¨r eine bestimmte Personengruppe. Die
weite Verbreitung des Internets brachte viele Risiken wie auch Annehmlichkeiten. Prob-
leme der Netzwerksicherheit sind der bekannte Verlust von Vertraulichket, Inegrita¨t und
Verfu¨gbarkeit. Eine Lo¨sungstechnologie ist ein Verteidigungssystem, das mit dem Net-
zwerk verbundene Resourcen schu¨tzt, die Firewall. Je gro¨sser Netzwerkbedrohungen
werden, umso wichtiger wird die Rolle der Firwall. Durch die weiterentwickelte Tech-
nologie werden die Angriffe immer bedrohlicher. Um vor neuen Angriffen zu schu¨tzen
mu¨ssen, neue Verteidigungsmechanismen entwickelt werden.
Die vorliegende Doktorarbeit untersucht Verteidigungsmechanismen gegen Netzwerkan-
griffe, die Schwachstellen in Netzwerkprotokollen ausnutzen, und betrachtet Risikobe-
wertung von Datenpaketen, um sie dann auf Netzwerksicherheitssysteme anzuwenden,
im besonderen auf ein Firewallsystem, das Janus genannt wird. Der Anfang dieser
Forschung basiert auf der MPhil Arbeit “An Intelligent Firewall Architecture Model to
Detect Internet-Scale Virus Attacks”. Mit dem Konzept einer intelligenten Firewall im
Auge wurde an mo¨glichen Technologien geforscht, die auf Janus anwendbar sind. Ziel
dieser Forschung ist es, die Fa¨higkeiten einer paketfilternden Firewall auszubauen, um
mo¨gliche Probleme und Angriffe durch verbesserte Firewalltechnologien zu reduzieren.
Janus ist eine adaptive Firewalltechnologie, die auf einer paketfilternden Firewall basiert
und die mit Protokollanomalieerkennung, Verifikation und E-Mail-Klassifikation ausges-
tattet ist. Weiterhin kann Janus Virenerkennung in Dateien, die einer E-Mail angeha¨ngt
sind, durchfu¨hren, ohne dabei Virensignaturen zu verwenden. Der nichtsignaturbasierte
Virenerkennungsansatz ist derzeit in der Lage, 84% von vireninfizierten Dateien in einer
Stichprobe zu erkennen, die auch polymorphe und verschlu¨sselte Viren entha¨lt. Die
False Positives Rate liegt im Moment bei 30%. Die Kombination klassischer Viren-
erkennungsverfahren mit dieser SOM-basierten Technik fu¨r unbekannte Viren kann dazu
beitragen, Systeme noch sicherer zu machen. Der Beitrag dieser Doktorarbeit ist es,
verschiedene Verteidigungsmechanismen anzubieten und mit diesen das adaptive Fire-
wallmodell weiterzuentwickeln.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
’I wish it need not have happened in my time!’, said Frodo.
’So do I’, said Gandalf, ’and so do all who live to see such times.
But that is not for them to decide.
All we have to decide is what to do with the time is given us.’
- The Lord of The Rings, J.R.R. Tolkien
Currently, there are many different types of network security systems e.g., intrusion
detection systems (IDS), anti-virus systems, firewalls, routers, proxies and so on. Often
these techniques are employed together. Since any organization connected to the Internet
deployed already some kind of routers, and most routers have at least simple packet
filtering capabilities, routers are often used in addition or instead of more complex
firewall products. However, routers and many other simple packet filters lack good
packet handling ability for defence against network attacks which use vulnerabilities of
network protocols and mechanisms. Therefore, various defence mechanisms need to be
held in depth, and risk assessment of data packets must be established in the defence
mechanisms.
1.1 Defence Mechanism and Network Protocols
There are many other components in the TCP/IP protocols for managing communica-
tions and providing higher-level services. Most of them were developed in the days when
the network had only trusted hosts, and security was not a concern [Anderson(2001b)].
The fundamental problem of the lower-level TCP/IP protocols is that there is no real
authenticity or confidentiality protection in most mechanisms. Furthermore, there are
not only security problems — e.g., TCP sequence number prediction, abuse of the rout-
ing mechanisms and protocols, and so forth — in the TCP/IP protocol suite (details
can be found in [Bellovin(1989)]), but also implementation problems — e.g., no initial
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slow start, inconsistent retransmission, extra additive constant in congestion avoidance,
excessively short keepalive connection timeout, insufficient interval between keepalives,
window probe deadlock, stretch ACK violation, retransmission sends multiple packets,
failure to send FIN notification promptly, failure to send a RST after half duplex close,
failure to RST on close with data pending, and so on — in the TCP protocol (known im-
plementation problems in detail are reported in RFC 2525 [V. Paxson and Volz(1999)]).
Therefore, defence mechanisms must overcome these problems altogether, which can be
abused by attackers.
1.2 Likelihood of Attacks
The mathematical concept of probability is inadequate to express our mental confidence
or diffidence in making such inferences, and that the mathematical quantity which ap-
pears to be appropriate for measuring our order of preference among different possible
populations does not in fact obey the laws of probability. To distinguish it from probabil-
ity, R. A. Fisher has used the term “likelihood” to designate this quantity [Fisher(1925)].
In this thesis, the likelihood of attacks is defined as our confidence to have certain oc-
currence of specific attacks and attackers’ preference to use certain patterns of attacks.
We look at the likelihood that a particular threat 1 using a specific attack, will exploit
a particular vulnerability of a system that results in an undesirable consequence, which
is called risk 2. The likelihood is not a probability, but an estimate of the threat po-
tential of each adversary 3 group to cause an undesired event at information resources.
The relative threat potential is based on characteristics of the adversary group and the
information resources. The vulnerabilities in network protocols still exist as long as the
structure of network and network protocols are not changed completely. As technologies
are getting better, the attack skills are also getting smarter in every way. Hence, the
likelihood of attacks using vulnerabilities in network protocols and mechanisms are still
high although new technologies to detect or security systems’ abilities are developed
significantly. Therefore, we need intelligent defence mechanisms.
1Def. from [NSFISSI(1997)]. Any indication, circumstance, or event that can cause the loss of,
damage to, or the denial of an asset.
2Def. from [NSFISSI(1997)]. (Likelihood of attack) * (Consequence) * (1 - System Effectiveness) =
RISK.
The likelihood of a successful attack is the probability that an adversary would succeed in carrying out
an attack.
3Def. from [NSFISSI(1997)]. Any entity that conducts, or has the capability and intention to conduct,
activities detrimental to interests or assets.
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1.3 Risk Assessment of Data Packets
In this thesis, the risk assessment of data packets is defined as that it is about un-
derstanding likely threats to network systems and the process of determining whether
proposed or existing defence mechanisms are adequate to protect information resources
from the threats. The threats to network systems are considered either using vulner-
abilities in network protocols and mechanisms or using common network mechanisms
with malicious code in data packets. The former can be active attacks including typical
denial service attacks, – e.g., ping attacks, SYN flood attacks, land attacks and tear
drop attacks – IP spoofing, spams (including phishing [Wikipedia(2005)]), and denial
of service Internet worms. On the other hand, the latter can be passive attacks using
social engineering methods including viruses and Internet worms.
Various existing security systems have specific defence mechanisms against specific at-
tacks. In this thesis, firewalls are the main concern for risk assessment of data packets.
Since firewalls are not smart enough to protect information resources from the above-
mentioned threats, this thesis proposes defence mechanisms to improve firewall tech-
nologies. Among passive attacks, Internet worms are focused on the propagation feature
using email, thus the detection of viruses, Internet worms and spams is considered in an
email defence mechanism. With these threat models, defence mechanisms are developed
and applied to an adaptive packet-filter firewall, Janus.
1.4 Exclusions
This thesis is not concerned with flaws in particular implementations of the protocols,
such as those used by Internet worms [Spafford(1988), Seeley(1988), Eichin and Rochlis(1988)].
Rather, generic problems of the protocols themselves are discussed, and various require-
ments for network defence systems are addressed. Careful implementation techniques
can alleviate or prevent some of these problems. Generic Internet protocols will be dis-
cussed. Neither is this project concerned with physical eavesdropping, nor with altered
or injected messages. This thesis discusses such problems only as far as they are facili-
tated or possible because of protocol problems. For the most part, there is no discussion
here of vendor-specific protocols. This thesis does discuss some problems with Berkeley’s
protocols, since these have become de facto standards for many vendors, and not just
for UNIX systems.
1.5 Reader’s Guide
The rest of the PhD thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 contains motivation of this
project, research aims and its objectives. It also describes the requirements to assess
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data packets in firewalls and the proposed firewall architecture. In addition to these,
the current state of virus detection is mentioned.
Chapter 3 briefly addresses analysis of vulnerabilities in network protocols and mecha-
nisms. There are protocol anomaly-based attacks and widespread malicious code, espe-
cially through email mechanism.
Chapter 4 looks at protocol anomaly detection and verification. It also describes the
threat models of protocol anomaly-based attacks and summarizes specific requirements
of network protocol anomaly detection. Then a TCP runtime verification model is
proposed taking into account current problems of TCP state transitions and genera-
tion of steps in the TCP verification model is presented. Furthermore, SDL modelling
is presented for prototyping an application and defensive measures against protocol
anomaly-based attacks.
Chapter 5 introduces email classification for risk assessment. It includes email viruses
and worms, which spread via emails. A Naive Bayesian classifier and a reduced ordered
binary decision diagram (OBDD) representation are used for email classification.
Chapter 6 presents virus visualization and recognition using Self-Organizing Maps (SOMs).
It briefly discusses SOM algorithms and processes, and describes the application of SOM
to detect virus patterns, which is discussed in Chapter 7, where application cases such
as the Janus firewall system and Janus VirusDetector are introduced. The applications’
implementation is outlined as well as experiments conducted as part of the research
method and their results. Then these results with regard to the research’s objectives
are discussed and evaluated.
Finally, Chapter 8 draws conclusions with a summary of the major shortcomings of the
Janus project and a brief discussion of future research.
Chapter 2
Motivations
If you don’t defend your rights,
you lose them by attrition.
- Lawrence Ferlinghetti
2.1 Research Objective
This research aims to develop cost-effective defence mechanisms and apply those mecha-
nisms to a packet-filter firewall in order to improve the firewall ability to defend against
network attacks and to manage risk assessment of data packets efficiently. As a result,
this research can also improve firewall technologies. Another motivation is to reduce
risk through preventing some malicious packets e.g., email viruses from entering the
secure network. Therefore, this project also seeks to answer the questions considering
risk assessment of data packets: “how to detect worms/viruses, which are replicated
via emails, at the level of a firewall without cooperation with an anti-virus server?”,
“how to detect email viruses without knowing their signatures?”, “how to determine
the probability whether the mail is abnormal?”, and “how to detect virus patterns in
virus-infected files?”. Theoretically, it is impossible to generate a program, which can
solve the general virus detection problem. This theorem has been proved in different
ways in the literature. Since the general virus detection problem is not solvable, we have
to reduce the problem.
To achieve the research objectives, specific requirements of network protocol usage and
malicious code propagation via email has been identified, run-time verification model,
email classificaiton model and virus recognition have been designed, and a prototype of
a packet-filter firewall has been implemented as a proof of concept.
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2.2 Increasingly Serious Attacks
Internet viruses include file viruses, file worms, and network worms. These Internet
viruses are being spread via systems’ security holes, emails, messengers, etc. A virus
is a piece of code that adds itself to other programs and cannot run independently.
As Microsoft Windows became popular, Windows viruses and Windows-application-
derived viruses using Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) spread widely. A common
way of Windows virus dissemination is through emails. In addition, a worm is a program
that can run by itself and propagate a fully working version of it to other machines. A
network worm is a worm, which copies itself to another system by using common network
facilities, and causes execution of the copy on that system. A recent serious attack was
Code Red. The Code Red worm is a malicious self-propagating code [CERT(2002a)]
that spreads surreptitiously through a hole in certain Microsoft software. The Code
Red, which left computers open to hijacking, has caused a lot of traffic being sent,
clogging the bandwidth on the Internet. An infected system will show an increased
processor and network load. The worm could easily permit hackers to take control of
hundreds of thousands of infected machines.
The biggest impact of these worms is that their propagation creates a DOS attack in
many parts of the Internet, because of the huge amount of traffic generated. DOS
attacks can interrupt services by flooding networks or systems with unwanted traffic.
A service will be denied, because the network or system is overwhelmed. Distributed
systems based on the client/server model have become increasingly popular. Therefore
Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks are also getting escalated. In an DDOS,
an attacker controls a number of handlers. A handler is a compromised host with a
special program running on it. Each handler is capable of controlling multiple agents.
An agent is a compromised host, which is responsible for generating a stream of packets
that is directed towards the intended victim.
2.3 Classification and Recognition
Classification and recognition are considered in this thesis. We can give the following
situation: we may be given a set of observations with the aim of establishing the existence
of classes or clusters in the data. Or we may know for certain that there are so many
classes, and the aim is to establish a rule whereby we can classify a new observation into
one of the existing classes.
The task of classification could cover any context in which some decision or forecast is
made on the basis of currently available information, and a classification procedure is
then some formal method for repeatedly making such judgments in new situations.
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If we create some classifier, the classifier should be considered of accuracy, speed, com-
prehensibility and time to learn [D. Michie and (Eds)(1994)].
1. Accuracy. There is the reliability of the rule, usually represented by the proportion
of correct classifications, although it may be that some errors are more serious than
others, and it may be important to control the error rate for some key class.
2. Speed. The speed of the classifier is a major issue in real critical circumstances.
90% accurate may be preferred over one that is 95% accurate if it is 100 times
faster.
3. Comprehensibility. If it is an administrator that must apply the classification
procedure, the procedure must be easily understood else mistakes will be made in
applying the rule. It is important also that the administrators believe the system.
4. Time to Learn. Especially in a rapidly changing environment, it may be necessary
to learn a classification rule quickly, or make adjustments to an existing rule in
real time.
The problem concerns the construction of a procedure that will be applied to a continuing
sequence of cases, in which each new case must be assigned to one of a set of predefined
classes on the basis of observed attributes or features.
The other is Pattern Recognition. There are many kinds of patterns; visual patterns,
temporal patterns, logical patterns. Using a broad enough interpretation, we can find
pattern recognition in every intelligent activity. No single theory of pattern recognition
can possibly cope with such a broad range of problems. There are several models,
statistical pattern recognition, syntactic or structural pattern recognition, knowledge-
based pattern recognition and so on. These pattern recognitions could be viewed as a
classification.
However, both of them are defined and used like this in this thesis: classification is based
on finding proper information and establishing links between data, on the other hand,
recognition is based on making a decision about the information after classifying data.
2.4 Faces vs. Packets
What is the feature of packets carrying virus codes? Compared with anti-virus systems,
firewalls only deal with packets. In order to detect virus packets, we need to know the
characteristics of virus packets. Assessment of packets has quite similar aspects like
that with faces. Faces have images or specific characteristics like distance from nose
to chin to identify a person. As Figure 2.1 shows, we can see several faces, nobody
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Figure 2.1: Face models, all different faces, but still have common features
is the same, but everybody has common features, such as hair, eyes, one nose, one
mouth and ears. Some pictures are collected from the FBI fugitive database. In terms
of likelihood of attacks, the FBI keeps fugitive information, since they can use this
information for several purposes to detect criminals. For example, they can sketch the
figure of a criminal according to this information. So, what kind of information is useful
to them? For example, size of eyes, distance between two eyes, colour of hair, eigenvector
of faces, and so on. Likewise, we need a function helping us to estimate, whether or
not packets are malicious and can cause undesired events. In addition, to reduce the
undesired events, assessment of packets is necessary.
2.5 Current Network Security Systems’ Problems
DOS attacks are easy to perpetrate and almost impossible to defend against even whilst
firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are installed. Even if the Intrusion
Detection Systems generate alerts, log packets, send emails, and call pagers, the attacker
could still get in, and by the time somebody could respond the damage would be done. A
malicious attacker could spoof attacks from many sources and effectively deny everybody
access to the server. This is considered to be an unacceptable risk. A firewall would be of
no help either. The web server has to remain available to the public and the vulnerability
is in the web server software such as IIS. A firewall has no way of determining if a request
being sent to a web server is benign or malicious. While the firewall could stop traffic to
ports that do not need to be publicly accessible, it is useless in this situation. Increasingly
complex security scenarios and incorrect configurations contribute to a firewall’s inability
to provide gateway security. A firewall is also only able to deal with traffic that passes
through the firewall, with all internal traffic completely unchecked.
When a virus associated with DOS spreads through the Internet, virus scanning proxy
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servers and IDSs or Firewalls must cooperate to prevent these attacks. Although anti-
virus servers and software have served users well for a lengthy period, today’s fast-paced
technology means that viruses travel much faster than signature updates can keep up
with. This kind of software often relies on databases containing these virus signatures,
which catch and define viruses. It is therefore essential to ensure that the database of
signatures is as up-to-date as possible. This implies that a mechanism guarantees that
the latest signatures are updated, as and when new viruses are detected. Therefore a
process of automatic updating of signatures, a built-in feature found in most anti-virus
products, as well performing the necessary upgrade maintenance are critical actions.
These are steps that cannot be left up to human processing, but must be automated
to be kept up-to-date at all times. This type of solution has become vital due to the
different ways that a virus can enter an organisation. This means that protection is
needed at each of the levels, stopping a virus where it enters rather than having to clean
up after it has spread.
2.6 Requirements To Assess Data Packets In Firewalls
2.6.1 Data Packet Detection
As social engineering attacks and security-vulnerability-exploiting attacks had been sur-
veyed in the MPhil thesis [Yoo(2004b)], attack trends of Internet-scale viruses are that
they are automatic and sophisticated with intruders misusing infrastructure for their
own purposes. To identify Internet-scale viruses, in addition to the usual network con-
trol ability of a firewall, data packet detection is compulsory. A packet-header check in
a firewall is not sufficient to detect infrastructure based attacks. It is, for example, not
sufficient to identify multiple file extension, domain-name-style file names and long sub-
jects in email attachments. Win32/SirCam, Win32/Gibe, Win32/Myparty, Nimda, and
Win32/BadTrans misuse this point [Yoo and Ultes-Nitsche(2003), Yoo and Ultes-Nitsche(2004a)].
Anti-virus software can detect viruses in programs using a unique character, called a
virus signature, a peculiar attack pattern will also appear in the data packets such as
Code Red’s packet. IDSs run a process known as anomaly detection. An IDS constantly
monitors network traffic and compares the stream of network packets with what it per-
ceives as normal network traffic. Anomaly detection appears to be applicable not only to
intrusion detection but also to virus monitoring [Swimmer(2000)], now not being applied
to the level of the full network traffic, but to single data packets. The improved virus
monitor will examine data packets as usual. Besides checking against known malicious-
code patterns, it will check whether it sees a pattern that it perceives as potentially mali-
cious and will react accordingly, e.g. by creating some sort of warnings. However, during
the investigation of data packets in a selection of the good packets, a very similar pattern
was identified to packets, which seem to contain malicious code, e.g. the BAT911/Chode
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worm. These were packets sent by Microsoft Servers to NetBIOS and DNS lookup ser-
vices. For example, port 137 is reserved for the NetBIOS name service and port 138
is reserved for the NetBIOS datagram service. The subsequent packet was assumed to
contain the signature of the “BAT911/Chode” worm even though it was a benign packet
(see Table 2.1) [Yoo and Ultes-Nitsche(2002b), InSeon and Ultes-Nitsche(2002)].
Table 2.1: Example of NetBIOS name service packets
05/24-13:10:13.082716 152.78.70.46:137 -> 152.78.70.127:137
UDP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:47635 IpLen:20 DgmLen:78
Len: 58
........................................................................
0x0030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 45 45 46 44 46 44 45 46 43 ................EEFDFDEFC
0x0040: 41 43 41 43 41 43 41 43 41 43 41 43 41 43 41 43 ACACACACACACACAC
0x0050: 41 43 41 43 41 42 4C 00 00 20 00 01 ACACABL .. ..
2.6.2 Dynamic Packet Handling Ability
Although a firewall is able to control a network and maintain its connectivity, it handles
packets only statically. Through open ports, a firewall would not inspect/control packets
willingly. According to the analysis of distributed denial of service attack tools, it is well
known how to use tools such as TFN [Dittrich(1999c)], TFN2K, Trinoo [Dittrich(1999a)]
and Stacheldraht [Dittrich(1999b)]. These programs use not only TCP and UDP packets
but also ICMP packets. Moreover, because the programs use ICMP ECHOREPLY
packets for communication, it would be very difficult to block attacks without breaking
most Internet programs that rely on ICMP. Since TFN, TFN2K and Stacheldraht use
ICMP packets, it is much more difficult to detect them in action, and packets will go right
through most firewalls. The current only sure way to destroy this channel is to deny all
ICMP ECHO traffic into the network. Furthermore, the tools mentioned above use any
port randomly; it is hard to prevent the port from an attack in advance using the fixed
port close scheme in current firewalls. Therefore, to prevent degradation of service on
the network and to deny this kind of malicious packet, dynamic packet handling on the
level of firewalls is crucial [Ultes-Nitsche and Yoo(2003), Yoo and Ultes-Nitsche(2003),
Ultes-Nitsche and Yoo(2004), Yoo(2004a)].
2.7 Proposed Firewall Architecture
Janus project intends to extend packet-filter firewalls with intelligent components. The
firewall model has packet-based components: a packet verifier, a packet-based classifica-
tion engine, a smart detection engine, and a policy interpreter. The architectural firewall
model is depicted in Figure 2.2. This architectural firewall model has been developed in
the MPhil thesis [Yoo(2004b)].
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Figure 2.2: Packet-Based Detection Components in the intelligent firewall.
Decoded packets pass into the packet verifier and the packet-based classification engine
in parallel. The packet verifier checks all protocols’ sanity and validates expected usage
of protocols. The packet-based classification engine aims to classify packets, which could
be malicious and estimate the probability of their maliciousness. On the other hand, the
smart detection engine aims at recognizing malicious patterns in data packets that have a
certain probability of being malicious. The smart detection engine analyses the payload
of the packets and aims to detect anomalous patterns in the payload. Finally, the policy
interpreter analyses the information it gets from the two engines and decides on whether
to drop the packet or let it pass through the firewall based on its specific security policy
[Yoo and Ultes-Nitsche(2003), Ultes-Nitsche and Yoo(2003), Yoo(2004a)].
2.7.1 Packet Verifier
The purposes of the packet verifier are validating compliance to standards, and vali-
dating expected usage of protocols e.g. protocol anomaly detection. It aims to cover
the TCP/IP/ICMP protocols. The packet verifier checks the protocol header part of
packets, verifies packet’ size, checks TCP/UDP header length, verifies TCP flags and
all packet parameters, does TCP protocol type verification, and analyses TCP protocol
header and TCP protocol flags. In the IP protocol, according to the Internet Protocol
Standard [Postel(1981b)], an IP header length should always be greater than or equal to
the minimal Internet header length (20 octets) and a packet’s total length should always
be greater than its header length. IP address checks are also important since land attacks
use the same IP address for source and destination. According to the TCP standard
[Postel(1981c)], neither the source nor the destination TCP port number can be zero, and
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TCP flags, e.g. URG and PSH flags, can be only used when a packet carries data. Thus,
for instance, combinations of SYN and URG or SYN and PSH become invalid. In addi-
tion, any combination of more than one of the SYN, RST, and FIN flags is also invalid.
Finally, the packet verifier sends the result of validation to the packet-based classification
engine [Yoo and Ultes-Nitsche(2004b), Ultes-Nitsche and Yoo(2004), Yoo(2004c)].
2.7.2 Packet-Based Classification Engine
The purpose of the packet-based classification engine is to make a decision whether
the packet classes are filtered into the smart detection engine or are dropped accord-
ing to their probabilities of being malicious. This classification is based on a struc-
tural analysis of data packets. The structural analysis is mainly concerned with in-
formation that can be obtained from a packet’s header plus certain information in its
payload. To make a statistical relation between interesting events among incomplete
data, Bayesian networks [Pearl(1988)] or probabilistic graphical models have been cho-
sen, in particular the Naive Bayesian network [Langley and Sage(1994)] among several
Bayesian network models. In the MPhil thesis, certain packet characteristics has been
analysed that allows me to attach to packets probabilities of their maliciousness. The
analysed file characteristics are used as the parameters of the Naive Bayesian network
[Yoo and Ultes-Nitsche(2004b), Ultes-Nitsche and Yoo(2004), Yoo(2004c)].
2.7.3 Smart Detection Engine
The smart detection engine deals with the filtered packets, which have a high probabil-
ity of being malicious, selected from the packet-based classification engine. The smart
detection engine aims to learn to distinguish anomalous data packets from normal pack-
ets [Cannady and Mahaffey(1998), Lee and Heinbuch(2001)]. However, unlike anti-virus
software, this engine does not need to match the infected part of a program exactly
[G. Tesauro and Sorkin(1996)]. Detecting known viruses in a system or file is a role of
anti-virus software. Note that the smart detection engine deals with virus-infected files
rather than file worms. In the file worm case, the packet-based classification engine aims
to classify this file worm based on the context information. Currently Self-Organizing
Maps (SOMs) [Kohonen(1995)] are applied to the smart detection engine to detect bad
patterns. It is aimed to design the SOM in a way that neurons will flag the presence
of peculiar patterns in data packets and that the position of the active neurons reflects
the position of potentially malicious content in the packet. Basically, all packets with
a probability of being malicious above a certain threshold is filtered into the smart de-
tection engine for examination [Yoo(2004d)]. The threshold has to be set in a relatively
arbitrary fashion first and then be adapted when fine-tuning is applied to the decision
procedures.
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2.8 Current Status of Virus Detection
The most popular approach to defend network systems against malicious program is
through anti-virus software such as Symantec [Symantec(2002)] and McAfee [McAfee(2002)],
as well as server-based scanners that filter email with executable attachments or embed-
ded macros in documents. However, there is still a problem to deal with unknown or
variants of viruses.
• Monitoring systems exist through organizations such as WildList [WildList(2001)]
and Trend Micro [TrendMicro(2002b)]. WildList is an organization consisting of
64 virus information professionals, who report all computer programs that they
have received and positively identified as malicious. This list does not include
those cases where an attachment is considered suspicious but not yet classified
as malicious, or include any viruses not specifically reported by these 64 partici-
pants. This leaves computer systems vulnerable to attack from unreported viral
incidents [WildList(2001)]. Since the process of reporting is not automated, mali-
cious programs, especially self-replicating programs, can spread much faster than
the warnings generated by WildList.
Trend depends on a proprietary virus scanner HouseCall [TrendMicro(2002a)],
which integrates with the Trend Micro Control Manager to report information
about actual virus infections. It attempts to predict virus outbreaks and prevent
them pro-actively with the use of a dynamic map to analyse worldwide virus trends
in real time [TrendMicro(2002b)]. However, since HouseCall is not widely used,
Trend’s data is incomplete. Furthermore, if Trend’s database is not updated at
the time that a virus infects a system, then the virus remains unreported.
• An anti-virus server is defined as a server-side virus-checking program. Its spe-
cific name depends on the company that produces it; for example, V3Netscan and
V3VirusWall in Ahnlab Inc.[Ahnlab(2002)], and MailMonitor in Sophos [Sophos(2002)].
Anti-virus servers examine network traffic, aiming to prevent malicious code from
entering network nodes by detecting known malicious-code patterns, for instance
in an email attachment. Apparently, they can detect only known viruses. All
of the major anti-virus vendors have produced networked products and systems
that scan incoming email. However, because Trojan horses, worms and viruses
can spread through local networks, shared hard drives and individual document
files, as well as through the Internet, it is always necessary to have virus check-
ing available on each client machine as well as on Internet gateways. Too often,
patterns that identify new malware are not ready until days or even weeks after se-
rious damage has been done. New viruses will only become detectable after their
pattern characteristics have been analysed and are made available. Looking at
techniques applied by other security systems such as intrusion detection systems,
seems to benefit virus detection [Swimmer(2000)].
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These approaches have been successful in protecting computers against known ma-
licious programs usually employing signature-based methods. Almost all anti-virus
products claim that they can detect 100% of known viruses. However, we realize
that hundreds of new viruses are created every month, they have not yet provided
a means of protecting against unknown viruses, nor do they assist in providing
information that may help trace those individuals responsible for creating viruses.
• There have been approaches to detect new or unknown malicious programs by
analysing the payload of an attachment. The methods used include heuristics
[White(1998)], data mining techniques [Matthew G. Schultz and Zadok(2001b),
Matthew G. Schultz and Zadok(2001a)], and neural networks [Kephart(1994)]. How-
ever, these methods in general do not perform well enough to detect malicious
programs in real time.
IBM researchers [O.Kephart and C.Arnold(1994)] developed a statistical method
for automatically extracting malicious executable signatures. Their research was
based on speech recognition algorithms and was shown to perform almost as good
as a human expert at detecting known malicious executables. Their algorithm was
eventually packaged with IBM’s anti-virus software. Lo et al.[R. Lo and Olsson(1995)]
presented a method for filtering malicious code based on telltale signs for detecting
malicious code. These were manually engineered based on observing the character-
istics of malicious code. Unfortunately, a new malicious program may not contain
any of the known signatures, so traditional signature-based methods may not de-
tect a new malicious executable. In an attempt to solve this problem, the anti-virus
industry generates heuristic classifiers by hand [Gryaznov(1999)]. This process can
be even more costly than generating signatures, so finding an automatic method
to generate classifiers has been the subject of research in the anti-virus community.
To solve this problem, different IBM researchers applied Neural Networks to the
problem of detecting boot sector malicious binaries [G. Tesauro and Sorkin(1996)].
A Neural Network is a classifier that aims to explore in human cognition. Because
of the limitations of the implementation of their classifier, they were unable to
analyse anything other than small boot sector viruses, which comprise about 5%
of all malicious binaries. In similar work, William Arnold and Gerald Tesauro
[Arnold and Tesauro(2000)] applied the same techniques to Win32 binaries, but
because of limitations of the Neural Network classifier, they were unable to have
the comparable accuracy when applying to new Win32 binaries.
Chapter 3
Analysis of Vulnerabilities in
Network Protocols & Mechanisms
The major difference between a thing that might go wrong
and a thing that cannot possibly go wrong is that
when a thing that cannot possibly go wrong goes wrong,
it usually turns out to be impossible to get at or repair.
- Douglas Adams.
Protocols are created with specifications, known as RFCs, to dictate proper use and
communication. An anomaly is defined as something different, abnormal, or not easily
classified, or some action, or data that is not considered normal for a given system,
or network. Protocol anomaly refers to all exceptions related to protocol format and
protocol behaviour with respect to common practice on the Internet and standard spec-
ifications. This chapter discusses vulnerabilities in network protocols and mechanisms
abused by attacks.
3.1 Protocol Anomaly-Based Attacks
3.1.1 IP Spoofing & Incomplete Three-way Handshake
IP Spoofing is an attack where an intruder pretends to be sending data from its own
IP address [Bellovin(1989)]. An IP address either source address or destination address
contained in an IP header is the only information needed by an intermediate routing
device to make a decision on how to route the IP packet. Anyone who has access to
the IP layer can easily modify the source address in the IP header of a packet, spoofing
itself as from another host or even from a non-existing host.
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Let us also assume that the hosts A and B communicate with one another by following
the three-way handshake mechanism of TCP/IP. The handshake method is described
below.
A → B: SYN (seq. no. = M)
B → A: SYN (seq. no. = N), ACK (ack. no. = M + 1)
A → B: ACK (ack. no. = N + 1)
Host X does the following to perform IP spoofing. First, it sends a SYN packet to host B
with some random sequence number, posing as host A. Host B responds to it by sending
a SYN-ACK packet back to host A with an acknowledgment number, which is equal
to one, added to the original sequence number. At the same time, host B generates its
own sequence number and sends it along with the acknowledgment number. In order to
complete the three-way handshake, host X should send an ACK packet back to host B
with an acknowledgment number which is equal to one added to the sequence number
sent by host B to host A. If we assume that the host X is not present in the same subnet
as A or B so that it cannot sniff B’s packets, host X has to figure out B’s sequence
number in order to create the TCP connection. These steps are described below.
X → B: SYN (seq. no. = M), SRC = A
B → A: SYN (seq. no. = N), ACK (ack. no. = M + 1)
X → B: ACK (ack. no. = N + 1), SRC = A
At the same time, host X should take away host A’s ability to respond to the packets
of host B. To achieve this, X may either wait for host A to go down (for some reason),
or block the protocol part of the operating system so that it does not respond back to
host B, for example, by flooding B with incomplete connections, such as SYN flooding.
3.1.2 SYN flood attack
In the normal TCP connection establishment, the client system begins by sending a SYN
packet to the server. The server then acknowledges the TCP SYN packet by sending
SYN-ACK packet to the client. The client then finishes establishing the connection by
responding with an ACK message. The connection between the client and the server is
then open, and the service-specific data can be exchanged between the client and the
server.
The SYN flood attack [CERT(2000a)] exploits the TCP/IP three-way handshake mecha-
nism by having an attacking source host send SYN packets with random source addresses
to a victim host. The victim destination host sends a SYN-ACK back to the random
source address and adds an entry to the connection queue. Since the SYN-ACK is des-
tined for an incorrect or nonexistent host, the last part of the three-way handshake is
never completed, and the entry remains in the connection queue until a timer expires,
typically within about one minute. By generating phoney SYN packets from random IP
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addresses at a rapid rate, it is possible to fill up the connection queue and deny TCP
services to legitimate users.
3.1.3 Ping of Death
Attackers send a fragmented ping request that exceeds the maximum IP packet size
(64KB), causing vulnerable systems to crash. The idea behind the ping of death and
similar attacks is that the user sends a packet that is malformed in such a way that
the target system will not know how to handle the packet. The ping of death attack
[CERT(1996)] sent IP packets of a size greater than 65,535 bytes to the target computer.
IP packets of this size are abnormal, but applications can be built that are capable of
creating them. Carefully programmed operating systems could detect and safely handle
abnormal IP packets, but some failed to do this.
3.1.4 Land Attack
The land attack [CISCO(1997)] involves the perpetrator sending a stream of SYN pack-
ets that have the source IP address and TCP port number set to the same value as the
destination address and port number, i.e., that of the attacked host. Some implemen-
tations of TCP/IP cannot handle this theoretically impossible condition, causing the
operating system to go into a loop as it tries to resolve repeated connections to itself
[Fyodor(1997)].
3.1.5 Smurf attack
The smurf attack [CERT(1998)] is a modification of the ping attack and take advantage
of direct broadcast addressing mechanisms by spoofing the target system’s IP address
and broadcasting ICMP ping requests across multiple subnets. A range of IP addresses
from the intermediate system will send pings to the victim, bombarding the victim
machine or system with hundreds or thousands of pings. The two main components
to the smurf attack are the use of forged ICMP echo request packets and the direction
of packets to IP broadcast addresses. On IP networks, a packet can be directed to an
individual machine or broadcast to an entire network. In addition, if ICMP echo request
packets were directed to IP broadcast addresses from remote locations to generate denial-
of-service attacks. Many of the machines on the network will receive this ICMP echo
request packet and send an ICMP echo reply packet back. When all the machines on a
network respond to this ICMP echo request, the result can be severe network congestion
or outages.
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3.1.6 Teardrop attack
The teardrop attack [Hoggan(2000)] exploit IP mechanisms involved in the reassembly
of packets that have been disassembled for efficient transmission. Packet fragments are
deliberately fabricated with overlapping offset fields causing the host to hang or crash
when it tries to reassemble them. Under normal conditions, packet fragments will yield
a positive integer value as can be derived from the diagram below.
Figure 3.1: IP TearDrop Attack - Correct reassemble
However, the teardrop attack sends a fragment that deliberately forces the calculated
value for the end pointer to be less than the value for the offset pointer. This can be
achieved by ensuring that the second fragment specifies a fragment offset that resides
within the data portion of the first fragment and has a length such that the end of the
data carried by the second fragment is short enough to fit within the length specified by
the first fragment. Diagrammatically this can be shown as follows:
Figure 3.2: IP TearDrop Attack - Incorrect reassemble
When the IP module performing the reassembly attempts a memory copy of the fragment
data into the buffer assigned to the complete datagram, the calculated length of data
to be copied (that is the end pointer minus the offset pointer) yields a negative value.
The memory copy function expects an unsigned integer value and so the negative value
is viewed as a very large positive integer value. The result of such an action depends
upon the IP implementation, but typically causes a stack corruption, failure of the IP
module or a system hang.
3.1.7 UDP Flood Attacks
This denial of service attack takes advantage of user datagram protocol (UDP) mech-
anisms. Since no connection setup is required before data is transferred, it is difficult
to bring a host down by flooding the host with just UDP packets. The UDP flood
attack [Ferguson and Senie(2000)] uses forged UDP packets to connect the echo service
‘echoes’ on one machine to the character generation ‘chargen’ service on the other ma-
chine, causing the two machines to consume all available bandwidth on the connection
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between them. The echo service of the former machine echoes the data of that packet
back to the victim’s machine and in turn, the victim’s machine responds in the same
way. Hence, a constant stream of useless load is created that burdens the network.
3.2 Widespread Malicious Code
A worm is a program that self-propagates across a network exploiting security flaws in
widely used services. They are not a new phenomenon, first gaining widespread notice in
1988 [Eichin and Rochlis(1989)]. This project distinguishes between worms and viruses
in that the latter require some sort of user action to abet their propagation. As such,
viruses tend to propagate more slowly. They also have more mature defences due to
the presence of a large anti-virus industry that actively seeks to identify and control
their spread. On the other hand, a worm is a computer program which, when it runs,
finds other computers that are vulnerable and breaks into them across the network. It
then copies itself over, starts itself running on the new hosts, and does the same thing
from there. Thus, it can spread exponentially like an epidemic of human disease. The
worm has several important aspects [Nazario(2004)]; a spread algorithm for finding other
hosts, one or more exploits allowing it to break into other computers remotely, and a
payload, which is what it does to your computer after it is broken into it, rather than
just using it to spread.
A worm is not the same as a virus. However, they are both malicious code that propa-
gates around the network. There are differences as follows:
• If the mail code can break into another computer and start running there imme-
diately with no human intervention, then it is a worm.
• If the malicious code is carried around in some other content and then may or may
not start running on other computers depending on when and whether humans
decide to process that content, then it is a virus.
In short, the distinction is made based on whether or not the malicious code is self-
activating. By this definition, Code Red, Slammer/Sapphire, and Blaster are worms.
ILoveYou and SoBig are viruses. Nimda had both viral and worm spread algorithms.
From an operational perspective, the biggest difference is that worms can spread sig-
nificantly faster, which has strong implications for defences against them. Viruses are
more common, however. By and large, existing anti-viral defences are adequate against
viruses as long as people deploy and update them properly. However, anti-viral defences
are fairly useless against worms, at least during the initial spread of the worm.
This thesis presents an adaptive approach to preventing the damage caused by viruses
that travel via email. The approach protects intranet machines from outside infected
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machines by spreading email viruses. This directly addresses the two ways that viruses
cause damage: fewer machines spreading the virus will reduce the number of machines
infected and reduce the traffic generated by the virus. The approach relies on the payload
inspection and probabilistic decision about potentially malicious packets.
3.2.1 Activation Techniques
Since most people do not want to have a worm executing on their system, these worms
rely on a variety of social engineering techniques. Some worms such as the Melissa
virus [CERT(1999a)] indicate urgency on the part of someone you know - “Attached is
an important message for you”, others, such as the ILoveYou [CERT(2000b)] attack,
appeal to individuals’ vanity - “Open this message to see who loves you”. Although
Melissa was a word macro virus - a piece of code written in Microsoft Word’s built-in
scripting language embedded in a Word document - later human-initiated worms have
usually been executable files which, when run, infect the target machine. Furthermore,
while some worms required that a user starts running a program, other worms exploited
bugs in the software that brought data onto the local system, so that simply viewing
the data would start the program running e.g., Klez [Ferrie(2002)].
3.2.2 Propagation
The distribution of code can either be one-to-many, as when a single site provides a
worm to other sites, many-to-many, as when multiple copies propagate the malicious
code, or a hybrid approach. There are a number of techniques by which a worm can
discover new machines to exploit: scanning, external target lists, pre-generated target
lists, internal target lists, and passive monitoring. Worms can also use a combination of
these strategies.
Two simple forms of scanning are sequential (working through an address block from
beginning to end) and random (trying addresses out of a block in a pseudo-random
fashion). Due to their simplicity, they are very common propagation strategies, and
have been used both in fully autonomous worms [CERT(2001b), eEye(2001)] and worms
which require timer or user based activation [MessageLabs(2002)].
3.2.3 Propagation Features of Email Worms
Email worms can be spread via several ways. However, only email propagation in each
worm is the interest in this thesis. In addition, the project is looking at the way of prop-
agation and virus mail features rather than looking for the presence of a virus signature
or how a program is infected.
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3.2.3.1 W32/Dumaru@MM
The email message created by W32/Gibe [CERT(2002c)] tries to convince users that the
attached file is a patch supplied by Microsoft [Authentium(2004)]. In fact, the attached
file, patch.exe, is a malicious code. It also uses its own SMTP engine to spread.
3.2.3.2 W32/Myparty
The attached file name of the virus is “www.myparty.yahoo.com.” [CERT(2002b)], which
cause the default web browser to run unexpectedly. It has a built-in SMTP engine, which
it uses to send itself via email to all addresses listed in the infected user’s Windows
Address Book.
3.2.3.3 VBS/BubbleBoy
This virus, in the same way as Melissa [CERT(1999a)], exploits MS outlook [VirusBulletin(2004)].
However, unlike Melissa, BubbleBoy does not require the user to open a document to
run. Just reading an email message is enough to be infected. The virus arrives in what
appears to be a standard HTML-enhanced Outlook email message. It copies all the
email addresses into the blind carbon copy (BCc) field of a new email message, then
sends it.
3.2.3.4 W32/SirCam
The virus appears in an email message written in either English or Spanish with a
seemingly random subject line. The email message contains an attachment whose
name matches the subject line and has a double file extension (e.g. subject.ZIP.BAT
or subject.DOC.EXE). The second extension is .EXE, .COM, .BAT, .PIF, or .LNK
[CERT(2001a)]. The attached file contains both the malicious code and the contents of
a file copied from an infected system. In addition, this worm includes its own SMTP
capabilities, which it uses to propagate via email. It determines its recipient list by re-
cursively searching for email addresses contained in all *.wab (Windows Address Book)
files. As a result, propagation via mass emailing causes denial of service conditions.
3.2.3.5 Nimda Worm
This worm propagates through email message consisting of two sections; a blank mes-
sage, and an executable attachment. The first section is defined as MIME type “tex-
t/html”, but it contains no text, so the email appears to have no content. The second
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section is defined as MIME type “audio/x-wav”, but it contains a base64-encoded at-
tachment file “readme.exe”, which is a binary executable [CERT(2001b)].
3.2.3.6 W32/BadTrans
This malicious Windows program distributes as an email file attachment. The filename
in the email attachment of infected email varies from message to message but always
has two file extensions such as filename.ext.ext [CERT(2001c)].
Chapter 4
Protocol Anomaly Detection and
Verification
Data without generalization is just gossip.
Robert M. Pirsig.
Anomaly in packets is different from packet anomalies, because legitimate packets can
contain malicious content, which cause systems to be violated. Therefore, assessing
anomaly in packets is not only to deal with anomalous packets, but also to examine
legitimate packets, which contain malicious content. However, important to note is
that not all threats or attacks exhibit themselves as protocol anomalies. Some types of
application logic attacks, denial of service attacks, viruses, and reconnaissance methods
1 [Chmielarski(2001)] all appear as perfectly legitimate network traffic. On the other
hand, there are some odd-looking but legitimate traffic includes [Julia Allen(2000)], for
instance, storms of FIN and RST packets, fragmented packets with the “don’t fragment”
flag set, legitimate tiny fragments, and data that is different when retransmitted. For
this reason, a well-built detection system will rely on multiple detection mechanisms,
each covering some portion of the threat space. This is often referred to as ‘defence in
depth’. In this chapter, requirements of network protocols and a TCP verification model
are presented. Then a protocol verification program, Packet Verifier is introduced using
SDL model.
1Generally scanning methods, the most popular reconnaissance methods, besides general scanning,
was DNS version query, followed by queries to RPC services.
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4.1 Requirements of Network Protocols For Anomaly De-
tection
This section discusses requirements of network protocols through RFCs, several TCP/IP
books such as [Stevens(1994), Stevens and Wright(1995)], and research papers for IDS
traffic analysis like [M. Handley and Paxson(2001), Shankar and Paxson(2003)]. Inter-
net protocol specifications do not always accurately specify the complete behaviour of
protocols, in particular for rare or exceptional conditions. In addition, different operat-
ing systems and applications implement different subsets of the protocols.
4.1.1 IP Protocol
Figure 4.1: IP v4 header.
The requirements of the IP header part are based on the Internet protocol (IP) speci-
fication [Postel(1981b)], other relative RFCs in each related field and other IDS traffic
analysis work like [M. Handley and Paxson(2001)]. Note that the maximum IP packet
size is 64 Kbytes. The IPv4 header is depicted in Figure 4.1.
• Header length: If the header length field is less than 20 bytes (the header is
incomplete), or, if the header length field exceeds the packet length, the packet
should be discarded. Note that if the header length is greater than 20 bytes, this
indicates options are present.
• Type Of Service/Diffserv [Grossman(2002)]/ECN (Explicit Congestion
Notification) [Ramakrishnan and Floyd(1999)] : These bits have been re-
assigned to differentiated services [K. Nichols and Black(1998)] and explicit con-
gestion notification [Ramakrishnan and Floyd(1999)]. If a site does not actually
use Diffserv mechanisms for incoming traffic, the bits should be zero. If these bits
are not being used internally, the bits should be zero.
• Total length: Total length must contain the total length of the IP datagram.
This includes IP header, e.g., ICMP or TCP or UDP header and payload size in
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bytes. If the total length field does not match the actual total length of the packet
as indicated by the link layer, then packets whose length field exceeds their link
layer should be discarded.
• IP Identification number: This field uniquely identifies each datagram sent by
a host. It normally increments by one each time a datagram is sent. It is used
to distinguish the fragments of one datagram from those of another. The identi-
fication field, the fragment offset field and the total length field provide sufficient
information to reassemble datagrams. RFC 791 [Postel(1981b)] states that frag-
mentation is necessary when it originates in a local network that allows a large
packet size and must traverse a local network that limits packets to a smaller size
to reach its destination.
• Must be zero: The current IP specification (RFC 791 [Postel(1981b)]) states
that the bit between IP identifier and DF must be zero. Hence, the packet with a
non-zero set bit should be discarded.
• Don’t Fragment(DF) flag: An Internet datagram can be marked “Don’t Frag-
ment”. Any Internet datagram so marked is not to be fragmented under any
circumstances. If Internet datagram marked “Don’t Fragment” cannot be deliv-
ered to its destination without fragmenting it, the packets should be discarded. If
DF is set, and the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) anywhere in the internal
network is smaller than the MTU on outside network to the site, DF on incoming
packets should be zero. If the packet with the “Don’t Fragment (DF)” bit set in
the IP header, is too large for a router to forward on to a particular link, the router
must send an “ICMP Destination Unreachable - Fragmentation needed” message
to the source address [Lahey(2000)]. The MTU of a given network link specifies
the largest allowable size of an IP packet on that link. Packets arriving with DF
set and a non-zero fragmentation offset are illegal. Hence, such packets should be
discarded.
• More Fragments (MF) flag, Fragment Offset: These two fields are treated
together because they are interpreted together for IP fragmentation. Packets where
the length plus the fragmentation offset exceeds 65535 are illegal. Hence, the
packets should be discarded.
• Time to live (TTL): As with DF, an attacker can use TTL to manipulate the
packet. Therefore, it is necessary to restore a TTL if that is larger than the longest
path across the internal site. If packets arrive that have a TTL lower than the
configured minimum, then it is necessary to restore the TTL to the minimum.
Since TTL spoofing is considered nearly impossible, a mechanism based on an
expected TTL value can provide a simple and reasonably robust defence from
infrastructure attacks based on forged protocol packets [V. Gill and Meyer(2004)].
Note that TTL should be the same for all fragments of a given IP packet.
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• Source address: If the source address of an IP packet is invalid in some way, for
example, 127.0.0.1 (localhost), 0.0.0.0 and 255.255.255.255 (broadcast), multicast
(class D) and class E address, source address is the same as destination address
(abused by the land attacks [CISCO(1997)]) , the packet should be discarded.
• Destination address: Like source address, if invalid destination address occurs
with local broadcast address (abused by the smurf attacks [CERT(1998)]), local-
host, broadcast address, and class E address, which are currently unused, the
packet should be discarded.
• IP options: IP packets may contain IP options that modify the behaviour of
internal hosts, or cause packets to be interpreted differently. Therefore, remove IP
options from incoming packets.
• Padding: The receiver explicitly ignores the padding field at the end of a list of
IP options, so it is safe to zero the padding bytes.
The protocol field indicates the next-layer protocol, such as TCP or UDP. According to
local site policy, a firewall can block traffic based on it. Moreover, regarding IP header
checksums, routers normally discard packets with incorrect IP checksums.
4.1.1.1 IP Fragmentation
Fragmentation is necessary in order for traffic, which is being sent across different types
of network media to arrive successfully at its intended destination. The reason for this
is that different types of network media and protocols have different rules involving the
maximum size allowed for datagrams on its network segment or MTU [Anderson(2001a)].
Whenever the IP layer receives an IP datagram to send, it determines which local in-
terface the datagram is being sent on (routing), and queries that interface to obtain
its MTU. IP compares the MTU with the datagram size and performs fragmentation,
if necessary. Fragmentation can take place either at the original sending host or at an
intermediate router [Stevens(1994)]. In order for a fragmented packet to be successfully
reassembled at the receiver of the fragments, the receiver should use these checks in RFC
791 [Postel(1981b)]. All of this information will be contained in the IP header.
• IP identification number field. Must share a common IP identification number
to ensure that fragments of different datagrams are not mixed.
• IP fragment offset field. The fragment offset field tells the receiver the position
of a fragment in the original datagram.
• IP total length field. Each fragment tells the length of the data carried in the
fragment. The fragment offset and length determine the portion of the original
datagram covered by this fragment.
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• IP more fragmentation (MF) field. The fragment must tell whether more
fragments follow this one or not using DF field.
RFC 791 [Postel(1981b)] states that every Internet module must be able to forward a
datagram of 68 octets without further fragmentation. This is because an Internet header
may be up to 60 octets, and the minimum fragment is 8 octets. However, for the purpose
of security, it is not sufficient to merely guarantee that a fragment contains at least 8
octets of data beyond the IP header. Thus, RFC 1858 [G. Ziemba and Traina(1995)]
states also that if the router’s filtering module enforces a minimum fragment offset for
fragments that have non-zero offsets, it can prevent overlaps in filter parameter regions
of the transport headers. In the case of TCP, the TCP flags field is never contained
in a non-zero-offset fragment. If a TCP fragment has fragment offset set with non-zero
(e.g. FO=1), it should be discarded because it starts only eight octets into the transport
header.
4.1.2 ICMP Protocol
IP itself has no mechanism for establishing and maintaining a connection, or even con-
taining data as a direct payload. The Internet control messaging protocol (ICMP)
[Postel(1981a)] is merely an addition to IP to carry error, routing and control messages
and data. ICMP is used to handle errors and exchange control messages. ICMP can also
be used to determine if a machine on the Internet is responding. To do this, an ICMP
echo request packet is sent to a machine. If a machine receives that packet, that ma-
chine will return an ICMP echo reply packet. ICMP is used to convey status and error
information including notification of network congestion and of other network transport
problems. ICMP can also be a valuable tool in diagnosing host or network problems.
Note that total ICMP header length is 8 bytes and the maximum requested data echo
size is 548 bytes.
• ICMP type: The message type, for example 0 is echo reply, 8 is echo request, 3
is destination unreachable.
• ICMP code: This is significant when sending an error message (unreachable),
and specifies the kind of error.
• ICMP checksum: The checksum for the ICMP header, and it is the same value
as the IP checksum.
• ICMP id: It is used in echo request/reply messages, to identify the request.
• ICMP sequence: It identifies the sequence of echo messages, if more than one
is sent.
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4.1.3 UDP Protocol
The user datagram protocol (UDP) [Postel(1980)] is a transport protocol for sessions
that need to exchange data. Both transport protocols, UDP and TCP provide 65535
different source and destination ports. The destination port is used to connect to a
specific service on that port. The UDP header is depicted in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: UDP header.
• Source port number: It is the source port that a client binds to, and the
contacted server will reply back to in order to direct its responses to the client.
• Destination port number: It is the destination port, which a specific server
can be contacted on.
• Length: It is the length of UDP header and payload data in bytes. If it does not
match length as indicated by IP total length, then the packet should be discarded.
• Checksum: It is the checksum of header and data.
4.1.4 TCP Protocol
The transmission control protocol (TCP) [Postel(1981c)] is the most used transport
protocol that provides mechanisms to establish a reliable connection with some basic
authentication, using connection states and sequence numbers. The TCP header is
illustrated in Figure 4.3. The size of the TCP header is 20 bytes, without counting its
options. Each TCP segment contains the source and destination port number to identify
the sending and receiving of application programs, respectively. The sequence number
is essential to maintain the bytes of data from the sender to the receiver in proper
order. By communicating the sequence number and the corresponding acknowledgment
number, the sender and the receiver can determine lost or retransmitted data in the
connection. There are six flag bits in the TCP header, namely URG, ACK, PSH, SYN,
and FIN. At any given time, one or more of these flag bits can be set.
TCP provides flow control by advertising the window size. The checksum covers TCP
header and TCP data and assists in determining any error in transmission of TCP header
or data. TCP’s urgent mode is a method for the sender to transmit emergency/urgent
data. The urgent pointer is valid only if the URG flag is set in the header. It helps to
locate the sequence number of the last byte of urgent data. There is an optional options
field as well, taking care of vendor specific information.
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Figure 4.3: TCP header.
• Source and destination port number: The source port and the destination
port. Ports are used by the kernel to identify network processes. Together with an
IP address, a TCP port provides an endpoint for network communication. Note
that the source address and the port should not be the same as the destination
address and the port (abused by the land attack [CISCO(1997)]).
• Sequence number: The sequence number is used to enumerate the TCP seg-
ments. The data in a TCP connection can be contained in any amount of segments
(single TCP datagrams), which will be put in order and acknowledged. TCP ac-
knowledges all data bytes received from the other end. The initial sequence num-
ber should be chosen randomly or the sequence number incremented randomly.
Bellovin [Bellovin(1989)] describes a fix for TCP that involves partitioning the
sequence number space. Each connection would have its own separate sequence
number space.
• Acknowledgment number: Every packet that is sent and a valid part of a
connection is acknowledged with an empty TCP segment with the ACK flag set
and this acknowledge field containing the value of the next expected sequence
number from the other side and acknowledges all data from the other side up
through this acknowledgment number minus one.
• Header length: The header length gives the length of the header in 32-bit words.
This is required because the length of the options field is variable. With a 4-bit
field, TCP is limited to a 60-byte header. Without options, the normal value of
this field is 5 (20 bytes) (e.g., 5 in decimal and 0101 in binary), thus if it is less
than 5 or if it is beyond end of packet, then the packet should be discarded.
• Reserved: The current TCP specification [Postel(1981c)] states that this field
must be zero.
• Flags: This field consists of six binary flags.
(1) URG: Urgent. It implies the urgent pointer is valid. Segment will be routed
faster, used for termination of a connection or to stop processes (using the telnet
protocol). This is TCP’s way of implementing out of band data. It can be used
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only when a packet carries data. If an URG packet without an ACK flag, the
packet should be discarded.
(2) ACK: Acknowledgement. It is used to acknowledge data and in the second and
third stage of a TCP connection initiation.
(3) PSH: Push. The systems IP stack will not queue this data, but rather pass it
to the application as soon as possible. This flag should always be set in interactive
connections such as telnet and rlogin. It can be used only when a packet carries
data. If a PSH packet without an ACK flag, the packet should be discarded.
(4) RST: Reset. It tells the peer that the connection has been terminated. All
memory structures are torn down. If a RST packet comes in, data should be
removed.
(5) SYN: Synchronization. It means the synchronize sequence number field is valid.
A segment with the SYN flag set indicates that a client wants to initiate a new
connection to the destination port. This flag is only valid during the three-way
handshake. Note that combination of SYN and URG, or SYN and PSH is invalid.
If a SYN packet with a RST flag, the packet should be discarded.
(6) FIN: Final. The connection should be closed, the peer is supposed to answer
with one last segment with the FIN flag set as well. If a FIN packet without an
ACK or SYN flag, the packet should be discarded without responding.
• Window size: The amount of bytes that can be sent before the data must be
acknowledged with an ACK before sending more segments.
• TCP checksum: It is the checksum of pseudo header, TCP header and payload.
The pseudo is a structure containing IP source and destination address, 1 byte
set to zero, the protocol (1 byte with a decimal value of 6), and 2 bytes (unsigned
short) containing the total length of the TCP segment. If it is incorrect, the packet
should be discarded.
• Urgent pointer: Only used if the urgent flag is set, otherwise this flag should be
zero. It points to the end of the payload data that should be sent with priority.
• Options:
(1) MSS (Maximum Segment Size) option [Lahey(2000)]: The TCP MSS (Maxi-
mum Segment Size) 2 option is only allowed in SYN packets. A TCP packet with
an MSS option and without a SYN flag is illegal. The MSS advertised at the start
of a connection should be based on the MTU of the interfaces on the system.
(2) WS (Window Scale) option [V. Jacobson and Borman(1992)]: The three-byte
window scale option may be sent in a SYN segment by TCP. It has two purposes:
(1) indicate that the TCP is prepared to do both send and receive window scaling,
and (2) communicate a scale factor to be applied to its receive window. Thus, a
2 The maximum amount of TCP data that a node can send in one segment. This should be the size
of the receiver’s reassembly buffer to try to avoid fragmentation. The equivalent at the physical layer is
“Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU)”.
Chapter 4 Protocol Anomaly Detection and Verification 31
TCP that is prepared to scale windows should send the option, even if its own
scale factor is 1. The scale factor is limited to a power of two and encoded loga-
rithmically, so it may be implemented by binary shift operations. This option is
an offer, not a promise; both sides must send window scale options in their SYN
segments to enable window scaling in either direction. This option may be sent in
an initial SYN segment (i.e., a segment with the SYN bit on and the ACK bit off).
It may also be sent in a SYN-ACK segment, but only if a Window scale option
was received in the initial SYN segment. A window scale option in a segment
without a SYN bit should be ignored. The window field in a SYN (i.e., a SYN or
SYN-ACK) segment itself is never scaled. If any packet does not have a SYN flag
set on, the option should be removed.
(3) SACK (Selective Acknowledgement) option [M. Mathis and Romanow(1996)]:
With selective acknowledgments, the data receiver can inform the sender about
all segments that have arrived successfully, so the sender need retransmit only the
segments that have actually been lost. The selective acknowledgment extension
uses two TCP options. The first is an enabling option, “SACK-permitted”, which
may be sent in a SYN segment to indicate that the SACK option can be used
once the connection is established. The other is the SACK option itself, which
may be sent over an established connection once permission has been given by
SACK-permitted. The Sack-Permitted option must not be sent on non-SYN seg-
ments. If the data receiver has not received a SACK-Permitted option for a given
connection, it must not send SACK options on that connection.
(4) T/TCP option [Braden(1995)]: T/TCP is a small set of extensions to make a
faster, more efficient TCP. It is designed to be a completely backward compatible
set of extensions to speed up TCP connections. T/TCP achieves its speed increase
from two major enhancements over TCP: TAO and TIME WAIT state truncation.
TAO is TCP Accelerated Open, which introduces new extended options to bypass
the three-way handshake entirely. Using TAO, a given T/TCP connection can
approximate a UDP connection in terms of speed, while still maintaining the reli-
ability of a TCP connection. In most single data packet exchanges (such is the case
with transaction-oriented connections like HTTP), the packet count is reduced by
a third. The second speed up is TIME WAIT state truncation. TIME WAIT
state truncation allows a T/TCP client to shorten the TIME WAIT state. This
can allow a client to make more efficient that use of network socket primitives and
system memory. This is an experimental TCP extension for efficient transaction-
oriented (request/response) service. It is safe to remove this option.
(5) TS (TimeStamps) option [Stevens(1994)]: TCP is a symmetric protocol, allow-
ing data to be sent at any time in either direction, and therefore timestamp echoing
may occur in either direction. For simplicity and symmetry, we specify that times-
tamps always be sent and echoed in both directions. For efficiency, we combine the
timestamp and timestamp reply fields into a single TCP Timestamps Option. The
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Timestamps option carries two four-byte timestamp fields. The Timestamp Value
field (TSval) contains the current value of the timestamp clock of the TCP sending
the option. The Timestamp Echo Reply field (TSecr) is only valid if the ACK bit
is set in the TCP header; if it is valid, it echoes a timestamp value that was sent
by the remote TCP in the TSval field of a Timestamps option. When TSecr is
not valid, its value must be zero. The TSecr value will generally be from the most
recent Timestamp option that was received. A TCP may send the Timestamps
option (TSopt) in an initial SYN segment (i.e., segment containing a SYN bit and
no ACK bit), and may send a TSopt in other segments only if it received a TSopt
in the initial SYN segment for the connection. If it is not negotiated in SYN, it is
safe to remove it.
(6) MD5 Signature Option [Heffernan(1998)]: The security of this option relies
heavily on the quality of the keying material used to compute the MD5 signature
[Leech(2003)]. If MD5 is used in SYN, then non-SYN packets without it should
be discarded.
(7) Other options: It is safe to remove other options.
4.2 TCP Runtime Verification Model
4.2.1 Current TCP Model
The transmission control protocol (TCP) [Postel(1981c)] is the most common transport
layer protocol used in modern networking environments. TCP provides reliable data
transfer between different application processes over the network. TCP provides flow
control and congestion control [M. Handley and Floyd(2000)] as well. Initiation, estab-
lishment, and termination of a connection are governed by the TCP state-transition
diagram, which consists of well-defined states and transition arcs between these states
(see Figure 4.4.). Nevertheless, during the past two decades, many security problems
of the TCP/IP protocol suite have been discovered [Bellovin(1989)]. Meanwhile, the
network hackers created a large number of intrusion methods to exploit those vulnera-
bilities.
The TCP state-transition diagram (see Figure 4.4.) is very closely associated with
timers. There are various timers associated with connection establishment or termina-
tion, flow control, and retransmission of data. A connection-establishment timer is set
when the SYN packet is sent during the connection-establishment phase. If a response
is not received within 75 seconds (in most TCP implementations), the connection estab-
lishment is aborted. A FIN WAIT 2 timer is set to 10 minutes when a connection moves
from the FIN WAIT 1 state to the FIN WAIT 2 state [Stevens and Wright(1995)]. If
the connection does not receive a TCP packet with the FIN bit set within the stipu-
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Figure 4.4: TCP connection state diagram from TCP/IP Illustrated Vol. 1 - The
Protocols, 18.6
lated time, the timer expires. If no FIN packet arrives within this time, the connection
is dropped. There is a TIME WAIT timer, often called a 2 MSL (Maximum Segment
Lifetime) 3 timer. It is set when a connection enters the TIME WAIT state. When the
timer expires, the kernel data-blocks related to that particular connection are deleted,
and the connection is terminated. A keepalive timer can be set which periodically checks
whether the other end of the connection is still active. If the SO KEEPALIVE socket
option is set, and if the TCP state is either ESTABLISHED or CLOSE WAIT, and the
connection is idle, the probes are sent to the other end of the connection once every
two hours. If the other end does not respond to a fixed number of these probes, the
connection is terminated.
4.2.1.1 Problems with Extraneous State Transitions
Let us consider a sequence of packets between hosts X and A. Intruder-controlled host
X needs to perform the following steps to wedge A’s operating steps so that it cannot
respond to unexpected SYN-ACKs from other hosts for as long as two hours.
1. Host X sends a packet to host A with SYN and FIN flags set. Host A responds
with an ACK packet. Host A changes its state from LISTEN to SYN RCVD, and
then to CLOSE WAIT.
3Common implementation values for 2 MSL are 1 minute or 2 minutes.
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Figure 4.5: Extraneous state in the TCP state-transition diagram [Extention of Figure
4.4]
2. Host X does not send any more packet to host A, thus preventing any TCP state-
transitions in host A.
Examining the state-transition diagram in Figure 4.5, we observe that host A is initially
in state LISTEN. When it receives the packet from host X, it starts processing the
packet. It processes the SYN flag first, then transitions to the SYN RCVD state. Then
it processes the FIN flag and performs a transition to the state CLOSE WAIT. Had the
previous state been ESTABLISHED, this transition to the CLOSE WAIT state would
have been a normal transition. However, a transition from SYN RCVD state to the
CLOSE WAIT state is not defined in the TCP specification. This phenomenon occurs
in several TCP implementations, such as those in the operating systems SUNOS 4.1.3,
SVR4, and ULTRIX 4.3 [Gupta and Mukherjee(1996)]. Thus, contrary to specification,
there exists in several TCP implementations a transition arc from the state SYN RCVD
to the state CLOSE WAIT, as shown in Figure 4.5.
In this attack scenario, the TCP connection is not yet fully established since the three-
way handshake is not completed; thus, the corresponding network application never got
the connection from the kernel. However, host A’s TCP machine is in CLOSE WAIT
state and is expecting the application to send a close signal so that it can send a FIN
packet to host X and terminate the connection. This half-open connection remains in the
socket-listen queue and the application does not send any message to help TCP perform
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any state-transition. Thus, host A’s TCP machine stuck in the CLOSE WAIT state. If
the keep-alive timer feature is enabled, TCP will be able to reset the connection and
perform a transition to the CLOSED state after a period of usually two hours. Thus, we
observe that extraneous state-transitions exist in several implementations of TCP and
these may lead to severe security violations of the system.
4.2.1.2 Problems with Simultaneous Open
Let us consider the sequence of steps followed by an intruder-controlled host X and host
A. This attack scenario was mentioned in [Gupta and Mukherjee(1996)]. Through these
steps, host X is successfully able to stall a port of host A.
1. Host X sends a SYN packet to host A. A TCP connection is established between
hosts X and A. Host A sends a SYN packet to host X in order to start a TCP
connection and performs a state-transition to the state SYN SENT.
2. When host X receives the SYN packet from host A, it sends a SYN packet back
in response.
3. When host A receives this packet, it assumes that a simultaneous open connection
is in progress; it sends out a SYN-ACK packet to host X and at the same time
switches off the connection-establishment timer and makes a state-transition to
state SYN RCVD.
4. Host X receives the SYN-ACK packet from host A but does not send back any
packet.
5. Host A is expecting a SYN-ACK from the host X. Since host X does not send back
any packet, host A is stalled in the state SYN RCVD.
4.2.2 Generating TCP Verification Model
4.2.2.1 Removing Unnecessary States In Implementation
In practical internetworking with TCP, for example, if an application prematurely closes
in SYN RCVD state, the specification requires the implementation to close the connec-
tion using the FIN, however, the transition from SYN RECV to FIN WAIT 1 cannot
possibly happen (see Figure 4.6). These transactions are part of ideal connection ter-
minations, but are not applicable to real TCP implementations. The working Linux
source (version 2.4.19) does not support this; the Linux implementation dropped the
connection and there was a comment that acknowledges the incorrect handling of this
case. Furthermore, some implementation fails to response a RST packet in SYN RCVD
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Figure 4.6: Impossible state transition in the existing TCP Protocol State Machine
state, which cause prematurely exit before processing the RST flag. Besides, there are
more unsupported states. The following description of TCP State Transition Diagram
is excerpted from TCP/IP Illustrated Vol. 1 - The Protocols, 18.6 [[Stevens(1994)]]:“
The state transition from LISTEN to SYN SENT is legal but is not supported in some
implementations, e.g., Berkeley-derived implementations.” In FIN WAIT 2 state, “we
have sent our FIN and the other end has acknowledged it. Unless we have done a half-
close 4, we are waiting for the application on the other end to recognize that it has
received an end-of-file notification and close its end of the connection, which sends us
a FIN. Only when the process at the other end does this close will our end move from
the FIN WAIT 2 to the TIME WAIT state. This means our end of the connection can
remain in this state forever. The other end is still in the CLOSE WAIT state, and can
remain there forever, until the application decides to issue its close. Many Berkeley-
derived implementations prevent this infinite wait in the FIN WAIT 2 state as follows.
If the application that does the active close does a complete close, not a half-close indi-
cating that it expects to receive data, then a timer is set. If the connection is idle for 10
minutes plus 75 seconds, TCP moves the connection into the CLOSED state. A com-
ment in the code acknowledges that this implementation feature violates the protocol
4TCP provides the ability for one end of a connection to terminate its output, while still receiving
data from the other end. This is called a half-close. The socket API supports the half-close, if the
application calls shutdown with a second argument of 1, instead of calling close. Most applications,
however, terminate both directions of the connection by calling close.
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specification.”
4.2.2.2 Reorganizing Sequences Of States
Figure 4.7: Client/Server Interaction
Client/server interaction is illustrated in Figure 4.7. To generate a TCP verification
model, client/server packet interaction is observed neither from the server nor from the
client side but from the viewpoint of an independent observer. For example, in firewalls’
view, close observation of packet communication from external clients to inside servers
or clients is worthwhile. Since a firewall is neither a server nor a client, it needs to look at
the packet-transition sequence of both sides. The firewall also can take communication
flags accordance with states into account.
Figure 4.8 illustrates a TCP verification model after eliminating unnecessary states in
implementation. This TCP verification model captures only the essential details of
the TCP protocol and accepts a superset of what is permitted by the standards. It
is still sufficient to deal with incomplete protocol runs meeting the standards (such as
abuse of incomplete three-way handshake). In order to achieve the goal of identifying
all necessary TCP transition for a set of reachable states, first it is necessary to search
through all the reachable states from the initial state to find their necessary transitions.
It then reduces the number of the searched states.
A TCP connection is always initiated with the three-way handshake, which establishes
and negotiates the actual connection over which data will be sent. The whole session
begins with a SYN packet, then a SYN-ACK packet and finally an ACK packet to
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Figure 4.8: TCP Verification Model (First)
acknowledge the whole session establishment. In Figure 4.8, a new session starts in
the LISTEN state. Data transfer takes place in the connection ESTABLISHED state.
If the TCP connection is initiated, then the state machine goes through SYN RCVD
and ACK WAIT states to reach the ESTABLISHED state. In order to tear down the
connection, either side can send a TCP segment with the FIN bit set. If an internal
host sends the FIN packet, the state machine waits for an ACK of FIN to come in from
an external host. This scenario is represented by the states FIN WAIT 1, FIN WAIT 2,
CLOSING and CLOSE WAIT 1 states. It is also possible that an external host send a
FIN packet after the ESTABLISHED state. In this case, we may receive a FIN, or a
FIN-ACK from the external host. This scenario is represented by the CLOSE WAIT 2
and LAST ACK states.
4.2.2.3 Removing Server-side-dependent Termination
In view of an independent observer like firewalls, the model can become even simpler
and thus much easier to apply to a real system. We do not need to look at which
state occurs on the server side where the monitoring firewall is located, since server
side initiates termination the independent observer does not need to verify next states
after termination process. Besides, to make the verification steps more abstract, we can
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ignore three parts, which are marked by a circle as shown in Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.9: Three Groups in TCP Verification Model (Second)
Some terms are used; an internal host as server side, an external host as client side to
make sure that the independent observer like firewalls is located in server side to monitor
all packets.
1. ESTABLISHED to FIN WAIT 1 state. This state transition requires request of
an internal host’s requests in order to tear down the connection. In particular,
since the request comes from the internal host, the independent observer does not
need to trace it down.
2. CLOSING to TIME WAIT state. Since state CLOSING is reached after a FIN has
occurred, Janus in this state can ignore other packets from the client and simply
drop them in any case.
3. CLOSE WAIT 2 to LAST ACK state. This represents the normal closing state of
an external client’s request after a connection has been established. The indepen-
dent observer does not need to trace down the server-side state change.
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Figure 4.10: Simplified TCP Verification Model (Final)
Table 4.1: TCP states table
Current State New State Action
LISTEN SYN RCVD recv: SYN
SYN RCVD LISTEN recv: RST
SYN RCVD ACK WAIT send: SYN, ACK
ACK WAIT ESTABLISHED recv: ACK
ACK WAIT CLOSE WAIT 2 recv: ACK of SYN, FIN
ACK WAIT CLOSED timeout (60 sec) or recv: SYN
ACK WAIT CLOSING recv: FIN, send: ACK
ESTABLISHED CLOSE WAIT 2 recv: FIN, send: ACK
ESTABLISHED CLOSED recv: RST or SYN, or timeout (30 min)
CLOSING CLOSED timeout (10 sec)
CLOSING CLOSE WAIT 2 recv: ACK
CLOSE WAIT 2 CLOSED recv: ACK, or timeout (10 sec)
4.2.2.4 Simplified TCP Verification Model
After leaving out the three cases above, it is not necessary for ACK WAIT state to
send RST to client side, but need to check whether server side receives SYN or not.
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The simplified TCP verification model is depicted in Figure 4.10 and the associated
TCP state table with action is presented in Table 4.1 to monitor and control TCP state
transitions. They may change according to the security policy, however, the default
values should be fairly well established in practice. To reduce clutter, the following
classes of abnormal transitions are not shown: conditions where an abnormal packet
is discarded without a state transition, e.g., packets received without correct sequence
numbers after connection establishment and packets with incorrect flag settings.
4.2.2.5 Example Cases of TCP State Transition
Figure 4.11: TCP Connection Establishment and Termination
1. Connection Establishment. A client sends a SYN segment specifying the port
number of the server that the client wants to connect to, and the client’s initial
sequence number (ISN). TCP state changes from LISTEN to SYN RCVD. The
server responds with its own SYN segment containing the server’s initial sequence
number. The server also acknowledges the client’s SYN by ACKing the client’s
ISN plus one. A SYN consumes one sequence number. TCP state changes from
SYN RCVD to ACK WAIT. (see Figure 4.11). The client must acknowledge this
SYN from the server by ACKing the server’s ISN plus one. TCP state changes
from ACK WAIT to ESTABLISHED.
2. Connection Termination. When the server receives FIN, it sends back an
ACK of the received sequence number plus one. TCP state changes from ES-
TABLISHED to CLOSE WAIT 2 (see Figure 4.11). A FIN consumes a sequence
number, just like a SYN. At this point, the server’s TCP also delivers an end-of-
file to the application (the discard server). The server then closes its connection,
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causing its TCP to send a FIN. Then the client TCP must ACK by incrementing
the received sequence number by one. TCP state changes from CLOSE WAIT 2
to CLOSED.
4.3 SDL Modeling For Prototyping Packet Verifier
The purposes of Packet Verifier are validating compliance to standards, and detecting
protocol anomalies. Packet Verifier checks the protocol header of packets, verifies packet
size, checks TCP/UDP header length, verifies TCP flags and all packet parameters, does
TCP protocol type verification, and analyses TCP Protocol header and TCP protocol
flags. The goal of using the specification and description language (SDL) [CCITT(1992)]
is not to define a formal description of the TCP verification model, but rather to provide
some assurance that the TCP verification model under development are complete and
perform the functions that were intended. This SDL allowed us to locate errors in
requirements of Packet Verifier.
The specification was made by hand (Figure 4.10) first, and then using SDL is to ac-
complish requirement of the TCP verification model. SDL is an International Telecom-
munication Union (ITU) standard, based on the concept of a system of Communicating
Extended Finite State Machine (CEFSM) Model [Hopcroft and Ullman(1979)]. To un-
derstand how SDL can work based on the CEFSM, it is necessary to address the dynamic
semantics of the finite state machine, SDL’s underlying model, and generating the TCP
verification model using SDL. This rapid development of a model for testing and validat-
ing of the contained behaviour of the development verification model was useful. This
process uncovered various ambiguities, unspecified transitions, and a deadlock within
the draft verification model. Thus helping to ensure that at least those errors found
were fixed and applied to development.
4.3.1 Dynamic Semantics Of Finite State Machines
SDL is based on the concept of CEFSMs, which communicate with each other and
their common environment by signals in an asynchronous manner via possibly delaying
communication paths. These signals are buffered on arrival at a process.
A finite state machine (FSM) is defined as a 4-tuple < S, s0, E, f >, where S is a
set of states, s0 is an initial state, E is a set of events with their parameter lists, f
is a state transition relation. However, the construction of an FSM is limited by the
state-explosion problem. An extended finite-state machine (EFSM) solves this problem
by introducing variables in addition to explicit states of the process instance. These
variables become implicit states, being able to take on a number of values themselves.
Each EFSM is defined as a FSM with addition of variables to its states. EFSMs are
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those defined with additional variables to states as a 5-tuple < S, s0, E, f, V >. Where
S, s0, E, and f as in the case of the FSM and V is a set of local variables along with
their types and initial values, if any. Each state in an EFSM is defined by a set of
variables, including state names. The transition T of an EFSM becomes [< s, v1, . . . ,
vn > + input
∗, task∗; output∗ + < s′, v′1, . . . v
′
n >], where s and s
′ are the names of
states, < v1, v2, . . . , vn > and < v
′
1, v
′
2, . . . v
′
n > are values of extended variables, n is
the number of variables, “+” means coexistence, “;” means sequence of events such as
tasks and outputs, and “[,]” denotes a sequenced pair. The difference between an EFSM
and an FSM is that an EFSM associates each transition not only with input and output
actions but also with assignment actions and conditions [Wang and Liu(1993)].
A communicating extended finite-state machines (CEFSM) includes the definitions of
EFSMs and signals [Jan Ellsberger and Sarma(1997)]. There are signals, which means
that channels exist. A CEFSM is defined as a 6-tuple < S, s0, E, f, V, X >. Where
S, s0, E, f , and V as in the case of the EFSM, and X is a set of signals. In CEFSM,
signals are responsible for communicating information from within the CEFSM to other
automata, some of which may be located in the environment of a system. The signals
account for the observable behaviour, which is more important than the actual model
for a specification. In SDL, CEFSM processes use signals to communicate with other
CEFSMs and the environment.
4.3.2 SDL’s Underlying Model
The language SDL is intended for the formal specification of complex, event-driven,
real-time, and interactive applications involving many concurrent activities that com-
municate using discrete signals. It is especially well suited for specification of commu-
nication protocols, reactive systems such as switches, routers and distributed systems.
SDL has been designed for the specification and description of the behaviour of such
systems, i.e., the internetworking of the system and its environments. SDL allows the
hierarchical description of systems. The description starts from a construction called
system, where functional blocks are inserted. A block is a component composed by one
or more processes and/or other blocks. A block consists of processes connected by signal
routes. A process contains a sequential behaviour and concurrency modelled by a set of
processes. Each process is a CEFSM. These machines or processes run in parallel. They
are independent of each other and communicate with discrete messages, called signals.
A process can also send signal to and receive signals from the environment of the system.
The behaviour of a state machine is characterized by a set of transitions. A transition to
another state or the same state occurs whenever an input is consumed. When a process
is in a state, it accepts input. This input can be a signal received by the input port
or timers. When a process enters a new state, it means that a transition terminates.
CEFSM enables decisions to be made in transitions based on the value associated with
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a variable so that the state which follows when a specific input is consumed is not only
determined by the existing state and input.
The SDL language supports two equivalent notations: the graphical notation (SDL-GR)
and the textual notation (SDL-PR). The SDL-GR is a standardized graphical represen-
tation of the system. SDL elements such as system, block, process, signal etc. are drawn
using standardized graphical symbols. The SDL-PR is a textual phrase representation
of the SDL system, or in other words, it is a SDL source code.
4.3.2.1 Process Model
The Z.100 ITU-T standard defines that the SDL underlying model is a CEFSM (Com-
municating Extended Finite State Machine), where all processes are CEFSMs. For each
process, a finite number of states, inputs and outputs determine its behaviour. Non-
determinism capability allows representing spontaneous transitions, which are transi-
tions without any signal causing them. This is useful to describe unpredictable system
characteristics. In SDL, only one input signal can be consumed/evaluated at each in-
stant. This means that each input signal consumed corresponds to one state transition
in an SDL description.
4.3.2.2 Communication Model
The concurrency model used in SDL allows independent and asynchronous processes
operation. There is no guaranteed relative ordering of operations in distinct processes,
except the ordering created by explicit synchronization among processes through the use
of shared signals. Shared signal events are then the means by which a precise ordering
of events in distinct process can be achieved.
The communication between processes is reliable. It is assured that the receiving process
will consume every signal produced by a sender process. However, it is not guaranteed
that the ordering of the signals generated by all processes is the same of their con-
sumption. This model is adequate to describe events without precise ordering, like
systems that can have their normal flow interrupted. Handshaking or unlimited queues
in practice-bounded queues are used to implement the communication model. For both
cases, each SDL state results in a set of protocol communication signals and area over-
head to implement the protocol. This characteristic may cause large communication
overhead, which can penalize the implementation.
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4.3.3 Generating the Specification
The TCP verification model is specified with CEFSM and is presented in SDL in this
section. A CEFSM is defined as a 6-tuple < S, s0, E, f, V, X >, as it is mentioned above.
• S is a set of states
• s0 is an initial state
• E is a set of events with their parameter lists
• f is a state transition relation
• V is a set of local variables along with their types and initial values, if any
• X is a set of signals
For a state, an input event, and a predicate composed of a subset of V , the state
transition relation f has a next state, a set of output events and their parameters, and
an action list describing how the local variables are updated.
The purpose of SDL in this project is to verify whether the simplified TCP verification
model follows the standard TCP transitions. To do this, the simplified TCP verifica-
tion model (Figure 4.10) was converted into a SDL specification. The CEFSM of the
simplified TCP verification model is as follows:
• S = {listen, syn rcvd, ack wait, established, closing, close wait 1, close wait 2,
closed}
• s0 = listen
• E = {send(Vi, Xi), recv(Vi, Xi), timeout(Vi)}
• f : {f(Si, Ei, Vi) → (Si+1, Vi+1, Ei+1) }
• V = {tcp id, tcp seq, tcp id seq}
• X = { ACK, SYN, FIN, RST, SYNACK, ACKFIN}
In this SDL specification, among TCP flags, PSH and URG are not included. Timeout,
and checking flags and packet sequences should be dealt with in a low-level implemen-
tation part as well.
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4.3.4 SDL Creation based on the TCP Verification Model
To detect packet fragmentation, the SDL specification can recall the packet sequence
and proper flag, and the low-level implementation part cooperates with this SDL specifi-
cation, other flag combinations, and timeout. To build the SDL specification, Cinderella
SDL [Cinderella(2003)] was used. Figure 4.12 shows the part of the StateTransition
process built in SDL. Besides, all SDL-GR and -PR of the proposed TCP verification
model can be found in Appendix A.
f is the state transition relation. It represents how to move from the current state to a
new state given a certain action if any.
Note that ‘, ,’ in a set of variables V means no variable changed, ‘{ }’ in a set of events
E means no specific event is required.
Figure 4.12: System of the TCP Protocol State Machine
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• LISTEN State.
f(listen, recv(tcp id, SYN), tcp id seq = 0) → (syn rcvd, tcp id seq = tcp seq,
send(tcp id, SYNACK))
Figure 4.13: LISTEN State of the TCP Protocol State Machine
• SYN RCVD State.
f(syn rcvd, recv(tcp id, RST), tcp id seq != 0) → (listen, tcp id seq = 0, {}),
f(syn rcvd, send(tcp id, SYNACK), tcp id seq != 0) → (ack wait, , {})
Figure 4.14: SYN RCVD State of the TCP Protocol State Machine
48 Chapter 4 Protocol Anomaly Detection and Verification
• ACK WAIT State.
f(ack wait, recv(tcp id, ACK), tcp id seq != 0)→ (established, tcp id seq = tcp seq,
{}),
f(ack wait, recv(tcp id, ACKFIN), tcp id seq != 0) → (close wait 2, tcp id seq =
tcp seq, {}),
f(ack wait, timeout(tcp id), tcp id seq != 0) → (closed, tcp id seq = 0, {F}),
f(ack wait, recv(tcp id, FIN), tcp id seq != 0) → (closing, , send(tcp id, ACK))
Figure 4.15: ACK WAIT State of the TCP Protocol State Machine
• CLOSING State.
f(closing, recv(tcp id, ACK), tcp id seq != 0)→ (close wait 1, tcp id seq = tcp id seq,
{}),
f(closing, timeout(tcp id), tcp id seq != 0) → (closed, tcp id seq = 0, {F})
Figure 4.16: CLOSING State of the TCP Protocol State Machine
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• CLOSE WAIT 2 State.
f(close wait 2, recv(tcp id, ACK), tcp id seq != 0) → (closed, tcp id seq = 0, {F}),
f(close wait 2, timeout(tcp id), tcp id seq != 0) → (closed, tcp id seq = 0, {F})
Figure 4.17: CLOSE WAIT 2 State of the TCP Protocol State Machine
• ESTABLISHED State.
f(established, recv(tcp id, RST), tcp id seq != 0) → (closed, tcp id seq = 0, {F}),
f(established, recv(tcp id, SYN), tcp id seq != 0) → (closed, tcp id seq = 0, {F}),
f(established, recv(tcp id, FIN), tcp id seq != 0) → (close wait 2, , send(tcp id,
ACK)),
f(established, timeout(tcp id), tcp id seq != 0) → (closed, tcp id seq = 0, {F})
Figure 4.18: ESTABLISHED State and CLOSE WAIT 1 state of the TCP Protocol
State Machine
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• CLOSE WAIT 1 State.
f(close wait 1, send(tcp id, ACK), tcp id seq != 0) → (closed, tcp id seq = 0, {F})
4.4 Countermeasures Against Protocol Anomaly-Based At-
tacks
4.4.1 Incomplete Three-way Handshake
Here countermeasures are presented using the packet verification model and Packet
Verifier against incomplete three-way handshake design in the TCP mechanism.
1. Extraneous state problem. Consider a sequence of packets between hosts X
and A. Host X sends a packet to host A, with both SYN and FIN flags set. Host
A responds by sending a SYN-ACK packet back to host X. In that scenario, the
TCP verification model work as follows: host A changes its state from LISTEN
to SYN RCVD because of receiving the SYN packet, and from SYN RCVD to
ACK WAIT because of sending the SYN-ACK packet, and then because of the
FIN packet, its state moves to CLOSING. Since host A receives a FIN packet,
host A sends a ACK packet to host X, and then its state CLOSING wait for
receiving a ACK packet from host X. Hence, if host X does not send any more
packets to host A, host A waits for 10 seconds and then enters CLOSED.
2. Simultaneous open problem. Host X sends a SYN packet to host A and host
A sends a SYN packet to host X in order to start a TCP connection. When host
X receives the SYN packet from host A, it sends an ACK packet back in response.
When host A receives this packet, its state of host A changed from LISTEN to
SYN RCVD and to ACK WAIT after receiving the ACK packet from host X and
replying with SYN-ACK. Hence, if host X does not send back any SYN-ACK, its
state moves to CLOSED after waiting 60 seconds.
4.4.2 IP Spoofing
IP spoofing attacks are combined by incomplete three-way handshake, predictable IP
identification values and then bogus IP. IP spoofing case, not by one method can solve
this problem, but several combined defence measures are needed to work out.
• Packet verification model and Packet Verifier. IP spoofing case has to
be solved by cooperation between the TCP verification model and IP packet’s
header analysis together. To achieve this kind of problem, we need not only
to check the TCP protocol three-way handshake mechanism but also to check
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packets’ specific requirement in each packet whether the packet’s IP address and
sequence numbers are valid or forged, such as checking tcp id as combination of
source address, source port, destination address and destination port, and checking
tcp id sequence number, tcp id acknowledge number and TTL.
• Be un-trust relationship. One easy way to prevent this attack is not to reply
on address-based authentication. Disable all the r command such as rlogin, rsh,
rcp, etc. Remove all .rhosts files and empty out the /etc/hosts.equiv file. This will
force all users to use other means of remote access such as telnet, ssh, skey, etc.
• Packet Filtering. Make sure only hosts on the internal LAN can participate in
trust-relationship. No internal host should trust a host outside the LAN. Then
simply filter out all traffic from the outside the Internet that purports to come from
the inside the LAN. And filter out all private network addresses (i.e., 10.0.0.0/24,
192.168.0.0/16 and 172.0.0.0/24) from the outside network.
• Cryptographic Methods. One of methods to deter IP spoofing is to require
all network traffic to be encrypted and/or authenticated. While several solutions
exist, it will be a worthwhile.
• Initial Sequence Number Randomising. Since the sequence numbers are not
chosen randomly, this IP spoofing works. Each connection would have its own
separate sequence number space. Bellovin [Bellovin(1989)] suggested the following
formula:
ISN = M + F (localhost, localport, remotehost, remoteport)
Where M is the 4 microsecond timer and F is a cryptographic hash. F must not
be computable from the outside or the attacker could still guess sequence number.
Bellovin suggests F be a hash of the connection-id and a secret vector such as a
random number, or a host related secret combined with the machine’s boot time.
On the other way, try to run operating systems with less predictable IP identifi-
cation sequences, such as recent versions of OpenBSD, Solaris, or Linux. Solaris
and Linux use peer-specific IPID sequences. In addition, Linux 2.4 zeros the IPID
fields in packets with the DF (Don’t fragment) bit set, since IP defragmentation
is the only critical use of the ID field [Fyodor(2003)].
• Use of IPv6. Another way to secure communication is by using IPv6 instead
of IPv4. RFC 1825 [Atkinson(1995)] specifies two new characteristics of IPv6:
authentication header and encapsulation security payload. The first prevents IP
address faking while the second introduces encryption for IP packet and TCP
header.
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4.4.3 SYN flood attack
• Packet verification model and Packet Verifier. Host X sends a SYN packet
to host A. Host A acknowledges the SYN packet by sending a SYN-ACK packet to
host X. Host X continuously sends SYN packets without responding with an ACK
packet. In this case, the TCP verification model works as follows: host A changes
its state from LISTEN to SYN RCVD, and to ACK WAIT, and then if host X
does not send ACK packet but sends SYN packet continuously, its state moves to
CLOSED. Since ACK WAIT state waits for ACK packet, and SYN packet is not
right one to move its state, so its state moves to CLOSED.
• Inside operating systems. Some operating systems stop accepting new con-
nections if there are too many forged SYN packets at them. Many operating
systems can only handle 8 packets. Linux kernels and some other systems allow
various methods such as SYN cookies to prevent this from being a serious problem
[Anderson(2001b)]. SYN cookies are a technique used to mitigate the effects of
SYN flood attacks by choosing initial TCP sequence numbers (ISNs) that can be
verified cryptographically. The server’s initial sequence number is generated as
follows [Bernstein(1997)]:
– top 5 bits: t mod 32, where t is a 32-bit time counter that increases every 64
seconds.
– next 3 bits: an encoding of an MSS selected by the server in response to the
client’s MSS.
– bottom 24 bits: a server-selected secret function of the client IP address and
port number, the server IP address and port number, and t.
4.4.4 Ping of Death & Land Attack
• Packet verification model and Packet Verifier. If each IP packet size exceeds
the maximum size (64KB) or if the header length field does not exceeds the min-
imum size (20 bytes), the packet should be discarded. In addition, each packet’s
source address and port number should not have the same as the target address
and port number. Otherwise, the packet should be discarded.
• Inside operating systems. Operating systems should check these packet fields
before accepting the packet.
4.4.5 Fragment attack
• Packet Verifier. If a TCP fragment has non-zero offset (e.g. F0=1), then it
should be discarded.
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• Router Filtering. Router’s filtering module enforces a minimum fragment offset.
• Inside operating systems. Operating systems can be fixed inserting some pieces
of code to the kernel files to check whether the IP packet’s offset is bigger than
the end of the packet.
4.4.6 ICMP flood (Smurf attack) & UDP flood attack
• Packet Filtering. UDP packets should never be allowed to destine for system
diagnostic ports from outside of administrative domain to reach intranet systems.
To prevent a network from these UDP attacks, turn off broadcast addressing on
all network routers that allow it unless needed for multicast features, or configure
a firewall to filter the ICMP ECHOREQUEST. In addition, UDP services could
be restricted for use only within the internal network, thus keeping UDP available
for network diagnostic purposes only. This prevents its unauthorized use for UDP
flooding attacks. To avoid becoming the victim of the smurf attack, have an
upstream firewall that can either filter ICMP ECHOREPLYs or limit echo traffic
to a small percentage of overall network traffic. Moreover, the border routers do
not allow directed broadcast packets to be forwarded through their routers as a
default.
Chapter 5
Email Classification For Risk
Assessment
What we anticipate seldom occurs;
What we least expected generally happens.
- Benjamin Disraeli.
Email is probably the most valuable service on the Internet. The use of email for com-
munication is constantly growing. Correspondingly, the volume of email received also
grows fast. Nevertheless, it is quite vulnerable to be misused. As normally implemented
[Postel(1982), Crocker(1982)], the mail server provides no authentication mechanisms.
This leaves the door wide open to faked messages. RFC 822 [Crocker(1982)] does sup-
port an Encrypted header line, but this is not widely used. 1 One such misuse is by
email viruses; another is by unsolicited bulk emails (UBEs) as known as spam. This
project focuses on the way of propagation of UBEs, because this propagation is also a
potential way of email viruses. The difference of UBE and Email virus is having malware
contents or not.
UBE is defined as Internet mail or email that is sent to a group of recipients who have
not requested it. A mail recipient may have at one time asked a sender for bulk email,
and then later asked the sender does not send any more emails or has otherwise not
indicated a desire for such additional mail; hence any bulk email sent after that request
was received is also UBE.
Email viruses are defined as viruses or worms that spread using email with attachments.
These email viruses include file viruses or email worms. Email worms are defined as
programs that self-replicate via email. Email statistics of year 2004 about UBEs and
email viruses reported by Postini [Postini(2004)] shows that the percentage of spam
1RFC 1040 [Linn(1988)] is for a discussion of a proposed new encryption standard for email.
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emails is 71.7% (10 out of 13 messages are spam), and that 1 in 26 messages is virus-
infected.
In order to determine a probability estimation which can tell us whether an email is
abnormal, to find relations between email viruses and detectable knowledge, and to
make a statistical relation between interesting events among incomplete data, Bayesian
networks [Pearl(1988)] or probabilistic graphical models have been chosen to use. A
Naive Bayesian classifier among several Bayesian network models has been used to clas-
sify packets of the SMTP protocol. Certain packet characteristics, which is analysed in
[Yoo and Ultes-Nitsche(2002a)], that allow us to attach to packets probabilities of their
potential maliciousness. The analysed file characteristics are used for the parameters of
the Naive Bayesian classifier.
5.1 Background of Bayesian Networks
In order to deal with malicious email attachments, Bayesian networks are used as means
of identifying malicious code.
5.1.1 Bayes’ Theorem and Bayesian Inference
To estimate the probability of the potential maliciousness of packets, it is necessary to
get some specific evidence from data. For independent events E and M , M represents
a group of malicious packets, E represents specific evidence about these packets. If E
and M are independent, we get:
P(M ∧ E ) = P(M ) ∗ P(E )
However, in cases where E and M are not independent. We must write:
P(M ∧ E ) = P(M ) ∗ P(E | M )
where, P(E | M ) is the probability of the specific evidence given the malicious packets
have occurred. The conditional probability of event E given event M , denoted P(E | M ),
is given by,
P(E | M ) =
P(E ∧M )
P(M )
Now since conjunction is commutative,
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P(M ∧ E ) = P(M ) ∗ P(E | M ) = P(E ) ∗ P(M | E )
And by rearranging we get:
P(M | E ) =
P(M ) ∗ P(E | M )
P(E )
which is known as Bayes’ Theorem. We write,
o P(M | E ): Posterior probability, the probability of malicious packets given the
specific evidence, which is what we wish to infer.
o P(E ): The probability of the specific evidence; this is a measurable quantity that
we get from existing data.
o P(E | M ): Likelihood probability, since we gain it from measurement of evidences.
The probability of the specific evidence given the malicious packets. We can mea-
sure this from the case histories of the malicious packets.
o P(M ): Prior probability, the probability of malicious packets that we get from
existing data. Since we knew it before we made any measurements.
Prior probability should be subjective. It represents our belief about the domain we are
considering, even if data has made a substantial contribution to our belief. Likelihood
probability should be objective. It is a result of the data gathering from which we are
going to make an inference. It makes some assessment of the accuracy of our data
gathering. In practice, either or both forms can be subjective or objective. In some
cases, we obtain the prior probability from statistics. For example, we can calculate
the prior probability as the number of instances of a disease divided by the number of
patients presented for treatment. However, in many cases this is not possible since the
data is not there, and there may also be prior knowledge in other forms.
5.1.2 Naive Bayesian Classifier
Figure 5.1: A Structure of a Naive Bayesian Classifier
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To make inference between interesting events among incomplete data, a Naive Bayesian
Classifier [Langley and Sage(1994)] has been chosen. The Naive Bayesian Classifier is
a simple structure in which nodes that show the same parent node cannot have a con-
nection between them. A Naive Bayesian Classifier is illustrated in Figure 5.1. We
assume each node as a class. This Naive Bayesian Classifier represents each class with
a single probability table. In particular, each table has an associated class probability
P(Ci ), which specifies the prior probability that one will observe a member of class Ci .
Each table also has an associated set of conditional probabilities, specifying a probability
distribution for each attribute. The Naive Bayesian classifier relies on two important
assumptions [Langley and Sage(1994)]. First is a single probability table. Instances in
each class can be summarized by a single probability table, and these are sufficient to
distinguish the classes from one another. Another assumption is independence of at-
tributes. The Naive Bayesian classifier requires that the probability distributions for
attributes are independent of each other within each class. One can model attribute
dependence within the Bayesian framework [Pearl(1988)]. However, determining such
dependencies and estimating them from limited training data is much more difficult.
Thus, the independence assumption has clear attractions. It is applicable in many
cases.
To determine the probability of whether packets are malicious, we are getting some
specific evidences from data. For independent events E and M , M represents a group
of malicious packets, E represents specific evidence about these packets. When we use
Bayes’ theorem we have just one hypothesis and one piece of evidence. However, we
have evidence from more than one source in the real world. Therefore, we apply these
several evidences to Bayes’ theorem, then we get:
P(M | E1 ∧ · · · ∧ En) =
P(M ) ∗ P(E1 ∧ · · · ∧ En | M )
P(E1 ∧ · · · ∧ En)
Using this equation, the probability of malicious packets is calculated in the next section.
5.2 Generating a Naive Bayesian Classifier
5.2.1 Statistical Characteristics of Email
In order to apply real data, MRTG [Oetiker and Rand(2003)] was used for counting
email messages entering the Southampton ECS department network during the past few
years, and the entire virus database of Ahnlab [Ahnlab(2002)] was analysed, and then
a database of email packets was built. Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 show email messages and
virus & UBE numbers which were measured by MRTG. Email messages are measured
by MRTG every second. To display the visual representation of this traffic, MRTG
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uses the weekly representation with 30-minute average data, the monthly representation
with 2-hour average data, and the yearly representation with 1-day average data. Each
number of messages represents a max, an average, and a current in a year, a month, and
a week. MRTG displays this number, which received data during a year, a month, and a
week, in current time per day. For example, a max in a year is chosen by the maximum
received number per day during one year, in a certain time when we measure. Note that
the year data is based on the 1-day average, the month data is based on 2-hour average
data, and the week data is based on 30-minute data. That is the reason that the current
data of a year is different from that of a week and a month.
Table 5.1: Email messages and Virus & UBE numbers in a Year
(Date: Thursday, 25 July 2002 at 11:04)
Type Messages Viruses UBEs
Max 215000 4957 (2.3%) 1881 (0.9%)
Average 8339 165 (2.0%) 706 (8.5%)
Current 9797 274 (2.8%) 1482 (15.1%)
Table 5.2: Email messages and Virus & UBE numbers in a Month
Type Messages Viruses UBEs
Max 215000 395 (0.2%) 1881 (0.9%)
Average 8995 201 (2.2%) 1383 (15.4%)
Current 9633 223 (2.3%) 1586 (16.5%)
Table 5.3: Email messages and Virus & UBE numbers in a Week
Type Messages Viruses UBEs
Max 109000 361 (0.3%) 1710 (1.6%)
Average 8542 293 (3.4%) 1383 (16.2%)
Current 9633 223 (2.3%) 1586 (16.5%)
According to the survey of email virus statistics, which was reported in year 2002
[Yoo and Ultes-Nitsche(2002a)], about 80% of windows file worms were transferred via
email, and approx. 61% of windows file worms had .EXE file extension. In addition, an
average 2% of all emails per month contained virus data (See Table 5.2), 80% of which
were in an Win32 executable file format as Table 5.5 shows. In addition, Table 5.6 shows
the percentage of several file extensions among windows file worm types. Most Internet
viruses 2, which was detected and reported until year 2002, had Win32 executable for-
mat (about 86%) among file/network worms. In executable attachment formats, there
2Internet viruses are the superset of email viruses. It includes email viruses, file worms, networks
worms and so on.
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are .EXE (64%), .SCR (22%), .COM (6%), .PIF (22%), .BAT (3%), .VBS (2%), and
Others (12%).
The email UBE statistics record [Administrators(2003)] was developed by administrators
in University of Calgary. Their record was remade for the reference as presented in Table
5.4. The dates of records in this table are between 10th May 04:09:39 and 18th May
01:01:11, 2003. Besides, the blocked mails include non-existent and invalid recipients,
non-existent senders’ domain and DNS black lists. However, this table does not contain
the DNS black list information. Note that the UBE numbers of Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3
represent the number of detected UBEs by pattern matching.
Table 5.4: Email UBE Statistics (Total:291985)
Type Number Percent
normal mail 26262 8.99%
blocked mail 249622 85.4%
non-existent and
invalid recipients 751 0.2%
non-existent senders’ domain 248739 85.1%
invalid senders’ address
but not blocked 25074 8%
Table 5.5: Detected viruses which were entering ECS Department. (Total: 17300)
Record date: Thursday, 25 July 2002 at 11:04.
Name Percent
W32/Sircam.A 50%
W32/Flcss 11%
W32/Klez.G 10%
W32/Navidad.B 7%
W32/Badtrans.B 5%
W32/Magistr.A 3%
W32/Navidad 2%
W32/Hybris.B 2%
Others 10%
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Table 5.6: Classification of Windows File Worms.
Prevalence of Win32 worm via email: total 96 worms
File Format Number Percent
.EXE file 58 60.4 %
.PIF or .SCR file 18 18.8 %
.BAT.COM.EXE.PIF.SCR file
(among these, choose 1 format) 3 3.1 %
.COM file 3 3.1 %
.VBS file 2 2.1 %
Self-executable
compressed format 6 6.3 %
Other 6 6.3 %
5.2.2 Choosing Evidence Factors
A base rate may be defined as the relative frequency with which an event occurs or an
attribute is present in a population [Lanning(1987), V. B. Hinsz and Robertson(1988),
Ginossar and Trope(1987)]. The extent to which base rates are used appears to depend
on the characteristics of the problem at hand. Base rates seem to be used more accurately
when the domain or the experimental process suggests that a statistical kind of answer
is warranted. If we disregard base rates, and rely on the individuality, evidences and
resultant likelihood ratio of abnormal mails will be surely overestimated, especially virus
emails. Therefore, considering the base rate of malicious mail, it is important to choose
high accurate detectable evidences. Each evidence factor has been chosen, which is
related to protocol specifications rather than data content, which can be changeable.
Emails are sent via SMTP protocol [Postel(1982)]. The usage of each protocol header
was analysed to detect protocol anomalies. Email worms use spoofed email addresses
under the guise of trusted sources. Email worms are sent with specific purpose not like
normal mail. They are sent with one to many connections, source IP addresses are
faked or spoofed, a sender’s address is not valid, a sender’s email address is not used
by a valid domain name, a recipient’s address is not used by a valid domain name, a
recipient’s email address is not used by IP address, or recipients are mentioned in BCc
(Blind Carbon Copy) rather than To or Cc (Carbon Copy), and so on. Therefore, four
factors have been selected: the header field, the sender field, the recipient field, and
an attachment field of each email among the SMTP protocol. Each field of an SMTP
packet to classify UBEs is normalized in a checking process in the following way:
o [Sender field] If reverse DNS domain check fails, e.g., non-existent domain, then
set FALSE. If invalid senders’ address, then set FALSE.
o [Recipient field] If non-existent recipient, then set FALSE. If invalid recipients’
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address, then set FALSE.
Each field of an SMTP packet to classify email viruses is also normalized as follows:
o [Header field] If there are multiple content-type headers, multiple encoding headers,
or multiple non-plain headers, then set FALSE. If content-type header is MIME,
then check whether or not the mail body has content-type;text/html;charset=utf-8
etc. If any match is not found, then set FALSE.
o [Sender field] If sender address is used with an IP address rather than domain
name, then set FALSE. If source address in IP packet is different from sender
address, then set FALSE.
o [Recipient field (To/Cc/Bcc)] If To does not contain a domain name (e.g. id@ip address),
then set FALSE. If To is empty and Cc includes the email address without a do-
main name, then set FALSE. If To and Cc are empty, then set FALSE even if Bcc
contains an address with a domain name.
o [Attachment field] If an attachment is an executable file (.EXE, .SCR, .COM, .PIF,
.BAT, .VBS, and others), then set TRUE.
The raw packets of emails are only dealt and the same protocol mechanism is used for
UBEs and email viruses. Therefore, UBEs’ normalization can be shared with email
viruses’ for classification. However, to increase one’s confidence, it is necessary to divide
the two cases and consider them separately.
5.2.3 A Naive Bayesian Classifier Against Email Viruses
According to the surveyed prior information (Tables 5.5, 5.6, 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3), a prob-
ability to each factor was assigned. Using this data we can determine the probability
of whether mail packets are malicious, denoted P(M), using the header field (H), the
sender field (Fr), the recipient field (To), and the attachment field (EF) as discussed in
the previous subsection. Each field of an SMTP packet is examined in a checking process
to compute a probability value. This Naive Bayesian classifier (Figure.5.2) represents
the probability of being malicious given several evidences such as malformed H, Fr, To,
and EF. The prior probabilities of a malicious mail and the likelihood probabilities of a
malicious executable attachment were assigned as discussed in Section 5.2.1.
The other prior probabilities were assigned as subjective values based on the prior prob-
ability of a malicious mail. As a result, each node has four likelihood probabilities; two
(their status is set with TRUE or FALSE) different probabilities for each node given
two cases (malicious mail is set with TRUE or FALSE) for the potential maliciousness
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Figure 5.2: A Naive Bayesian classifier for detecting abnormal emails.
of a mail packet, which is denoted by M. The Naive Bayesian classifier was built as in
Figure 5.2, and then an exact inference algorithm was used for Bayesian inference using
MATLAB 5.3 [MATHWORKS(2003)]. The results of posterior probabilities from the
Naive Bayesian classifier are in Table 5.7 .
Table 5.7: Results of posterior probabilities from the Naive Bayesian Network
(Malicious mail M = T)
Probability of Malicious mail given evidences Results
P(M | H = F) 0.4494
P(M | H = F ∧ Fr = F) 0.9662
P(M | H = F ∧ Fr = F ∧ To = F) 0.9992
P(M | H = F ∧ Fr = F ∧ To = F ∧ EF = T) 0.9998
P(M | Fr = F) 0.4167
P(M | Fr = F ∧ To = F) 0.9698
P(M | Fr = F ∧ To = F ∧ EF = T) 0.9923
P(M | To = F) 0.4787
P(M | To = F ∧ EF = T) 0.7860
P(M | EF = T) 0.0755
Through this result, we can predict the probability of data packets being malicious if
certain evidence is given. For example, if only the header field is FALSE (meaning that
it is malformed), the maliciousness probability of a current SMTP packet is 0.4494.
If the sender field and the recipient field are FALSE, the maliciousness probability is
0.9698. If the sender field is FALSE, and the mail includes an executable attachment, the
probability of being malicious is 0.7860. However, note that this executable attachment
is not recognized as a malicious executable file yet in this moment. This Naive Bayesian
Classifier just tells us, because this is an executable file, the probability of being malicious
is estimated by value 0.7860. The detailed process for recognizing this executable file
is the next step. Nevertheless, the value of the probability to be malicious is quite
reasonable.
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Table 5.8: Results of posterior probabilities from the Naive Bayesian classifier
(Malicious mail M = T)
Probability of Malicious mail
given evidences Results
Fr=T ∧ To=T ∧ H=T ∧ EF=T 5.2013e-004
Fr=T ∧ To=T ∧ H=T ∧ EF=F 3.2524e-005
Fr=T ∧ To=T ∧ H=F ∧ EF=T 0.0926
Fr=T ∧ To=T ∧ H=F ∧ EF=F 0.0063
Fr=T ∧ To=F ∧ H=T ∧ EF=T 0.1867
Fr=T ∧ To=F ∧ H=T ∧ EF=F 0.0141
Fr=T ∧ To=F ∧ H=F ∧ EF=T 0.9783
Fr=T ∧ To=F ∧ H=F ∧ EF=F 0.7376
Fr=F ∧ To=T ∧ H=T ∧ EF=T 0.0562
Fr=F ∧ To=T ∧ H=T ∧ EF=F 0.0037
Fr=F ∧ To=T ∧ H=F ∧ EF=T 0.9210
Fr=F ∧ To=T ∧ H=F ∧ EF=F 0.4216
Fr=F ∧ To=F ∧ H=T ∧ EF=T 0.9633
Fr=F ∧ To=F ∧ H=T ∧ EF=F 0.6212
Fr=F ∧ To=F ∧ H=F ∧ EF=T 0.9998
Fr=F ∧ To=F ∧ H=F ∧ EF=F 0.9969
Table 5.9: the truth table of malicious email
Fr To H EF f
T T T T 0
T T T F 0
T T F T 0
T T F F 0
T F T T 0
T F T F 0
T F F T 1
T F F F 0
F T T T 0
F T T F 0
F T F T 1
F T F F 0
F F T T 1
F F T F 0
F F F T 1
F F F F 1
The results of posterior probabilities from the Naive Bayesian classifier are in Table 5.8.
In addition, to build an ordered Binary decision diagram from the email classifier in
Figure 5.2, the posterior probabilities were extended from Table 5.7 to Table 5.8. The
result of applying a threshold 0.9 is in Table 5.9. These results is used to classify email
viruses whether they confirm maliciousness, depending on whether the probability of
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maliciousness given the evidences is no less than a certain threshold, say, 0.9. Using this
threshold, an email decision diagram is built in the next section.
5.3 Generating OBDDs For Email Classifier Model
5.3.1 Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams
Figure 5.3: Decision Tree Representation of Malicious Email
Binary decision diagrams (BDDs) [Bryant(1986)] have been recognized as abstract rep-
resentations of Boolean functions. A BDD represents a Boolean function as a rooted, di-
rected acyclic graph. As Figure 5.3 illustrates, a representation of the function f(Fr, To,H,EF )
defined by the truth table Table 5.9, leads to the special case where the graph is actually
a tree. Terminal nodes of out-degree zero are labelled 0 or 1, and a set of variable nodes
v of out-degree two are used. The two outgoing edges are given by two functions low(v)
corresponding to the case where the variable is assigned 0, and high(v) corresponding
to the case where the variable is assigned 1, these are shown as dotted and solid lines,
respectively. A variable var(v) is associated with each variable node.
The key idea of OBDDs [Bryant(1992)] is that by restricting the representation, Boolean
manipulation becomes much simpler computationally. A BDD is OBDD if on all paths
through the graph the variables respect a given linear order x1 < x2 < ... < xn, such
as Fr < To < H < EF . An OBDD is reduced if no two distinct nodes u and v have
the same variable name and low- and high-successor, i.e., var(u) = var(v), low(u) =
low(v), high(u) = high(v) implies u = v, and no variable node u has identical low- and
high-successor, i.e., low(u) 6= high(u) [Bryant(1992)].
5.3.2 OBDD Representation From The Naive Bayesian Classifier
Reduced OBDDs [Bryant(1992)] provide compact representations of Boolean expres-
sions. They are all based on the crucial fact that for any function f : Bn → B, there is
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Figure 5.4: The removal process to build a reduced OBDD.
exactly one reduced OBDD representing it, for a given ordering. This means, in partic-
ular, that there is exactly one reduced OBDD for the constant true and constant false
function on Bn: the terminal nodes 1 and 0. Hence, it is possible to test in constant
time whether a reduced OBDD is constantly true or false. Furthermore, OBBDs are
good to reason about the properties of any Naive Bayesian classifier. Specifically, when
any Naive Bayesian classifier is represented by an OBDD that is tractable in size even
given an intractable number of instances. The size of the graph representing a function
can depend heavily on the ordering of the input variables.
Table 5.9 represents the truth table of malicious email using a threshold 0.9. Figure 5.3
represents the classifier induced by the Bayesian network using Table 5.9. To build an
OBDD from this decision tree, transformation rules [Bryant(1992)] were applied, e.g.,
remove duplicate terminals, remove duplicate nonterminals, then remove redundant tests
(see Figure 5.4).
The transformation rules are defined in [Bryant(1992)] as follows:
• Remove Duplicate Terminals: Eliminate all but one terminal vertex with a
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given label and redirect all arcs into the eliminated vertices to the remaining one.
• Remove Duplicatate Nonterminals: If nonterminal vertices u and v have
var(u) = var(v), low(u) = low(v), high(u) = high(v) then eliminate one of the
two vertices and redirect all incoming arcs to the other vertex.
• Remove Redundant Tests: If nonterminal vertex v has low(v) = high(v), then
eliminate v and redirect all incoming arcs to low(v).
After this reduction of the decision tree, an reduced OBDD was produced as in Figure
5.5. This OBDD represents the naive Bayesian classifier induced by the network in
Figure 5.2 with probability threshold 0.9, with respect to variable order (Fr, To, H, EF).
Figure 5.5: A reduced OBDD of Email Viruses
5.3.3 Email Classifier With OBDDs
A truth assignment to a Boolean function B is the same as fixing a set of variables in the
domain of B, i.e., if X is a Boolean variable in the domain of B, then X can be assigned
either 0 or 1 (denoted [X → 0] and [X → 1], respectively). Let X → Y1, Y2 denote the
if-then-else operator. Then X → Y1, Y2 is true if either X and Y1 are true or X is false
and Y2 is true; the variable X is said to be the test expression. More formally, we have:
X → Y1, Y2 = (X ∧ Y1) ∨ (¬X ∧ Y2)
All operators can easily be expressed using only the if-then-else operator and the con-
stants 0 and 1. Hence the operator gives rise to a new kind of normal form.
68 Chapter 5 Email Classification For Risk Assessment
• Definition An If-then-else Normal Form (INF) is a Boolean function built entirely
from the if-then-else operator and the constants 0 and 1 such that all tests are
performed only on variables.
This is known as the Shannon expansion of t with respect to u + v. From the Shannon
expansion we get that any Boolean function can be expressed in an If-then-else normal
form (INF) by iteratively using the above substitution scheme on t. The ordering of the
variables, corresponding to the order in which the Shannon expansion is performed, is
encoded in the BDD [Bryant(1986)]. If abnormal mail classifier is denoted by t, UBEs
part is by u and Email virus part is by v, we by t[0/u+v] denote the Boolean expression
obtained by replacing u + v with 0 in t and then it is not hard to see that the following
equivalence holds:
t = u + v → t[1/u + v], t[0/u + v].
Then the abnormal mail classifier t is true if either u or v are true, which means that
this classifier can say that a mail is abnormal by considering the UBEs part or email
virus part in the detected raw packets. The truth table of the abnormal mail classifier
is in Table 5.10.
Table 5.10: the truth table of UBE and that of abnormal mail
Fr To f UBE Virus f
F F 1 F F 0
F T 1 F T 1
T F 1 T F 1
T T 0 T T 1
Like building the OBDD for email viruses, an OBDD for UBEs also can be built. How-
ever, considering the previous survey and examination of UBEs in Table 5.4, about 85%
of email was blocked and 85.3% of emails was reported as non-existent or an invalid rea-
son. Apart of this statistics, non-existent or invalid senders/recipients are also protocol
anomalies. Therefore, two factors have been chosen, i.e., a sender denoted by Fr and
a recipient by To. A simple Boolean function can be created using the NAND Boolean
operator as follows. The truth table of this Boolean function is in Table 5.10. The
OBDD representations of the UBEs classification and abnormal mail classification is in
Figure 5.6.:
u = ¬(Fr ∧ To)
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Figure 5.6: OBDD representation of UBEs and abnormal mail classification
The UBEs classifier u is true if either a sender field Fr or a recipient field To are false
as in Figure 5.6, which means that this classifier can say this mail is an UBE by either
a sender field or a recipient field are malformed or wrong.
For the email virus part v, a Boolean function can be built according to Figure 5.5 in
the following way:
v =
(Fr∧¬To∧¬H∧EF )∨(¬Fr∧To∧¬H∧EF )∨(¬Fr∧¬To∧H∧EF )∨(¬Fr∧¬To∧¬H)
The email virus classifier v is true if four factors Fr, To,H,EF are joining towards
terminal (1) as in Figure 5.5, which means that this classifier can estimate that this mail
contains an email virus using these facts; although a sender field is correct, a recipient
field and a header field are wrong and there is an attachment in the mail, or although
a recipient field is correct, a sender field and a header field are wrong and there is an
attachment in the mail, or a sender field and a recipient field are wrong even though a
header field is ok and there is an attachment, or a sender field, a recipient field and a
header field are all wrong whether there is an attachment or not.
The results on email classification which is presented in this chapter will be used in the
intelligent firewall implementation as presented in Section 7.1.
Chapter 6
Virus Visualization &
Recognition
That all knowledge begins with experience,
there is indeed no doubt ....
but although our knowledge originates with experiences,
it does not all arise out of experience.
- Immanuel Kant.
Virus software is probably the most widely discussed class of computer threat. To qualify
as a virus a program must meet one special criteria [Chantico(1992)]: the code in the
program must be able to replicate or copy itself so as to spread through the infected
machine or across to other machines.
In the general case, malicious software detection is theoretically infeasible. In the spe-
cific case of searching for a particular malicious code instance, it is not only possi-
ble, but performed daily by anti-virus software. Thus, we have good commercial so-
lutions to detecting known malicious code instances. However, the problem of deter-
mining whether software has malicious functionality is not decidable in the general case
[Rubin and Geer(1998)]. That is, we cannot look at a given application and, in gen-
eral, decide whether it contains code that will result in malicious behaviour. This is
equivalent to the halting problem in computer science theory, which states that there
is no general-purpose algorithm that can determine the behaviour of an arbitrary pro-
gram [Davis and Weyuker(1983)]. Aside from the halting problem, the property of being
malicious depends to a large extent on the beholder and the context. For example, a
disk-formatting program might be exactly what the user wants and therefore is not con-
sidered malicious, though when embedded in a screensaver unbeknownst to the user, it
can be considered malicious. Thus, we cannot develop an algorithm to decide malicious-
ness.
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The major spread of email viruses in 2005 is through using file worms sent via emails. In
September 2005, the top ten viruses (53.2%) of detected viruses were file worms spread
by either email attachments and/or network shares [Sophos(2005)]. Nonetheless, the
original method of virus infection must not be ignored. These “classical” viruses are the
scope of this chapter. The classic virus-detection techniques look for the presence of a
virus-specific sequence of instructions, called a virus signature, inside the program: if
the signature is found, it is highly probable that the program is infected. For example,
the Win95.CIH/Chernobyl virus is detected by checking for the following hexadecimal
sequence [Wang(1998)]: “E800 0000 005B 8D4B 4251 5050 0F01 4C24 FE5B 83C3 1CFA
8B2B”.
Apart from commercial anti-virus solutions to detecting known viruses in virus-infected
files, what options are we left with in addressing unknown viruses? The research pre-
sented in this thesis differs from traditional approaches to the malicious code problem in
that it does not attempt to define or identify malicious behaviour. Instead, the research
focuses on structural characteristics of malicious executable code. This approach allows
for methods of examining any application, whether previously known or unknown, in
order to determine if it has been tampered with since its original development. Such
tampering usually takes the form of an embedded virus or Trojan horse that is activated
during subsequent executions of the program.
To detect virus patterns including unknown ones in Windows virus-infected executable
files, this project has chosen the unsupervised learning, especially the Self-Organizing
Map (SOM) [Kohonen(1995)]. This chapter explains and presents the non-signature
based virus detection approach using SOM. Virus-infected files cannot hide the presence
of the virus through the SOM projection. As no knowledge (no signature etc) about
a virus is required to detect it, the SOM-based approach can detect not only known
viruses but also unknown ones. As defence in depth strategy, we can build much more
secure systems by accompanying traditional virus-detection techniques based on virus
signatures with the non-signature based virus-detection technique for unknown viruses.
6.1 Background of Self-Organizing Map
This section does not intend to give a complete theoretical foundation of Self-Organizing
Maps (SOMs) [Kohonen(1995)]. In order to understand better of SOMs, some back-
ground of SOMs and relevant part of SOM theories are addressed. (More details can
be found in books on SOMs such as [Kohonen(1982), Kohonen(1988), Kohonen(1995),
Hinton and Sejnowski(1999), Haykin(1999)].)
SOM [Kohonen(1995)] is an unsupervised neural network, which does not require that
the user specifies desired outputs, in contrast to the supervised neural network, which
require that one or more outputs are specified in conjunction with one or more inputs
Chapter 6 Virus Visualization & Recognition 73
to find patterns or relations between data [Haykin(1999)]. SOM is also a feed forward
neural network which uses an unsupervised training algorithm, and through a process
called self-organization, configures the output units into a topological representation of
the original data [Kohonen(1982)].
The SOM algorithm is based on competitive learning. SOM reduces multi-dimensional
data to a lower dimensional map or grid of neurons [Hinton and Sejnowski(1999)]. It
provides a topology preserving mapping from the high dimensional space to map units
[Kohonen(1988)]. Map units or neurons usually form a two-dimensional grid and thus
the mapping is a mapping from a high dimensional space onto a simple topology, e.g.
rectangular or hexagonal. The property of topology preserving means that a SOM
groups similar input data vectors on neurons: points that are near each other in the
input space are mapped to nearby map units in the SOM. The SOM can thus serve as
a clustering tool as well as a tool for visualizing high-dimensional data.
SOM consists of two layers of processing units [Kohonen(1995)]: the first is an input
layer containing processing units for each element in the input vector; the second is an
output layer or grid of processing units that is fully connected with those at the input
layer. The number of processing units at the output layer is determined by the user
based on the initial shape and size of the map that is desired. Unlike other neural
networks there is no hidden layer or hidden processing units [Haykin(1999)].
6.1.1 SOM Algorithm
The principal goal of the SOM algorithm developed by Kohonen [Kohonen(1982)] is
to transform an incoming signal pattern of arbitrary dimension into a one- or two-
dimensional discrete map, and to perform this transformation adaptively in a topological
ordered fashion. When an input pattern is presented to a SOM network, the winning
output unit will be the unit whose incoming connection weights are the closest to the
input pattern in terms of Euclidean distance [Kohonen(1995)]. Thus, the input is pre-
sented and each output unit competes to match the input pattern. The output that
is closest to the input pattern is declared the winner. Often starting from randomised
weight values, the output units slowly align themselves such that when an input pattern
is presented, a neighbourhood of units responds to the input pattern. The connection
weights of the winning unit are then adjusted, i.e. moved in the direction of the input
pattern by a factor determined by the learning rate.
As training progress, the size of the neighbourhood around the winning unit and the
learning rate will decrease [Kohonen(1995)]. Initially large numbers of output units will
be updated, but as the training proceeds, smaller and smaller numbers are updated until
at the end of the training only the winning unit is adjusted. SOM creates a topological
mapping by adjusting not only the winner’s weights, but also adjusting the weights of
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the adjacent output units in close proximity to the neighbourhood of the winner. So,
not only is the winner adjusted, but also the whole neighbourhood of output units is
moved closer to the input pattern.
There are three basic steps involved in the application of the algorithm after initial-
isation, namely, sampling, similarity matching, and updating. These three steps are
repeated until the map formation is completed. The algorithm is summarized as follows
based on Kohonen’s book [Kohonen(1988)]:
1. Initialisation. Choose random values for the initial weight vectors wj(0). The
only restriction here is that the wj(0) be different for j = 1, 2, ..., N,, where N is
the number of neurons in the lattice. It may be desirable to keep the magnitude
of the weights small.
2. Sampling. Draw a sample x from the input distribution with a certain probability;
the vector x represents the sensory signal.
3. Similarity Matching. Find the best-matching (winning) neuron i(x) at time n,
using the minimum-distance Euclidean criterion: i(x) = argminj ||xn − wj ||, j =
1, 2, ..., N
4. Updating. Adjust the synaptic weight vectors of all neurons, using the update
formula
mj(n + 1) =
{
wj(n) + η(n)[x(n)− wj(n)], j ∈ Λi(x)(n)
wj(n), otherwise
where η(n) is the learning-rate parameter, and Λi(x)(n) is the neighbourhood func-
tion centred around the winning neuron i(x); both η(n) and Λi(x)(n) are varied
dynamically during learning for best results.
5. Continuation. Continue with step 2 until no noticeable changes in the feature
map are observed.
The learning process involved in the computation of a feature map is stochastic in nature,
which means that the accuracy of the map depends on the number of iterations of the
SOM algorithm. Moreover, the success of map formation is critically dependent on how
the main parameters of the algorithm, namely, the learning-rate parameter η and the
neighbourhood function Λi are selected. Unfortunately, there is no theoretical basis for
the selection of these parameters.
6.1.2 SOM’s Properties
The SOM has properties of both vector quantization and vector projection algorithms.
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6.1.2.1 Quantization
The quantization from the N training samples to M prototypes reduces the original data
set to a smaller, but still representative, set to work with. Further analysis is performed
primarily, or at least initially using the prototype vectors instead of all of the data.
Using the reduced data set is only valid if it really is representative of the original data.
When the number of prototypes approaches infinity and neighbourhood width is very
large, numerical experiments have shown that the results are relatively accurate even
for a small number of prototypes [Kohonen(1999)]. While the connection between the
density of prototypes of SOM and the input data has not been derived in the general
case, it can be assumed that SOM roughly follows the density of the training data. The
primary benefit of using a reduced data set is that the computational complexity of
subsequent steps is reduced. Another benefit of vector quantization is that it usually
involves averaging of data samples, thus removing zero-mean noise and reducing the
effect of outliers.
6.1.2.2 Projection
Since the prototype vectors of SOM have well-defined positions on the low-dimensional
map grid, SOM is a kind of vector projection algorithm. The projection of a data
sample can be defined to be the index b or location rb of its BMU on the map grid. The
projection is discrete as it can only get as many values as there are map units. Therefore,
different vectors may be projected to the same point. Also, since the shape of the map
is defined beforehand, information of the global shape of the data manifold is lost. The
topological ordering of map units depends primarily on the local neighbourhood, which
is defined on the map grid. Since there are more map units where data density is high,
the neighbourhood in these areas becomes smaller as measured in the input space. Thus,
the projection tunes to local data density.
6.2 File Format & Virus Types
The research differs from traditional approaches to the malicious code problem in that it
does not attempt to define or identify malicious behaviour. Instead, the research focuses
on structural characteristics of malicious executable code. This approach allows for
methods of examining any application, whether previously known or unknown, in order
to determine if it has been tampered with since its original development. The initial
target file format considered is Microsoft Windows executable format as about 80% of
detected viruses or worms were Windows executable files, in particular, approximately
61% had an “.EXE” file extension (reference to section 5.2.1).
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6.2.1 Parasitic Viruses
Parasitic viruses are all viruses, which change the content of target files while transferring
copies of them. The files themselves remain completely or partly usable [Pfleeger(1997)].
The most common method of virus incorporation into a file is by appending the virus
to the end of the file as shown in Figure 6.1. In this process, the virus changes the
header of file in such way that the virus code is executed first. In Windows and OS/2
executables (NewEXE - NE, PE, LE, LX), the fields in the NewEXE header are changed.
The structure of this header is much more complicated than that of a conventional DOS
EXE file, so there are more fields to be changed: the starting address, the number of
sections in the file, properties of the sections etc. In addition to that, before infection,
the size of the file may increase to a multiple of one paragraph (16 bytes) in DOS or to
a section in Windows and OS/2. The size of the section depends on the properties of
the EXE file header [Pfleeger(1997)].
Figure 6.1: Virus positions in EXE and document files.
Figure 6.2: Structure of Windows Executable file
The structure of the data of a virus-infected file is similar to what can be seen in Figure
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6.2, where the positions are octal number. When several virus-infected files have been
examined, most files have the same size of the DOS stub (say, 128 bytes), and vary-
ing other parts. Apart from the virus code, only the PE (portable executable format)
header is filled with quite similar character patterns, containing text, data, source and
relocation information. The program code and data contain compiler-generated charac-
ter sequences. Looking at Figure 6.2, the character sequence of the virus code differs
from the other program code, which means that the program code and the inserted virus
code have different data characteristics, e.g. because the original code was compiled as
one solid piece of code, and the virus is injected only afterwards.
Table 6.1: Location starting point information of Test files (Unit: bytes)
Note. DOS stub always starts from 0000.
Virus file PE header Program Code Virus Code
Win95.CIH Ver 1.2 128 576 11632
Win95.CIH Ver 1.3 128 624 14256
Win95.CIH Ver 1.4 128 576 1968
Win95.Boza.A 128 1024 2016
Win95.Boza.C 256 1536 3072
Win32.Apparition 128 1024 38912
Win32.HLLP.Semisoft 128 1024 41360
Table 6.1 shows the test data file information based on the file structure. If these four
different areas in the virus-infected file are identified, they can be used to prove the virus
visualization correct as done in the next section. Each different area will be labelled,
e.g. DS for the DOS stub, PE for the NewEXE header, PR for the program code &
data, and VS for the virus code. These labels are only used to identify where each part
of the file will be located in the SOM projection, in order to show that the virus code is
located in an area of close neighbourhood; the labels are not necessary for SOM training
and visualization.
6.2.2 Macro Viruses
Another virus type appearing in Windows systems is macro virus. Macro viruses are
programs written in macro languages of programs such as Microsoft Word and Excel
as presented in Figure 6.3. To propagate, such viruses use the capabilities of macro
languages and with their help transfer themselves from one infected file, e.g. document
or spreadsheet, to another. Microsoft Word Version 6 and 7 allows to encrypt macros
in documents [Kaspersky(2000)]. Therefore, some word viruses are present inside the
infected documents in an encrypted, execute-only form.
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Figure 6.3: Macro virus position in an infected document.
6.2.3 Polymorphic viruses
Polymorphic viruses cannot or can with significant effort be detected using virus signa-
tures. Polymorphic viruses try to remain undetected by changing their structure with
each infection. There is no unique signature, which anti-virus programs can search for.
Some polymorphic viruses even use different encryption techniques with every infection.
In this research, polymorphic viruses have not been dealt with separately, because these
polymorphic viruses can be included in parasitic and macro viruses, and they can be
handled in the approach similarly to parasitic and macro viruses. The assumption of
polymorphic viruses is that they are somehow inserted in the executable file, and this
inserted virus code, as described in section 6.2.1, will differ again from the original
program code. Thus, whether encrypted or polymorphic, the virus code can be distin-
guished from original program code as it is injected into an intact, kind of homogeneous
program file.
6.3 SOM Training & Visualization
The SOM Toolbox 2.0 [Esa Alhoniemi and Vesanto(2002)], a software library for MAT-
LAB 6.0 [MATHWORKS(2003)] was used under Linux to visualize virus-infected files.
The visualization experiments were carried out under Linux as a precaution against
infection with any of the viruses used (they were all Windows viruses).
6.3.1 Data Preparation for SOM Training
To train a SOM, a virus-infected file’s binary data was converted into a table of numerical
values. In general SOM data, each row of the table is one data sample, which means
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the entire table consists of n different data samples. The columns of the table are
the variables. The items in one row are values of these variables from the data set.
The number of variables depends on features of data and was chosen to be 8 in the
experiments.
Figure 6.4: Table-format data: fixed length and the sample variables
The 8 variables are presented in Figure 6.4. For the virus-detecting SOM, multiple
bytes were given to each variable to reflect data characteristic features. Each row of
the table is one row of one (possibly virus-infected) file’s binary data, and the table is a
transformed form of the (possibly virus-infected) file (I call it this transformed form of
the file “file under test”).
To match the table structure with multiple bytes per variable in the table, a common
octal-dump open source program (command name “od” in Linux) was rewritten to
remove the front offset information from the dump output, transforming a binary file
into a short-integer typed data format. The short integer format was chosen in order
to keep the range of numerical values relatively small (in C, short integers range from
-32768 to +32767). In this transformation, 4 bytes are assigned to each of the 8 variables
per row, i.e. each input sample of the SOM will contain 32 bytes of the file under test. To
summarize, the table consists of single 8 × 4-byte data samples representing n (number
of rows) different portions of the file under test without overlapping data. It should be
noted that this is an unusual way of using a SOM (it is not trained with n different data
samples but it is “trained” with n fractions of the same sample).
6.3.2 Visualization Method
There are many different methods of displaying SOMs. I use the unified distance matrix
or Umatrix since the shape of the Umatrix corresponds to the density structure of
the input data, and the location of the best-matching prototypes corresponds to the
topography of the input data. Therefore, the SOM “trained” with a file under test
reflects the file’s structure in the Umatrix.
The Umatrix represents the map as a regular grid of neurons, which can be visualized
easily. Every neuron gets a numeric value assigned that corresponds to its local density
in the input-space: the average distance between its prototype and the neighbouring
nodes’ prototypes. A low value corresponds to a high local density, a high value to a
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low local density. For visualization purposes, these values can be converted easily into a
colour scheme: a light (low value) colour corresponds to a high local density, and a dark
(high value) colour to a low local density, or vice versa.
6.3.3 Process of SOM training and visualization
Figure 6.5 illustrates the process of SOM training and visualization. Each step in Figure
6.5 is described subsequently.
Figure 6.5: Process of SOM training and visualization
1. Data buffer represents the input data in a table format. The size of the input
data is arbitrary. In this example we assume we can partition it into four parts
labelled A, B, C and D, each representing n rows of the input data (the entire
input data consists of 4n rows, where n is an arbitrary number). A consists of
n rows containing the data designated by a11, a12, ..., a18, a21, a22, ..., a28, ..., and
an1, an2, ..., an8. Similarly, B, C, and D are defined. There is no data overlap
between any of these parts. Finally, in this step, the entire data is normalized and
then used to train the SOM.
2. At the beginning of the SOM training, the entire data is quantized and in an initial
training step, eigenvectors to each entity are calculated. There exists a random
and a linear initialisation phase in the training of SOMs. In this approach, the
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linear initialisation is used, which uses a linear mapping whose eigenvectors are
used in the initialisation phase.
3. Using certain parameters in the SOM training phase, namely hexagonal topology,
Gaussian neighbourhood, and particular map size values, each row value of the
weight vector is calculated and updated until finding best matches to the input
data.
4. The weight vector is used for updating the vector value in each point (SOM cell).
5. Once the entire weight vector structure is calculated, the values are saved in the
so-called codebook vector. In each step, the winning entry is found in the codebook
using Euclidean distance by going through the list of all weight vectors, each time
computing the distance between the codebook and the input entry from the weight
vector.
6. Once the fine tune is performed, the codebook is fixed and consists of best-matched
vector values.
7. The weight vector and the codebook are referenced and updated for rough tune
and fine tune.
8. The Umatrix is one of methods to visualize a SOM. The Umatrix visualizes the
codebook vector values.
9. The Umatrix visualization reflects the quantized data. Similar data is located in
a close neighbourhood to one another, producing an area of similar data density.
10. Having given different sections of the data with different name allows representing
the location of each group of the data in the Umatrix. The purpose of the illustra-
tion is to cluster around the data in the Umatrix about which we know where it
was located initially in the input data, aiming at identifying what the SOM does
to that data. This cluster of data represents data’s close neighbourhood. Like this,
virus data will turn out to be represented in close neighbourhood to one another,
which can be distinguished from the other data.
6.3.3.1 SOM projection
Figure 6.6 shows a simple example to illustrate the process of SOM training and visual-
ization. It shows that if there is similar “isolated” data in a file, it will be distinguished
from remaining data during the training of the SOM.
1. There is a very small input data set in the data buffer. For simplicity, identical
data rows are labelled with one of the letters A, B, C, D and E. A, B, C, and D
represent exactly one row of data, E represents the last 4 rows of identical data.
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Figure 6.6: Example of SOM training and visualization
We will use this example to present how the Umatrix reflects the existence the
area of identical data labelled with E.
2. This is the input data after normalization. The entire data structure is not changed
- E still represents rows of identical data.
3. After the SOM training process, the codebook is produced as presented in Figure
6.6 (3).
4. The Umatrix presents the codebook vector values. In the example, only the
bottom-right neurons are in close neighbourhood to one another when compared
to other neurons.
5. The illustration presents how SOM training located the data based on their density.
The “E data” appears in an area of neurons with a close neighbourhood relation
to one another, compared to other data, because relatively many identical data
instances (labelled with E) were fed into the SOM to train it. That caused the
SOM to calculate a high density of data belonging to E, meaning that the neurons
are in close neighbourhood to one another. The illustrated data location using the
labels was created after identifying each neuron in the Umatrix with its original
label. We will call the way the original data is distributed in the UMatrix the
“SOM distribution” (explained in the next section using Figure 6.7) with data
labels.
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It is important to note that labels are used only to identify where a previously identified
part of the input data will be distributed. They are not a part of the training process
itself. By using such a labelling, an area in the UMatrix will be shown, so-called the virus
mask, represents indeed virus data. In the virus detection system, which is developed in
Janus project, data is obviously unlabelled, as any prior knowledge is not given about
where, if at all, virus data and other fraction of the data are located.
6.3.3.2 SOM Distribution
This technique was used to identify which data part was located where. Using this SOM
distribution, the virus part was identified and proved that the virus detection approach
using SOM was reasonable. Note that this SOM distribution was only used for the
purpose of proving where input data distributed.
Figure 6.7: Example of SOM distribution with labelled data
The way to produce this distribution of data as presented in Figure 6.7 is a bit different
from normal SOM training. That is the reason why the output of the Umatrix (Figure
6.7 (2)) is different from Figure 6.6 (4).
1. The same data buffer, which was used in Figure 6.6, holds labelled data at the end
of each row. In this case, each row belongs to that label, e.g. the first row belongs
to label ‘a’.
2. This SOM distribution represents each label’s data density. Each label’s data
is located together. This method is used for identifying each data’s location and
density. The SOM distribution proves that the E part is located together in Figure
6.6 (4) and illustrated in like Figure 6.6 (5).
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6.4 Virus Visualization Using MATLAB
This section discuss how viruses can be visualized using the SOM-based approach. In
the SOM projection, a particular pattern will be identified, which signals the presence
of a virus. This pattern will be called the virus mask. Table 6.2 presents the test file
information.
Table 6.2: Test file information
variants of the virus file size
Before infection by CIH1.2 11,632 Bytes
Before infection by CIH1.3 14,256 Bytes
Before infection by CIH1.4 1,968 Bytes
Win95.CIH Ver 1.2 19,536 Bytes
Win95.CIH Ver 1.3 36,864 Bytes
Win95.CIH Ver 1.4 4,608 Bytes
Before infection by Win95.Boza.A 2,016 Bytes
Before infection by Win95.Boza.C 3,072 Bytes
Win95.Boza.A 12,408 Bytes
Win95.Boza.C 16,384 Bytes
Before infection by Win32.Apparition 38,912 Bytes
Win32.Apparition 96,239 Bytes
Before infection by Win32.HLLP.Semisoft 41,360 Bytes
Win32.HLLP.Semisoft 59,904 Bytes
Macro.Word97 mw97a 60,928 Bytes
Macro.Word97 mw97b 53,760 Bytes
Macro.Word97 mw97c 68,608 Bytes
Macro.Word97 mw97d 54,272 Bytes
Macro.Word97 mw97e 62,976 Bytes
Macro.Word97 mw97f 65,536 Bytes
Macro.Word97 mw97g 76,288 Bytes
6.4.1 Initialisation
To train a SOM, a virus-infected file’s binary data was converted into a table of numerical
values as it is explained in Section 6.3.1. The file under test of WIN95CIH12.exe was
fed into a SOM and the SOM was initialised like below.
d = som read data(’Win95CIH12.exe.dat’);
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6.4.2 Normalisation
Although binary data was converted to decimal short format, the range of data is still
big. We need to represent each data item using a value between 0 and 1. To do this,
SOM normalization function was used to normalize data to values between 0 and 1. The
‘range’ option implies values are normalized between [0,1].
sd = som normalize(d, ‘range’);
6.4.3 Creation
To create, initialise and train a SOM, there are some values we need: map size, topology,
neighbourhood, radius values, learning rates, and training length. For example, mapsize:
12x8, topology : hexagonal, neighbourhood: Gaussian, radius values: for rough tune 10,
for fine tune 3, learning rate values: for rough tune 0.05, for fine tune 0.02, trainlength
values: for rough tune 1000, for fine tune 10000.
sm = som make(sd, ‘init’, ‘lininit’, ‘msize’, [12,8], ‘algorithm’, ‘batch’, ‘lat-
tice’, ‘hexa’, ‘neigh’, ‘gaussian’, ‘training’, ‘long’);
6.4.4 Visualization
To visualise the trained SOM, there is a ‘som show’ function. Unified distance matrix
or Umatrix, is a method of displaying SOMs. Umatrix represents the map as a regular
grid of neurons. The size and topology of the map can readily be observed from the
picture where each element represents a neuron. Every node of the SOM’s grid gets a
numeric value that corresponds to its local density in the input-space: the average of
distances between its prototype and the neighbouring nodes’ prototypes. A low value
corresponds to a high local density. A high value corresponds to a low local density.
The numeric values are shown as shades of grey.
The location of the best-matching prototypes corresponds to the topography of the input
data. The shape of the Umatrix corresponds to the density structure of the input data.
This can be done in order to discover the spatial structure of a given set of data samples.
First, when generating an Umatrix, a distance matrix between the reference vectors of
adjacent neurons of two-dimensional map is formed. Then, some representation for the
matrix is selected, e.g., a grey-level image. The colours in the figure have been selected
so that the lighter the colour or lower of the colour value between two neurons, the
smaller the relative distance between them.
som show(sm, ‘umat’, ‘all’);
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In this function, ‘umat’ implies show Umatrix with all variables, e.g., the whole variables
in the codebook.
6.5 Result of Virus Visualization
6.5.1 Example Case: Win95 CIH Virus
The Win95.CIH/Chernobyl [Samamura(1998)] is a Windows95/98/NT specific parasitic
virus infecting Windows PE (Portable Executable) files, and has about 1 Kbytes of
length. As this virus was one of the most famous viruses, which appeared periodically
from 1998 to 2004 in slightly different variants, it is chosen to discuss here. Figure 6.8
shows the SOM projection of two Windows executable files before Win95.CIH infection.
The SOM projections of the tested Windows executables are different to one other,
because they are different executable files. However, after Win95.CIH infection, the
SOM projections of the files develop a similar pattern as presented in Figure 6.9: a dark
area (navy coloured in the coloured map, representing an area of SOM cells where each
cell has a short distance to its neighbouring cells). The easily identifiable dark spot is
so-called the virus mask. It is the pattern that signals the presence of a virus in the file
under test.
Figure 6.8: SOM projections of two different Windows EXE files before infection
Figure 6.9 shows two SOM projections after training the SOM with two Win95.CIH (ver-
sions 1.2 and 1.3) infected Windows executable files respectively. Each Win95.CIH/Chernobyl
virus mask has an obvious location: top of the centre. Although the tested Windows ex-
ecutable files were different, the SOM projections of CIH virus-infected files look similar
and have the same sort of projection map.
To prove that the virus mask represents indeed the CIH virus code, the SOM was
trained in another experiment with data to which labels DS (DOS stub), PE (NewEXE
header), PR (program code), and VS (virus code) were attached. The labels reflect
the structure of an infected file as was presented in Figure 6.2. In order to attach the
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Figure 6.9: SOM projections of Windows EXE files infected by Win95.CIH viruses
labels, the structure of the infected file was examined “by hand”. When the data set was
produced, to each row a label was added as shown in Figure 6.7 (1). The result of the
SOM distribution with labelled data is presented in Figure 6.10. This SOM distribution
has grouped the same labels together. Therefore the figures of the SOM distribution
with labels are quite different from the normal SOM projection (Figure 6.9).
Figure 6.10: Virus SOM Distribution of CIH 1.2 and 1.3 viruses.
The circles in Figure 6.10 identify the different data areas except for the program code
area (PR). PR is simply represented by the remaining area. As Figure 6.10 shows,
there are two parts where cells have a smaller distance to their neighbouring cells: PE
(NewEXE header) and VS (Virus Code). Even though PE shows an area of smaller
distances between two SOM cells, VS dominates the area of small cell distances (black
area in grey-scale, navy-coloured area in colour print), proving that the virus mask
identified in Figure 6.9 represents indeed virus code.
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6.5.2 Example Case: Win95 Boza Virus
Boza virus [Service(1996)] is the first known virus infecting Windows Portable Exe-
cutable (PE) files, such files are used by Windows 95/NT. However, Boza does not
infect machines running the Microsoft Windows NT operating system. It searches for
EXE files, checks the files for PE signature, and then creates in the EXE file a new
section named “.vlad”, and writes its code into that section.
Figure 6.11: SOMs of Win95 Boza.A and Boza.C viruses.
Figure 6.12: SOM Distribution of Boza.A and Boza.C viruses.
Two different variants of Boza virus were selected and trained. Figure 6.11 shows the
Boza virus projection: the majority of lower valued colour in the upper centre repre-
sented the Boza virus code. To prove this, SOM distribution was made with labels as
shown in Figure 6.12. As it was expected, the majority of smaller distance area was the
Boza virus code. Although the NewEXE header code also had small distances, it did
not represent the majority.
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6.5.3 Example Case: Win32.Apparition
Win32.apparition virus [KASPERSKY(2003)] has a very unusual structure. The main
part (about 60K) is the virus code (virus routines and C runtime library), text strings,
icon and other data used by the virus while installing and spreading. The next block
(3.5K) contains a packed (with LZ method) MS Word template - a Word macro virus.
The third block (21K) contains packed (by LZ) virus source code. And the last block
(3K) contains a resources file that is used when the virus runs the Borland C compiler.
Figure 6.13: SOM projection and distribution of WinNT apparition virus.
Like other virus SOM projections, this virus SOM also had the virus mask. Figure 6.13
shows the projection of Win32.apparition virus and the projection with labels for the
distribution respectively. In addition, this virus code had an unusual structure: the
distribution of the virus code was quite similar to the program code and the data parts.
Nevertheless, the majority of the smaller distance area represented the virus code.
6.5.4 Example Case: Win32.HLLP.Semisoft
Win32.HLLP.Semisoft virus [McAfee(2001)] is an unusual file infector which infects files
under Windows 95/NT. Figure 6.14 shows the SOM projection of Win32.HLLP.Semisoft
virus and the SOM distribution with labels for the data distribution respectively. Like
the previous virus SOMs, this SOM also has the virus mask and the majority of the
smaller distance area represented the virus code.
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Figure 6.14: SOM projection and distribution of Win32.HLLP.Semisoft virus.
6.5.5 Example Case: MacroWord97.Mbug Virus
When SOM was trained with macro viruses, the result was as in Figure.6.15. The
Macro.Word97.Mbug virus is a class macro virus for Word97 documents and templates.
The infected file is an MS Word document file. Variants of the Macro.Word97.Mbug
virus are also presented in Figure.6.15 after training by the SOM.
Figure 6.15: SOMs of Word97 file infected by Macro viruses.
Although the figures of the SOM projections look very similar to the virus mask in the
CIH example, the result of analysing the SOM data distribution (Figure 6.16) showed
that the majority of the top-centre located data was not virus code (VS) part but were
labelled OD and SD (these reflect the particular structure of Word documents and will
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Figure 6.16: SOM distribution of Word97 file infected by Macro viruses
not be discussed any further in this paper). Thus, the result indicates that we cannot
deal with macro viruses in the same way we deal with parasitic viruses. Thus, the
current SOM-based approach is insensitive to macro viruses.
Chapter 7
Application Cases
Security used to be an inconvenience sometimes,
but now it is a necessity all the time.
- Martina Navratilova.
Until now, this project has addressed packet evaluation methods and their application
of technology. In this chapter, those methods were applied to Janus, the firewall system.
The details of the project were mentioned in previous chapters, whilst this chapter
focuses on how Janus works based on the computational methods employed.
7.1 Janus Firewall System
7.1.1 Background of Packet Filtering & Packet Classification
The primary aspect of packet filtering is the issue of packet classification. It oper-
ates by identifying a policy by comparing the protocol header fields of a packet with
a filter specification. Packet classification has been the subject of much study in re-
cent time, for instance, [Lakshman and Stiliadis(1998), Gupta and McKeown(1999a),
Feldmann and Muthukrishnan(2000)]. The reason being that the ability to classify
packets plays a central role in routing and in the Differentiated Services (diffserv) 1
architecture [F. Baker and Smith(2002)]. However, the requirements to the packet clas-
sification scheme may be quite different from one application to another. One example
is routing on the Internet, where the classifier is used for choosing an interface based
1Differentiated services enhancements to the Internet protocol are intended to enable scalable service
discrimination in the Internet without the need for per-flow state and signalling at every hop. A variety
of services may be built from a small, well-defined set of building blocks, which are deployed in network
nodes. The services may be either end-to-end or intra-domain; they include both those that can satisfy
quantitative performance requirements (e.g., peak bandwidth) and those based on relative performance
(e.g., “class” differentiation).
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on a routing table. Here the classification only uses one or two of the address fields in
the packet header to determine route, where a firewall may classify packets based on
any number of packet header fields in TCP and/or IP. A related example is whether
the classification algorithms should support dynamic updates of the specification or not.
This is, for instance, the case with dynamic routing. Firewalls, on the other hand, use
specifications that are more static. A final difference may be the option to use dedicated
hardware or not. Given these differences, common performance measures of packet clas-
sification algorithms still remain. This includes classification time, space complexity,
and performance of the optimisation phase. Often worst case complexities are given in
along with empirical measurements.
Packet processing has something in common, they have a set of rules and they match
incoming packets to the rules to find which rules match the packet. This common
function is usually called packet classification. Figure 7.1 illustrates the conceptual
model of a packet classification. Packet classification function has three components;
a packet, a filter database, and an algorithm to classify packets. A packet is the IP
datagram to be matched with filters in the filter database. The packet has several
properties that are relevant to classification; source and destination addresses, type of
service, length, and so on. Filter database is a collection of filters also called rules, and
each filter consists of several fields and an action. Each field of a filter is associated to a
certain property of IP packet, usually to a packet header field. Each field can be in the
form of single value e.g., 23, range e.g., 0-1023, prefix e.g., 203.178.143/24, or wildcard
i.e., matches all values. A packet property matches to its corresponding filter field if the
value of that property is contained within the value range of the filter field. A packet
matches to a filter if all properties of the packet match to the corresponding fields of the
filter. When this happens, packet is classified into the flow defined by the filter, and will
be treated according to the action of the filter. Packet classification algorithm performs
the matching between IP packet and the filters to find which filter matches the packet.
Figure 7.1: Conceptual model of packet classification
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Packet classification can be categorized as layer-3 or layer-4 classification, depending on
the fields of filters. Filters of layer 3 classification uses IP address fields or other packet
header fields that are relevant for processing at the Internet layer of TCP/IP protocol
stack. If classification includes other fields that are only relevant to UDP and TCP, and
then it is called layer-4 classification.
Firewalls in general do layer-4 classification since they tend to use port fields for their fil-
ter databases. Firewalls are used not only to prevent or allow traffic from and to certain
hosts, but also from and to certain hosts using certain applications, indicated from the
protocol type and port fields. Firewall database obtained in packet classification field are
less than 2000 filters [Gupta and McKeown(1999b), V. Srinivasan and Varghese(1999),
Venkatachary Srinivasan and Waldvogel(1998)]. Further details of related work in packet
filtering & classification is in Appendix B.
7.1.1.1 Packet Filters
Packet filters work by dropping packets based on their source or destination addresses
and/or ports. In general, no context is kept; decisions are made only from the contents
of the current packet. Depending on the type of router, filtering may be done at input
time, at output time, or both. The administrator makes a list of the acceptable machines
and services and a stop-list of unacceptable machines or services. It is easy to permit or
deny access at the host or network level with a packet-filter.
Table 7.1: An example of a CISCO router access list.
Note. The fourth rule is never matched because of the second rule.
order rules
1 permit udp any host 10.0.0.1 eq 53
2 deny udp any host 10.0.0.2
3 permit udp any 10.0.0.0 0.0.0.255 eq 123
4 permit udp any host 10.0.0.2 eq 177
5 deny ip any any
Simple packet-filters usually use simple ordered lists of rules. An example of a CISCO
router access list is shown in Table 7.1. When a packet is received, the list is scanned
from the start to the end, and the action, either “permit” or “deny”, associated with
the first match is taken. If a packet does not match any of the rules, the default action
is “deny”. Often a “deny all” rule is included at the end of the list to make it easier to
verify that a list has not been truncated. Separate lists can be specified for each network
interface.
The rules can use the following fields from the IP protocol header: next level protocol,
e.g., TCP or UDP, source and destination IP addresses, type-of-service, and precedence.
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In addition, some fields for upper level protocols, such as TCP and UDP port numbers
can be used. A more complete discussion of the syntax of the rules used by CISCO
routers is in [CISCO(2002), Hundley and Held(2000)]. Since the first matching rule is
always used, it is very easy to make mistakes when writing access lists, especially when
the lists are long; several hundred rules are not uncommon. For instance, the fourth
rule in Table 7.1 is never matched because the packets are stopped at the second rule.
7.1.2 Process of Janus System
It is a well-known fact that all protocol stacks have security holes; these can cause
vulnerabilities in firewall systems as well. However, Janus does not require a TCP/IP
stack. In order to achieve this on a normal Unix computer, it was necessary to recompile
the kernel with support for network cards but without any TCP/IP networking support.
Figure 7.2: Work flow to make a decision in the adaptive detection model.
Figure 7.2 represents the process flow of the Janus system. Decoded packets are in-
spected in order to validate protocols, and are checked for protocol sanity, e.g. check
header, check sender, check recipient, and check attachment. Meanwhile, TCP packets
are verified using the TCP verification model. Then among TCP packets, the UBE/Virus
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mail checker classifies mail packets. If mail packets’ attachments contain virus possibly,
virus detection alerts it. All processing parts here are predefined in previous chapters
(details are found in all previous chapters); they are now applied to the real implemen-
tation. In the last step, the policy relative part needs to be updateable or modifiable.
According to a site policy, the interpreter will decide whether to drop a packet or let it
pass. Therefore, most policy parts are editable through rules in Janus. Through these,
malicious logic, which causes the site policy to be violated, can be detected. The process
flow was implemented as in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 process of Janus system
let allPackets = {pkt | pkt ∈ ipPackets where decodedPackets(pkt) }
let receivedPackets = {rvp | rvp ∈ allPackets where decodedPackets(pkt) }
let mailPackets = {m | m ∈ TCPPackets where decodedPackets(pkt) }
let policy = {p | p ∈ accessRules & p ∈ messageRules where messagePattern(p) }
for all pkt ∈ allPackets do
do in parallel
for all rvp ∈ receivedPackets do
SanityCheck(rvp)
end for
choose pkt ∈ allPackets where TCPSanityCheck(pkt) do
TCPTransactionVerification(pkt)
choose mail ∈ mailPackets where EmailClassifier(mail) do
VirusDetect(mail.attachment)
end choose
end choose
PacketFilter(pkt, policy)
enddo
end for
7.1.3 Placement of the Janus system
The Janus firewall has been designed to protect any server system from any internal or
outside network area. Like in Figure 7.3, the Janus system is placed inside the university
firewalls with a separated subnetwork routing setup on an Internet connection. This
causes the Janus system to act as a firewall/router on the subnetwork since all traffic
travels through that system.
There are three types of placement possible: in a single server, in a multi-server, or in
a grouped server environment. Current IP settings and working environment with the
Janus box are in a single server environment as in Figure 7.4. The Janus packet-filter
drops, and lets pass packets according to the rules defined in a config file (janus.config)
and a rule file (janus.rules). For each packet inspected by the filter, the set of rules
is evaluated from top to bottom, and the last matching rule decides what action is
performed.
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Figure 7.3: Janus Network Configuration
• In a single server environment with the use of a crossover cable. In this
setup, the Janus system is attached to the network where the server used to be
and the server is connected to the second network card in the Janus system via a
crossover cable. This is the current Janus system configuration (Figure 7.4).
Figure 7.4: In a single server environment with the use of a crossover cable
• In a multi-server environment. In this setup, the Janus system is attached to
the network where the servers used to be and the servers are either connected via
a hub to the second Janus network card or multiple network cards can be used in
the Janus system as in Figure 7.5.
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Figure 7.5: In a multi-server environment
• In a grouped server environment. Where servers are grouped together by type
of services provided, separate Janus boxes can be used for each group as in Figure
7.6. In this configuration, rules are optimised by separating them into multiple
Janus systems to increase performance and by grouping servers according to the
services they offer to match the rules.
Figure 7.6: In a grouped server environment
7.1.4 Packet-filter & Classifier
A packet-filter is a multi-interfaced device that applies a set of rules to filter IP packets
passing through its interfaces. Each interface on the device represents a connection to
a network. For instance, a company protecting their internal LAN from the Internet
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would need a packet-filter with two interfaces, one to the local network and another to the
external network to which the local network connects such as the company’s Internet
service provider. Filtering on a packet-filter may occur in several places. In theory,
packets can be filtered in both inbound and outbound directions on all the interfaces
of a packet-filter, although this flexibility may differ between various implementations
of packet-filters [Cheswick and Bellovin(1994)]. Thus, the rules of a packet-filter are
organised into a set of access lists and each list is then applied to a particular interface,
in a specified direction.
The main idea of packet-filter rule searching is to combine all the rules into a single data
structure that can be searched once to find the first matching rule. The aim of Janus’
packet-filter rule-format is to find an internal representation for access lists capable
of providing fast lookup with reasonable memory requirements. Since access lists are
consulted frequently for each arriving packet, the ability to perform fast lookups is the
most important factor. This justifies using a potentially large amount of effort initially
to create an efficient internal representation. Janus rule set consists of packet header field
and message field. Since a firewall has to prevent secure systems from network attacks,
Janus must cover the known network attacks by attack signatures. So, the message field
can be used in this way, as well as for declaring mail attached file extensions. However,
message field information needs to be chosen carefully.
7.1.4.1 Access Lists
An access list describes the security policy of the packet-filter at the point at which it
is applied. Although the syntax of access lists may differ from one implementation of
a packet-filter to another, their flexibility and semantics remain fairly constant. Each
rule in an access list consists of a selection criterion and an action field. The action
field specifies what should happen if the packet meets the selection criterion. Packet
filters usually offer the two actions accept and drop. Accept means the packet should
be allowed to continue towards its destination IP address whereas drop means that the
packet should be discarded.
The selection criterion of a rule is a Boolean expression involving values of fields avail-
able in the packet headers. The number of fields that may be specified for filtering is
known as the dimension of a filter. In theory, any information available in the packet
headers can be used as filtering criteria. In practice, the common filtering fields include
[Vos and Konijnenberg(1996)]:
• Source and destination IP addresses. These addresses can be found in the IP header
of every packet. Traffic restriction is facilitated by allowing the administrator to
specify the set of well-known hosts or networks that may use the system.
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Table 7.2: Example of Janus Rule
<rule>
ip proto(UDP, ICMP, IGMP, 13-15)
action=block
</rule>
<rule>
ip dst(134.21.0.0/16, 134.21.14.50-134.21.14.59)
tcp port(21-25)
action=block
</rule>
# incoming packet towards MailServer includes executable file,
# then check for virus detection.
<rule>
ip dst(MailServers)
tcp dst(25)
tcp nocase(.exe, .pif, .com)
action=check
</rule>
# incoming packet towards Webserver includes executable file, then drop
<rule>
ip dst(WebServers)
tcp dst(80)
tcp nocase(.exe, .vbs, .com)
action=test
</rule>
• Transport protocol, like TCP, UDP, or ICMP, which is also found in the IP header.
• IP options, like the source route option, which is often considered dangerous for
network security.
• Source and destination port numbers, associated with TCP and UDP. These can
be found in the TCP and UDP headers respectively. Filters using port numbers
can restrict the network traffic to a limited set of services that are associated with
well-known ports.
• TCP flags, such as the ACK and SYN flags. These flags indicate whether a packet
is initiating a new connection and can be used to restrict TCP connections from
being initiated in certain directions.
• ICMP message types. These are found in the ICMP header. Filtering on ICMP
types allows the administrator to restrict ICMP traffic to a limited set of message
types.
The classification for each packet, i.e., whether it should be accepted or discarded, is
given by the action field of the first rule whose selection criterion matches the packet.
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Each rule of an access list describes the condition, based on the values of fields within
the packet header, that a packet must meet in order to have the corresponding action
effected. Thus, the condition of a rule is simply a logical expression involving certain
fields of the packet header to be accepted, a packet must satisfy this expression if the
rule’s action is accept, and not satisfy the expression if the rule’s action is reject. Current
Janus rules look like Table 7.2. If no rules match, the default rule is applied. The default
rule is determined by the security policy and is usually set to reject all packets, since
this is the preferred security stance [R.L.Ziegler(2000)]. In the Janus rule file, “action”
defines the action to perform when the rule matches. Actions are defined in the Janus
config file.
7.1.4.2 Address Notation
Although the syntax of access lists differs from system to system, in terms of network
addresses and masks, two conventions are used.
• base address/bit count notation: The expression 134.21.54.0/24 represents the
block of IP addresses in the range 134.21.54.0 to 134.21.54.255. In other words,
the number after the slash indicates the number of bits in the address, starting at
the most significant, that are significant for comparison.
• address, mask tuple: The address block 134.21.54.0/24 can be alternatively ex-
pressed with a base address of 134.21.54.0 and a mask of 0.0.0.255. Both the
address and the mask consist of 32 bits, with each bit in the mask specifying
whether the corresponding bit in the address is significant for comparison.
7.1.4.3 Structures For Filtering Ruleset
Figure 7.7: The linked list structure for filtering ruleset in Janus.
Janus uses a two-dimensional linked-list structure for filtering rule-set. This linked
list consists of rule tree nodes and message tree nodes. A rule tree node holds many
common properties that must be included in each rule, such as the source and destination
addresses, source and destination ports, and protocol type such as TCP, UDP, ICMP
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and so on. The message tree node holds the information for the various messages that
can be added to each rule, e.g., packet content. These structures are organized into
chains which can be conceptualised with the rule tree node’s string from left to right as
chain headers and the message tree node’s hanging down from the individual rule tree
nodes to which each is associated as illustrated in Figure 7.7.
When packets are being examined against a given rule set, the packet is first compared
along the rule tree node list from left to right until the packet matches a particular rule
tree node. Only if such a match occurs is the packet then compared down the message
tree node list of the matching rule tree node. If any of the message checks fails, the
packet is then checked against the next message tree node in the list. If a content check
is required, Janus uses a Boyer-Moore pattern matching algorithm to check the content
string held in the message tree node against the entire packet payload. If no match
exists, Janus will proceed to the next message tree node in the list, which could have all
options identical to the previous message tree node except for a slightly different content
string.
7.1.4.4 Message Pattern Matching Algorithm
Algorithm 2 Boyer-Moore message pattern matching
if Output = undef or Index 6= undef then
if Index > Length(packetPayload) - Length(msgPattern) then
Index := undef
else if CharAt(msgPattern, Offset) = CharAt(packetPayload, Index + Offset)
then
if Offset = 0 then
Output := Index
else
Offset := Offset - 1
end if
else
Index := Index + Skip(Offset, CharAt(packetPayload, Index + Offset))
Offset := Length(msgPattern) - 1
end if
end if
This message pattern matching has two purposes: matching file extensions for mail
attachment file, and possible attack message patterns. For message pattern matching,
the Boyer-Moore algorithm was applied. Boyer-Moore [Boyer and Moore(1977)] is a
quite fast pattern matching algorithm in practice. It uses heuristics to reduce the number
of comparisons needed to determine if a given text string matches a particular pattern,
i.e., it uses knowledge of the keyword to search for to skip over unnecessary comparisons
against the text being searched. The algorithm typically aligns the text and the keyword
to search for so that the keyword can be checked from left to right along the text string
beginning with the last character of the keyword and ending with the first.
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We will define a nullary function Index that holds the current index that we are testing.
We will assert that its initial value is 0. If we determine that the current value of Index
is not the start of a match, we simply increment Index. If we find no matches anywhere
in the string, we update Index to undef. The algorithm is finished if a match is found,
in which case Output is updated to some value, or if not match is found anywhere, in
which case Index is updated to undef. We will define another nullary function Offset,
which will be used in the character-by-character comparison. The message pattern at
index Offset will be compared with the packet payload. A new function CharAt takes
a string and an integer and returns the character at that position in the string. In the
Boyer-Moore algorithm, the message pattern is compared against the packet payload
from right to left. The message pattern still advances along the packet payload in a left
to right fashion. Boyer-Moore uses the rule ‘skip’ over certain characters as well. If the
character currently being scanned in the packet payload does not appear at all in the
message pattern, we know that nothing to the left of this current character can be part
of a match. So, we can move the message pattern all the way to the right of the current
character. It is not the offset value that counts; rather it is the current character in the
packet payload. The Boyer-Moore algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2.
7.1.5 Packet Verifier
Packet Verifier consists of Sanity Checker and a TCP verification model. To cover
other protocol aspects apart from TCP state specification, there is Sanity Checker. This
performs layer 3 and layer 4 sanity checks. These include verifying packet size, checking
UDP and TCP header lengths, dropping IP options and verifying the TCP flags to
ensure that packets have not been manually crafted by a malicious user, and that all
packet parameters are correct. This validation is based on the protocol requirements
in Section 4.1. For instance, an IP header length should always be greater than or
equal to the minimal Internet header length (20 octets) and a packet’s total length
should always be greater than its header length. IP address checks are also important
since land attacks [Fyodor(1997)] use the same IP address for source and destination.
According to the TCP standard [Postel(1981c)], neither the source nor the destination
TCP port number can be zero, and TCP flags, e.g. URG and PSH flags, can be used
only when a packet carries data. Thus, for instance, combinations of SYN and URG or
SYN and PSH become invalid. In addition, any combination of more than one of the
SYN, RST, and FIN flags is also invalid. Through the requirement in Section 4.1, the
implementation part of Sanity Checker procedure (function SanityCheck in Algorithm
1) is presented in Algorithm 3.
Sanity Checker examines every packet within a 10 second window, and at the end of
each window, it will record any malicious activity it sees using syslog. Sanity Checker
assumes any TCP packet other than a RST may be used to scan for services. If packets
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Algorithm 3 SanityCheck procedure
let receivedPackets = {pkt | pkt ∈ ipPackets where decodedPackets(pkt) }
for all pkt ∈ receivedPackets do
if CheckAddress(pkt.dstaddr, pkt.srcaddr) 6= true then
BlockPkt(pkt)
else
ipProtocol := getPktIP(pkt)
if ipProtocol = TCP then
TCPSanityCheck(pkt)
else if ipProtocol = UDP then
UDPSanityCheck(pkt)
else if ipProtocol = ICMP then
ICMPSanityCheck(pkt)
else
Skip
end if
end if
end for
of any type are received by more than 7 different ports within the window, an event is
logged. The same criteria are used for UDP scans. Any SYN packets with source and
destination address and ports being the same are identified as land attacks. If more than
5 ICMP ECHO REPLIES are seen within the window, Sanity Checker assumes it may be
a Smurf attack [CERT(1998)]. Sanity Checker also assumes that any fragmented ICMP
packet is bad, so this catches attacks such as the ping of death. Sanity Checker check any
TCP fragment whether it has non-zero offset or not, so this catches fragment attack. To
make the certainty higher, Sanity Checker cooperates with the TCP verification model
to check three-way handshake and a SYN flood event.
The simplified TCP verification model is depicted in Figure 7.8 and the associated TCP
state table with action is presented in Table 7.3 to monitor and control TCP state
transitions as was presented in Chapter 4. Janus needs to trace down the behaviour
represented by the remaining TCP verification model. Janus should take all kinds of
TCP behaviour into account. With the TCP verification model, Janus can avoid blocking
packets such that a TCP session can hang, and makes the window of opportunities for
abuse as small as possible. Abuse is defined here as sending malicious data that will be
accepted as valid data or sending malicious ACK’s that will be accepted as valid ACK’s.
In addition, Janus should minimize the amount of blocked packets that belong to valid
sessions. Through the verification model (Figure 7.8), the implementation part of the
TCP state verification procedure (function TCPTransitionVerification in Algorithm 1)
is presented in Algorithm 4.
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Algorithm 4 TCP Transaction verification procedure
let pktHeader = {ph | ph ∈ allTCPPackets where ChooseTCPHeader(pkt) }
let tcpId = Hash (pkt.srcAddr, pkt.srcPort, pkt.dstAddr, pkt.dstPort)
do in parallel
rcvFlags := CheckRcvFlags(tcpId)
sntFlags := CheckSntFlags(tcpId)
choose tcpId ∈ pktHeader where CheckState(tcpId) do
if UnexpectedFlags(tcpId) then
UpdateState(tcpId, CLOSED)
end if
end choose
choose tcpId ∈ pktHeader where CheckStateListen(tcpId) do
if rcvFlags = SYN then
UpdateState(tcpId, SYN RCVD)
end if
end choose
choose tcpId ∈ pktHeader where CheckStateSynRcvd(tcpId) do
if rcvFlags = RST then
UpdateState(tcpId, LISTEN)
else if sntFlags = SYNACK then
UpdateState(tcpId, ACK WAIT)
end if
end choose
choose tcpId ∈ pktHeader where CheckStateAckWait(tcpId) do
if rcvFlags = ACK then
UpdateState(tcpId, ESTABLISHED)
else if rcvFlags = ACKFIN then
UpdateState(tcpId, CLOSE WAIT 2)
else if rcvFlags = FIN & sntFlags = ACK then
UpdateState(tcpId, CLOSING)
else if sentFlags = RST or timeout(tcpId) then
UpdateState(tcpId, CLOSED)
end if
end choose
choose tcpId ∈ pktHeader where CheckStateClosing(tcpId) do
if rcvFlags = ACK then
UpdateState(tcpId, CLOSE WAIT 1)
end if
end choose
choose tcpId ∈ pktHeader where CheckStateCloseWait1(tcpId) do
if sntFlags = ACK then
UpdateState(tcpId, CLOSED)
end if
end choose
choose tcpId ∈ pktHeader where CheckStateEstablished(tcpId) do
if rcvFlags = FIN & sntFlag = ACK then
UpdateState(tcpId, CLOSE WAIT 2)
else if rcvFlags = RST or rcvFlags = SYN or timeout(tcpId) then
UpdateState(tcpId, CLOSED)
end if
end choose
choose tcpId ∈ pktHeader where CheckStateCloseWait2(tcpId) do
if rcvFlags = ACK or timeout(tcpId) then
UpdateState(tcpId, CLOSED)
end if
end choose
enddo
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Figure 7.8: TCP Verification Model
Table 7.3: TCP states table
Current State New State Action
LISTEN SYN RCVD recv: SYN
SYN RCVD LISTEN recv: RST
SYN RCVD ACK WAIT send: SYN, ACK
ACK WAIT ESTABLISHED recv: ACK
ACK WAIT CLOSE WAIT 2 recv: ACK of SYN, FIN
ACK WAIT CLOSED timeout (60 sec) or recv: SYN
ACK WAIT CLOSING recv: FIN, send: ACK
ESTABLISHED CLOSE WAIT 2 recv: FIN, send: ACK
ESTABLISHED CLOSED recv: RST or SYN, or timeout (30 min)
CLOSING CLOSED timeout (10 sec)
CLOSING CLOSE WAIT 2 recv: ACK
CLOSE WAIT 2 CLOSED recv: ACK, or timeout (10 sec)
7.1.6 Email Classifier
In Chapter 5, email classification was described. With the result of classification, an
email classifier is implemented as presented by Algorithm 5.
Here, most parts are predefined with the result classification information of Chapter
5. For example, the abnormal mail classifier is denoted by t, UBEs by u and Email
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Algorithm 5 process for email classifier
let receivedMailPackets = {m | m ∈ mailPackets where decodedPackets(m)}
for all mail ∈ receivedMailPackets do
do in parallel
fr := CheckSender(mail)
to := CheckRecipient(mail)
h := CheckHeader(mail)
ef := CheckExecutable(mail)
enddo
do in parallel
UBEflag := AlertOfUBE(fr, to)
Virusflag := AlertOfVirus(fr, to, h, ef)
enddo
if UBEflag = true & Virusflag = true then
mailAlert := true
else if UBEflag = true & Virusflag = false then
ubeAlert := true
else if UBEflag = false & Virusflag = true then
virusAlert := true
else
mailAlert := false
ubeAlert := false
virusAlert := false
end if
end for
viruses by v. Therefore the abnormal mail classifier t is true if either u or v are true,
which means that this classifier can say whether or not a mail is abnormal by UBE or
email-virus data in the raw packets detected.
t = u + v.2
The UBE classifier u is true if either a sender Fr or a recipient To are false, which
means that this classifier can say whether a mail is an UBE by identifying that either
the sender part or the recipient part are malformed.
u = ¬(Fr ∧ To)
The classifier decides whether mail contains an email virus by the following facts; al-
though the sender part is correct, a recipient part and a header part are wrong and there
is an attachment in the mail, or although the recipient part is correct, a sender part and
a header part are wrong and there is an attachment in the mail, or a sender part and a
recipient part are wrong even though the header part is ok and there is an attachment,
2“+” represents here the Boolean OR operation.
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or a sender part, a recipient part and a header part are all wrong whether there is an
attachment or not. For email virus classification v,
v =
(Fr∧¬To∧¬H∧EF )∨(¬Fr∧To∧¬H∧EF )∨(¬Fr∧¬To∧H∧EF )∨(¬Fr∧¬To∧¬H)
UBE and email virus information is implemented in functions AlertOfUBE and AlertOfVirus.
The process of email classification is implemented by Algorithm 5.
7.2 Janus VirusDetector
Prior work presented in Chapter 6 described an approach to visualize virus patterns using
Self-Organizing Maps (SOMs) [Kohonen(1995)]. The SOM visualization of virus-infected
files proved that the virus detection approach without prior knowledge of virus signatures
using SOM made sense. In this section, a virus detection program, VirusDetector, is
presented which has been developed for determining whether a file is virus-infected or
not, based on the prior work using SOM.
A virus detection program, VirusDetector, was then developed which uses the SOM algo-
rithms initially employed in the MATLAB visualization. However, it does not visualize
the viruses anymore but solely decides whether or not the visualization had contained
the so-called virus mask which indicates the presence of a virus.
Even though a colourful visualization was produced easily using MATLAB, VirusDetec-
tor does not require colourful visualization; only the Umatrix neurons’ values are used
for detection. Thus, VirusDetector uses an internal Black/White representation of the
Umatrix’s node values using textual information.
7.2.1 Test Data Collection
In total, 790 virus-infected files (291 Win9x files and 499 Win32 files), 80 normal (i.e.
non-infected) Windows executable files, and 15 macro-virus-infected Windows Word
files were tested using the SOM-based approach, including downloadable application
programs such as SSHSecureShellClient-3.2.9.exe, dxwebsetup.exe, klcodec220b.exe, and
already installed executable programs such as Excel.exe, Winword.exe, Acrobat.exe,
servertool.exe. Those virus-infected files were detected and caught in between 1996 and
2004. Even “old” viruses are still of interest as they have several variants that appear
in present days. For example, variants of the CIH/Chernobyl [CERT(1999b)] virus have
appeared each year since 1998. All test data, file information and the test results are
listed in Appendix C.
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7.2.2 Process of Virus Detection
With the knowledge about the virus mask in SOM projections of virus-infected files,
VirusDetector is built which, based on SOM algorithms, detects the virus mask. Apart
from the colourful visualization result using MATLAB, VirusDetector uses a simple
Black/White colour scheme.
Figure 7.9: The process of virus detection in VirusDetector
Figure 7.9 shows the step-wise process in VirusDetector. After feeding a binary exe-
cutable file to VirusDetector, the data is converted into integer format. Then the data
is normalized using certain SOM parameters such as topology type: Hexa, neighbour-
hood: Gaussian, map size: 12 x 8, radius1: 10, radius2: 3, learning rate1: 0.05 for rough
tune, learning rate2: 0.03 for fine tune, trainlength1: 1000, and trainlength2: 10000.
Afterwards, the SOM is trained with the normalized data. Unfortunately, there is no
theoretical basis for the selection of these parameters [Kohonen(1995)]. The parameter
settings were determined experimentally from the visualization results using the SOM
toolbox in MATLAB. Note that the graphical representation of the SOM depends on
the initialisation, meaning that a virus mask might be located in a different location,
or be shown in a totally undetectable form for a different initialisation. However, us-
ing the mentioned (good) parameters, the SOM projection produces the patterns which
VirusDetector can search for and finally find the virus mask if it is present.
While the SOM is trained, it produces a codebook for storing the data. Using this
codebook, VirusDetector calculates the Umatrix in Black/White. High values (dark
SOM cells) indicate high data density, which is particularly the case for virus data. A
“factor value” is used for selecting which high values are significant. According to these
B/W Umatrix values, VirusDetector filters out the Umatrix values above the factor value
and saves them. To represent the filtered-out values on the two-dimensional projection
plane, the character “S” is used (each SOM cell with an assigned gray-scale value above
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the factor value is represented by an “S” all other cells are blank). This produces a
representation of the projection plane in form of ASCII strings. After producing the
map of “S”’s, VirusDetector searches for the virus pattern and marks the virus mask
if any is present. After identifying the virus mask, VirusDetector decides that the file
under test is virus-infected.
Figure 7.10: Virus Detection Example
Here is an example of the detection process as depicted in Figure 7.10.
1. Data buffer presents a virus-infected file’s short-integer-formatted data.
2. After normalization in VirusDetector, the codebook of the input data is produced.
3. VirusDetector calculates the values of the Umatrix neurons from the codebook,
assigning a grey-scale colour value to each neuron (SOM cell).
4. If the factor value is 72, which is used in VirusDetector, the neurons with a higher
value than the factor value are selected, as presented in Figure 7.11 (a).
5. The filtered values are replaced by character “S” to create strings as presented in
Figure 7.11 (b), and VirusDetector manipulates the strings to search for the virus
pattern. In the final step, VirusDetector decides on the found pattern whether or
not it represents a virus mask using Algorithm 6.
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Figure 7.11: In B/W Umatrix, bigger values are selected and replaced by char S’.
Algorithm 6 process of searching virus mask
for all string ∈ givenfile do
if search string S i for the first occurrence of substring ”SSS” then
if search string S i+1 for the first occurrence of substring ”SS” then
compare up to each string’s size characters of string S i to S i+1, and vice
versa.
if size string is equal to or less than the other string, then
virus mask!
end if
else if repeated search on string S i for substring ”SSSS” then
if search string S i+1 for the first occurrence of substring ”SSS” then
virus mask!
end if
end if
else
compare up to string S i’s size characters of string S i to S i+1,
if S i is equal to or less than S i+1, then
virus mask!
end if
end if
end for
7.2.3 Result of Virus Detection
Using VirusDetector, the 790 virus-infected files are tested, which are listed in Appendix
C. The test set only includes virus-infected executable Windows files. Since experiments
with labelling the input data showed that it could not detect macro viruses properly,
macro viruses are excluded from the test set.
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7.2.4 Unencrypted Parasitic Viruses
Figures 7.12, 7.13 and 7.14 are the SOM projection of the CIH virus v1.2, v1.3, v1.4 and
recognition result produced by VirusDetector respectively. As the result shows, the virus
mask is represented roughly by the strings of “S”’s. Figures 7.15 and 7.16 contains the
equivalent result for Win95.Anxiety virus. Tables 7.4 and 7.5 summarize the experiments
conducted on some virus-infected executables in Win9x and Win32 format respectively.
Results on the recognition of non-infected executable files are presented in Table 7.6.
The complete result list can be found in Appendix C.
Figure 7.12: SOM Umatrix and detection result of CIH 1.2 virus
Figure 7.13: SOM Umatrix and detection result of CIH 1.3 virus
Figure 7.14: SOM Umatrix and detection result of CIH 1.4 virus
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Figure 7.15: SOM Umatrix and detection result of W95 Anxiety.1397 virus
Table 7.4: Win9x Virus Detection Result by VirusDetector.
Win9x Virus Total Number: 291, Error number: 26.
False negative: 0.09 (approx. 9%)
Date indicates the virus’s detected & caught date in form MM-DD-YY.
Virus names are also the names of the test files. Size unit is byte.
Virus Name Size Date Detection Virus Name Size Date Detection
Altar.797 8192 6-19-99 O Altar.884 4096 10-4-02 O
Altar.910 4096 10-24-99 O Antic.695 7863 9-2-02 O
Anxiety.1358 152778 3-1-04 O Anxiety.1397 49736 3-1-04 O
Anxiety.1399 8192 3-21-98 O Anxiety.1399.b 49736 3-1-04 O
Anxiety.1422 5684 11-22-03 O Anxiety.1451 29213 2-21-01 O
Anxiety.1486 8192 1-24-98 O Anxiety.1517 8192 11-22-03 O
Anxiety.1586 42590 11-22-03 O Anxiety.1596 49736 3-11-98 O
Anxiety.1823 8192 3-1-04 O Anxiety.1823.b 6196 7-2-03 O
Anxiety.2471 8192 11-22-03 O Apop.1086 8192 7-17-02 O
Argos.310 4096 9-2-02 O Argos.328 4096 3-1-04 O
Argos.335 4096 9-24-02 O Argos.402 4096 6-30-99 O
Bodgy.3230 97438 4-15-03 X Bonk.1232 19632 11-22-03 O
Bonk.1243 9460 3-1-04 O Boza.2220 24576 11-22-03 X
Boza.a 12408 3-17-96 O Boza.b 7994 11-22-03 O
Boza.c 16384 3-1-04 O Boza.d 16384 11-22-03 O
Boza.e 16384 11-22-03 O ByteSV.Thorn.886 20480 11-22-03 O
Caw.1262 205550 11-22-03 O Caw.1335 5943 3-1-04 O
Caw.1416 55964 11-22-03 O Caw.1419 54667 11-22-03 X
Caw.1457 6065 11-22-03 O Caw.1458 8192 10-5-02 O
Caw.1525 24576 11-22-03 O Caw.1531 8192 11-2-01 O
Caw.1557 180224 12-31-00 O Chimera.1542 35846 11-22-03 O
CIH 19536 7-8-02 O CIH.1003.b 4608 3-1-04 O
CIH.1010.b 37394 11-22-03 O CIH.1016 34304 9-2-02 O
CIH.1019.c 4896 3-1-04 O CIH.1024 1553 3-1-04 O
CIH.1026 1555 3-1-04 O CIH.1031 4096 9-2-02 O
CIH.1035 1564 3-1-04 O CIH.1040 159744 3-1-04 O
CIH.1048 20480 9-2-02 O CIH.1049 65536 9-2-02 O
CIH.1103 2144 11-22-03 O CIH.1106 153088 11-27-02 O
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Figure 7.16: SOM Umatrix and result of of W95 Anxiety.1399b virus
Table 7.5: Win32 Virus Detection Result by VirusDetector.
Win32 Virus Total Number: 499, Error number: 103.
False negative: 0.2064 (approx. 21%)
Date indicates the virus’s detected & caught date in form MM-DD-YY.
Virus names are also the names of the test files. Size unit is Byte.
Virus Name Size Date Detection Virus Name Size Date Detection
Adson.1559 8192 7-26-02 O Adson.1734 20480 11-22-03 O
Aidlot 8192 10-4-04 O Akez 32768 4-27-02 O
Aliser.7825 12288 3-6-03 O Aliser.7897 8192 6-8-03 O
Aliser.8381 8192 6-8-03 O Alma.2414 10606 3-1-04 O
Awfull.2376 3072 9-9-03 O Awfull.3571 4096 3-1-04 O
Bakaver.a 24576 10-6-03 O Banaw.2157 8192 11-22-03 O
Barum.1536 5632 8-31-02 O Bee 24576 3-1-04 O
Beef.2110 57344 3-1-04 O Belial.2537 8192 11-22-03 O
Belial.2609 254513 3-9-02 X Belial.a 4096 3-10-04 O
Belial.b 4096 2-23-02 O Belial.c 4096 11-22-03 O
Belial.d 4096 9-24-02 O Belod.a 8192 3-12-02 O
Belod.b 8192 8-21-02 O Belod.c 8192 3-14-02 O
Bender.1363 3584 12-31-01 O Bika.1906 8192 12-31-01 O
BingHe 296643 10-11-02 X Blackcat.2537 8192 9-9-03 O
Blakan.2016 8192 12-31-01 O Blateroz 8192 9-2-02 O
Blueballs.4117 16384 11-22-03 X Bobep 8192 8-25-03 O
Bogus.4096 38400 10-13-99 O Bolzano.2122 36864 2-10-03 O
Bolzano.2664 15135 2-10-03 O Bolzano.2676 15183 2-10-03 O
Bolzano.2716 13521 2-10-03 O Bolzano.3100 15277 2-10-03 O
Bolzano.3120 15331 2-10-03 O Bolzano.3148 15373 2-10-03 O
Bolzano.3164 15409 2-10-03 O Bolzano.3192 15457 3-1-04 O
Bolzano.3628 16095 3-1-04 O Bolzano.3904 16251 2-10-03 O
Bolzano.5572 28237 2-10-03 O Butter 96665 9-2-02 X
Cabanas.a 7171 5-7-04 X Cabanas.b 7171 3-1-04 O
Cabanas.Debug 95748 10-4-04 O Cabanas.e 16384 7-8-03 O
Cabanas.MsgBox 39996 10-4-04 X Cabanas.Release 49152 1-26-99 O
CabInfector 4096 3-1-04 O Cecile 28672 12-31-01 X
Cefet.3157 7253 9-2-02 O Cerebrus.1482 8192 3-1-04 O
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Figure 7.17: Virus Detection Result Scene 3: normal executable file cases.
Table 7.6: Normal Executable Program’s Virus Check Result by VirusDetector
Normal Executable File’s Total Number: 80, Error number: 24.
False positive: 0.3 (approx. 30%).
If the result of detection is marked X, VirusDetector says this file is a virus-infected file,
which means incorrect detection.
Filename Detection Filename Detection
dxwebsetup.exe divx311.exe
awsepersonal.exe DVD2DIVXVCD trial.exe
paulp en1.exe adrenalin2.0.1.exe
GOMPLAYER14.exe sdvd190.exe
csdl13.exe HwpViewer.exe
SSHSecureShellClient-3.2.9.exe DivX505Bundle.exe
klcodec220b.exe SwansMP24a-WCP.exe
DivXPro511GAINBundle.exe NATEON.exe X
WinPcap 3 1 beta 3.exe ducp708 type3 free.exe
wmpcdcs8.exe Acrobat.exe
iTunes.exe pccmain.exe
sicstusc.exe Tra.exe
acrodist.exe java.exe X
PCcpfw.exe sicstus.exe
Trialmsg.exe X Ad-Aware.exe
javaw.exe X PCctool.exe
splfr.exe X tsc.exe
AdobeUpdateManage.exe jpicp132.exe X
Photoshp.exe spmkds.exe
conf.exe policytool.exe X
spmkrs.exe X unregaaw.exe
CSDL.exe kinit.exe X
Sshclient.exe ssh2.exe
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7.2.5 Polymorphic and Encrypted Parasitic Viruses
Among the 790 virus-infected test files, there were 30 Win9x encrypted and 15 polymor-
phic parasitic viruses. These are about 15% of the tested Win9x virus-infected files. In
case of Win32 executables, 30 were encrypted and 50 were polymorphic. This represents
again approximately 16% of all tested Win32 virus-infected files. The way VirusDetector
checks these files is identical to testing for unencrypted, non-polymorphic viruses. The
results in the encrypted or polymorphic case are quite noticeable. In case of Win9x
executables, either encrypted or polymorphic viruses were detected easily by VirusDe-
tector with 3% and 13% false negative rate respectively. In case of Win32 executables
containing an encrypted virus, the false negative rate was lower (13%) than VirusDe-
tector ’s average false negative rate on the entire data set (presented in Tables 7.7 and
7.9). However, the false negative rate for Win32 executables infected with a polymorphic
virus was much higher (42%) than average (16%) (see Tables 7.8 and 7.10).
Table 7.7: Win9x Encrypted Parasitic Virus Detection Result by VirusDetector.
Encrypted Win9x Virus Total Number: 30, Error number: 1, False negative: 0.03 (3%)
Date indicates the virus’s detected & caught date in form MM-DD-YY.
Virus names are also the names of the test files. Size unit is byte.
Virus Name Size Date Detection Virus Name Size Date Detection
Bumble.1736 8192 3-1-04 O Bumble.1738 8192 11-22-03 O
Iced.1344 44032 9-6-01 O Iced.1376 8192 11-22-03 O
Iced.1412 8192 11-22-03 O Iced.1617 8192 3-1-04 O
Iced.2112 8192 3-1-04 O Mad.2736.a 32768 10-4-04 O
Mad.2736.b 32768 10-4-04 O Mad.2736.c 32768 1-7-02 O
Mad.2736.d 32768 1-7-02 O Mad.2806 32768 1-19-98 O
Nathan.3276 7372 9-2-02 O Nathan.3520.a 12288 3-10-04 O
Nathan.3520.b 16384 9-9-01 O Nathan.3792 185552 10-23-99 O
Obsolete.1419 5003 3-1-04 O PoshKill.1398 8192 4-21-01 O
PoshKill.1406 8192 3-17-03 O PoshKill.1426 8192 8-20-01 O
PoshKill.1445.a 8192 3-10-04 O PoshKill.1445.b 8192 11-22-03 O
Priest.1419 4096 8-9-99 O Priest.1454 4096 3-1-04 O
Priest.1478 9728 6-10-00 X Priest.1486 9728 10-4-01 O
Priest.1495 9728 8-18-01 O Priest.1521 9728 3-1-04 O
Shoerec 321536 8-12-01 O Tip.2475 10752 11-22-03 O
Voodoo.1537 61441 11-22-03 O Werther.1224 6344 12-31-01 O
All encrypted Win9x viruses used in the tests are listed in Table 7.7, all polymorphic
Win9x viruses are in Table 7.8, all encrypted Win32 viruses are in Table 7.9, and all
polymorphic Win32 viruses are in Table 7.10, each attached with their size, the date
when they were caught and the test result of VirusDetector. For information about
these polymorphic and encrypted parasitic viruses, please refer to the site about Win-
dows viruses at KASPERSKY (Metropolitan Network BBS Inc., Bern, Switzerland)
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Table 7.8: Win9x Polymorphic Virus Detection Result by VirusDetector.
Win9x Polymorphic Virus Total Number: 15, Error number: 2, False negative: 0.13
(13%)
Date indicates the virus’s detected & caught date in form MM-DD-YY.
Virus names are also the names of the test files. Size unit is byte.
Virus Name Size Date Detection Virus Name Size Date Detection
Begemot 8192 3-1-04 O Darkmil.5086 12288 3-1-04 X
Darkmil.5090 74210 7-2-03 O Fiasko.2500.a 8192 11-22-03 O
Fiasko.2500.b 12935 3-1-04 O Fiasko.2508 8192 3-1-04 O
Invir.7051 9728 3-1-04 O Luna.2636 8192 4-24-02 O
Luna.2757.a 62213 3-10-04 O Luna.2757.b 12288 1-1-80 O
Marburg.a 493789 3-10-04 O Marburg.b 28381 11-22-03 X
Matrix.3597 35916 2-14-03 O Merinos.1763 9216 3-1-04 O
Merinos.1849 8192 11-22-03 O
[KASPERSKY(1994-2005)].
Table 7.9: Win32 Encrypted Parasitic Virus Detection Result by VirusDetector.
Encrypted Win32 Virus Total Number: 30, Error number: 4, False negative: 0.13 (13%)
Date indicates the virus’s detected & caught date in form MM-DD-YY.
Virus names are also the names of the test files. Size unit is byte.
Virus Name Size Date Detection Virus Name Size Date Detection
Ditto.1488 6096 3-1-04 O Ditto.1492 12288 11-22-03 O
Ditto.1539 8192 10-1-00 O Gloria.2820 16384 11-22-03 X
Gloria.2928 16384 3-1-04 O Gloria.2963 12288 10-1-00 O
Idele.2104 8192 7-8-03 O Idele.2108 8192 3-1-04 O
Idele.2160 8192 11-12-03 O IhSix.3048 8192 11-22-03 O
Infinite.1661 8192 3-1-04 O Levi.2961 12288 5-16-01 O
Levi.3040 7188 11-22-03 O Levi.3090 12288 11-22-03 O
Levi.3137 35941 11-22-03 O Levi.3205 12288 3-1-04 X
Levi.3240 16384 8-17-02 O Levi.3244 16384 11-22-03 X
Levi.3432 16384 11-22-03 O Mix.1852 4096 5-30-00 O
Niko.5178 65611 11-22-03 X Santana.1104 81920 12-4-01 O
Savior.1680 8192 1-8-01 O Savior.1696 12288 5-18-01 O
Savior.1740 12288 3-28-02 O Savior.1828 20480 8-6-01 O
Savior.1832 12288 3-1-04 O Savior.1904 12288 12-4-01 O
Undertaker.4887 12288 11-22-03 O Undertaker.5036.a 12288 11-22-03 O
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Table 7.10: Win32 Polymorphic Virus Detection Result by VirusDetector.
Encrypted Win32 Virus Total Number: 50, Error number: 21, False negative: 0.42
(42%)
Date indicates the virus’s detected & caught date in form MM-DD-YY.
Virus names are also the names of the test files. Size unit is byte.
Virus Name Size Date Detection Virus Name Size Date Detection
Andras.7300 14238 7-27-02 O AOC.2044 8192 11-28-99 O
AOC.2045 8192 11-26-99 O AOC.3657 16384 3-1-04 O
AOC.3833 16384 3-1-04 O AOC.3860 20480 2-10-03 X
AOC.3864 20480 2-10-03 O Champ 12288 2-10-03 O
Champ.5430 12288 10-6-02 O Champ.5464 12288 2-10-03 O
Champ.5477 12288 10-6-02 O Champ.5495 6144 2-10-03 X
Champ.5521 12288 2-10-03 X Champ.5536 12288 2-10-03 X
Champ.5714 12288 2-10-03 O Champ.5722 16384 2-10-03 X
Chop.3808 64049 8-29-01 X Crypto 49152 3-1-04 X
Crypto.a 28672 11-22-03 X Crypto.b 32768 11-22-03 O
Crypto.c 32768 11-22-03 O Driller 94208 3-1-04 O
Harrier 108544 11-22-03 X Hatred.a 16384 3-10-04 O
Hatred.d 16384 10-29-02 O Kriz.3660 415232 7-27-02 X
Kriz.3740 764928 10-4-04 X Kriz.3863 475136 10-4-04 X
Kriz.4029 12288 3-1-04 O Kriz.4037 12288 8-19-01 O
Kriz.4050 479232 11-22-03 X Kriz.4057 12288 8-19-01 X
Kriz.4075 12288 11-22-03 O Kriz.4099 12288 11-22-03 X
Kriz.4233 8192 7-15-01 X Kriz.4271 57344 10-4-04 O
Prizm.4428 8704 9-4-02 X RainSong.3874 8192 11-22-03 O
RainSong.3891 61509 3-1-04 O RainSong.3910 8192 12-5-01 X
RainSong.3956 12288 10-4-04 X RainSong.4198 8192 3-12-02 O
RainSong.4266 12288 10-4-04 X Thorin.11932 16384 3-1-04 O
Thorin.b 16384 3-1-04 O Thorin.c 16384 10-23-99 O
Thorin.d 16384 7-14-99 O Thorin.e 16384 10-23-99 O
Vampiro.7018 18432 3-1-04 X Vampiro.a 16896 3-10-04 O
7.2.6 False positive vs. False negative in VirusDetector
A false positive occurs when a non-infected file is tested and the test result categorizes
the file as positive (i.e. infected). In the inverse case of a not-detected-infected file, the
outcome is called a false negative. The false negative rate and the false positive rate
are interdependent; to decrease one is to increase the other. Therefore, it is important
to decide which side to decrease and which to increase. A significant role is played by
the factor value, one uses in VirusDetector to decide whether the value of SOM cell is
significant or not (i.e. whether or not the cell is likely to present a fraction of the virus
mask). To determine the threshold of decision in certain patterns, the test results of all
790 virus-infected and 80 non-infected Windows executable files were taken into account.
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For different factor values, the false-positive and false-negative rates of the tests on the
entire data set are presented in Figure 7.18.
Figure 7.18: VirusDetector’s Error Curve based on factor values
As Figure 7.18 shows, the false positives remain more or less in the same range (0.25 -
0.3) for factor values 72 and 79. On the other hand, the false-negative rate is increased
significantly. So, without knowing any virus signature and anything else about a virus,
VirusDetector can detect a virus infection with a probability of 84% and false positive
rate of 30%. Some further fine-tuning might be necessary, possibly on the cost of reduc-
ing the detection capabilities (i.e. increasing the false-negative rate), in order to decrease
the false positives. Using the factor value (72), all the files (790 virus-infected files and 80
non-virus-infected normal executable files) were tested. The full list of information and
results on the tested files is given in the appendix. Among the 291 Win9x virus-infected
files, VirusDetector failed to detect 26 (approximately 9%; see Table 7.4). Among the
499 Win32 virus-infected files, VirusDetector did not succeed in detecting 103 (approx-
imately 21%; see Table 7.5). On the other hand, among the 80 non-infected Windows
executable files, VirusDetector failed to pass 24 (approximately 30%; see Table 7.6).
7.2.7 Discussion of VirusDetector
The virus-detection approach presented in this paper exploits the detection capabilities
of a self-organizing map (SOM). It basically uses structural information about the data
contained in an executable file: the virus code is data injected into a formerly complete
and (sort of) homogeneous structure, namely the program code. Hence the virus, even
though not easily detectable by standard techniques (assuming that the virus signature
is not known), is “somewhat different” from the program it infected. The SOM used in
the non-standard way, is capable of just doing that: reflecting the presence of data in
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an executable, which is somehow different from the rest. Whether the injected code was
an encrypted parasitic or a polymorphic parasitic virus does not matter; it still differs
from the rest of the program code. In SOM terminology: its data density, compared to
the original program code, is high enough to display a virus mask (i.e. an area of close
neighbourhood in the SOM projection).
Standard anti-virus software can detect variants of a virus only if different virus sig-
natures are available. However, the detection approach in this paper detects viruses
independent of any prior knowledge (such as a virus mask). Even polymorphic or en-
crypted parasitic viruses show a virus mask which can be detected by VirusDetector.
Since the question of whether or not a program contains virus code is in general unable
to answer, VirusDetector cannot be perfect. It is therefore a surprisingly good result
that in the tests (with 790 files, all infected by a different virus or different version of
a virus), VirusDetector detected almost 84% of the viruses with a false positive rate of
30%. During the experiments, based on the good detection rate of VirusDetector, the
confidence in the possibility of detecting unknown viruses increased significantly.
Until now, the classical virus-detection techniques could not deal with unknown viruses
(not all, but some). The SOM-based, non-signature-based virus detection complements
these standard techniques in that it provides a tool capable of identifying unknown
viruses. The combination of signature-based methods with the SOM-based approach
can make systems much more secure by making them less vulnerable to infections by
unknown viruses.
There is still the macro-virus-detection problem. Although the SOM visualization pat-
tern looks very similar to a virus mask in a NewEXE file, it will always be produced
when a document is checked for macro viruses using VirusDetector. An approach differ-
ent from that for parasitic viruses is therefore needed to deal with macro viruses. Even
though the macro virus is inserted into a complete document, it is first of all part of a
macro and that macro is then saved in the macro area of a document file. Because of
this, the inserted macro virus data cannot be differentiated from the macro itself and
identified by the SOM neurons. Additionally, the macro virus part is not big enough to
produce a significant neighbourhood density and is possibly “hidden behind” low density
data. The macro part is simply too small compared to the entire data structure. It will
be future work aiming to overcome this problem and be able to deal with macro viruses
as well.
Another remaining weakness is the too high false-positive rate of 30%. Even though the
experimental results are very promising, additional work must be spent in the future on
reducing the relative number of false positives. There is already some scope for that in
the approach by adapting the factor value used by VirusDetector. This will cause the
false-negatives rate to increase, which is partly acceptable. However, it will be necessary
to examine other improvements in order to reduce the relative number of false positives.
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Nevertheless, if VirusDetector can only prevent a single unknown virus from infecting
our system (or systems world-wide), the significant research effort spent on developing
VirusDetector was absolutely worth it.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
The serious problems of life are never fully solved.
If ever they should appear to be so,
it is a sure sign that something has been lost.
The meaning and purpose of a problem seem to lie
not in its solution but in our working at it incessantly.
- C. G. Jung.
In information security, confidentiality, integrity and availability are major pillars to
protect and ensure information. Network security problems are the familiar loss of them.
Various defence mechanisms need to be held in depth, and risk assessment of data packets
must be established in the defence mechanisms. One of the solution technologies is a
defence system to protect network-connected resources, which is called a firewall. The
more serious network threats, the more important the role of the firewall. Therefore,
intelligent firewall technology is indispensable to achieve a high level of protection. This
thesis looks for defence mechanisms against network attacks, which use vulnerabilities
in network protocols, and risk assessment of data packets, then apply them to network
security systems, in particular, the firewall systems. With the concept of an intelligent
firewall in mind, potential technologies applicable to an intelligent firewall have been
worked and researched. One of the main criticisms of firewalls is that they often create
bottlenecks [Ballew(1997)]. To enforce a security policy, firewalls must in some way
process all network packets passing through them, and this results in a loss of network
performance. This motivates the need for faster firewall technologies, keeping in mind
that there are tradeoffs between performance and security, high security requirements
must warrant any loss in performance. Therefore, firewalls need to be clever in checking
incoming packets efficiently. The goal of this research is to extend the abilities of packet-
filtering firewalls aiming to reduce possible problems and attacks by improving firewall
technologies.
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8.1 Overview
The likelihood of attacks is defined as our confidence to have certain occurrence of specific
attacks and attackers’ preference to use certain pattern of attacks. The vulnerabilities in
network protocols still exist as long as the structure of network and network protocols
are not changed completely. Hence, the likelihood of attacks using vulnerabilities in
network protocols and mechanisms are still high although new technologies to detect
or secure systems’ abilities are developed significantly. Therefore, we need intelligent
defence mechanisms.
The risk assessment of data packets is defined as that it is about understanding likely
threats to network systems and the process of determining whether proposed or existing
defence mechanisms are adequate to protect information resources from the threats.
The threats to network systems are considered either using vulnerabilities in network
protocols and mechanisms or using common network mechanisms with malicious code in
data packets. The former can be active attacks including typical denial service attacks, –
e.g., ping attacks, SYN flood attacks, land attacks and tear drop attacks – IP spoofing,
spams, and denial of service Internet worms. On the other hand, the latter can be
passive attacks using social engineering methods including viruses and Internet worms.
There are various existing secure systems; each system has specific defence mechanism
against specific attacks. In this thesis, firewall systems are the main concern for risk
assessment of data packets. Since firewall systems are not smart enough to protect infor-
mation resources from the threats, this thesis proposes defence mechanisms to improve
firewall technologies. To evaluate packets, filtering, classification, detection, verifica-
tion, and recognition techniques have been applied to Janus. Based on a packet-filtering
firewall, Janus is modelled using adaptive firewall architecture, which can deal with pro-
tocol anomaly detection and verification, and email classification. Furthermore, Janus
can conduct detecting virus as in attached files without the use of virus signatures.
Fundamental technologies which have been researched in course of this project include
software engineering techniques, e.g. the specification description language and abstract
state machines, machine learning, especially Naive Bayesian inference, symbolic and
algebraic manipulation, and pattern recognition with self-organizing maps.
8.2 Summary
The summary of this thesis is as follows;
• Protocol Anomaly Detection: Protocol anomaly refers to all exceptions related
to protocol format and protocol behaviour with respect to common practice on the
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Internet and standard specifications. However, network attack packets cannot be
discovered as being a protocol anomaly, because there exists some odd-looking
but legitimate traffic as well. To distinguish protocol anomalies from network
traffic, network traffic had been analysed closely using protocol specifications, and
then requirements for protocols has been addressed against misuse, based on the
protocol specifications. Through that, a packet sanity checker was implemented.
• TCP Runtime Verification Model: TCP provides reliable data transfer be-
tween different application processes over the network. TCP provides flow control
and congestion control as well. Nevertheless, during the past two decades, many
security problems of TCP/IP protocol suite have been discovered. Meanwhile,
the network hackers created a large number of intrusion methods to exploit those
vulnerabilities. Well-known TCP attacks against the current TCP model are SYN
flooding and IP spoofing attacks [CERT(2000a)]. These conduct denial-of-service
attacks by creating TCP “half open” connections. Any system connected to the
Internet and providing TCP-based network services is potentially subject to this
attack. Improved OS kernel or stateful inspection firewall/proxy systems support
TCP protocol transaction checking against this type of attack. There is one tech-
nical solution against SYN flood attack, SYN cookie method, which is generally
accepted to this problem with the current IP protocol technology. However, there
is no general accepted TCP transaction verification solution, in particular for fire-
walls, it is necessary to deal with this problem having a practical view on TCP
implementation features. Although a standard TCP protocol specification is avail-
able, TCP implementations do not fully follow the specification and practical TCP
internetworking often violates the protocol standards.
To identify anomalous transactions in TCP, it has been addressed what current
TCP problems are and investigated why practical implementations work differently
from the standard TCP specification. Then, to detect anomalous TCP transactions
and to check the three-way handshake completed correctly, a TCP verification
model has been proposed and was applied to Janus. The TCP verification model
does not replace the current TCP specification; it rather provides a verification
method of TCP transactions. The TCP verification model is useful to detect
anomalous TCP transactions, which can cause system security to be compromised.
• Email Classification with Naive Bayesian inference and OBDD: Email is
vulnerable to misuse. One such misuse is by email viruses, another is by UBEs
also known as Spam. In this project, it is dealt with the propagation of UBE,
because the propagation is the potential way for email virus propagation as well.
The difference between UBE and Email viruses is whether or not malicious content
s present. To detect misused emails, and to estimate the probability of whether
the mail is abnormal, the structure of emails has been examined and the header
field, the sender field, and the recipient field of each email transferred using the
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SMTP protocol, have been checked. Then a Naive Bayesian classifier has been
built representing the probability of an email attachment of being malicious. Prior
probabilities to malicious mail have been assigned and the likelihood of being ma-
licious of an executable attachment has been estimated. Then an exact algorithm
for Bayesian inference is used, and the Naive Bayesian classifier is converted into
an OBDD. Since Janus should deal with packets fast enough, the OBDD has been
designed with predefined properties. The Bayesian-OBDD based model is capable
of drawing conclusions about the potential maliciousness of incoming email pack-
ets. Based on the estimation of a packet’s potential maliciousness and using a
particular security policy of the protected network, a data packet can then either
be dropped or it passes.
• Virus Detection and Recognition with Self-Organizing Maps: To recog-
nize virus patterns in virus-infected executable files, without virus signatures, a
self-organizing map (SOM) is used to visualize data densities through the SOM pro-
jection. Without using virus signatures, this SOM projection tells us the structure
of a virus-infected executable file. Besides we can detect virus-infected executable
files independent of whether the virus is known or not. A virus is a part of the file,
which was inserted in a certain way, and this virus code shows a different struc-
ture when compared to the original program code it infected. Thus, virus code is
distinguishable from the remaining program code, whether it is encrypted or not.
Therefore, the SOM produces a particular pattern, so-called the virus mask when
a file is virus-infected. The virus mask can prove decisive in establishing the ex-
istence of virus in virus-infected files. Anti-virus software can detect variants of a
virus only by different virus signatures. This research can be applied to anti-virus
detection without any knowledge of virus signatures. It is therefore applicable to
the detection of unknown new viruses.
• Packet Filtering and Classification: Packet classification performs a matching
between IP packets and filters in order to find which filter matches the packet. It
should be fast enough to allow the classification algorithm being executed several
times and still forward packets at line speed. Packet filtering is a special case
of packet classification. Although Janus performs packet classification, the pur-
pose of this project is improving firewall technologies rather than creating a new
classification algorithm to improve the filtering speed. Therefore, a quite simple
packet-filtering mechanism has been implemented using double-linked lists and the
Booyer-Moore pattern matching algorithm.
• Janus Firewall: Janus is an adaptive firewall model. After developing technolo-
gies applicable to the recognition of anomalies in data packets, those have been
implemented in Janus. Janus does not require the presence of the TCP/IP stack.
To reduce the scope for security holes in protocol stacks, it has been necessary
to recompile the Linux kernel with support for network cards, but without any
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TCP/IP networking support. Janus is designed to protect of any server systems
against any internal or external network attacks. The current version of Janus is
placed inside the university’s firewalls with a separated subnetwork routing setup
on an Internet connection. This causes Janus to act as a firewall/router on the
subnetwork since all traffic travels through it. The current IP settings and working
environment of the Janus box are that of a single server environment.
• Janus VirusDetector: A non-signature-based virus detection program, Virus-
Detector is presented. Unlike classical virus detection techniques using virus sig-
natures, this SOM-based approach can detect virus-infected files without any prior
knowledge of virus signatures. Exploiting the fact that virus code is inserted into
a complete file which was built using a certain compiler, an untrained SOM can be
trained in one go with a single virus-infected file and will then present an area of
high density data, identifying the virus code through SOM projection. VirusDe-
tector has been tested on 790 different virus-infected files, including polymorphic
and encrypted viruses. It detects viruses without any prior knowledge — e.g.
without knowledge of virus signatures or similar features — and is therefore as-
sumed to be highly applicable to the detection of new, unknown viruses. This
non-signature-based virus detection approach was capable of detecting 84% of the
virus-infected files in the sample set, which included polymorphic and encrypted
viruses. The false positive rate was 30%. The combination of the classical virus
detection technique for known viruses and this SOM-based technique for unknown
viruses can help systems even more secure.
8.3 Future Work
• Analyzing Firewall Rules: For firewalls, they must also be configured properly.
Firewall configurations are often written in a low-level language, which is very hard
to understand. For instance, the order of the rules is often very important. Thus,
it is often quite difficult to find out which connections and services are actually
allowed by the configuration.
This brings up two related problems: how to express the organization’s security
policy in a language understood by the firewall and finding out what a given
firewall configuration actually does. This second problem often occurs when a new
network administrator takes over, for instance, or when a third party is performing
a technical security audit for the organization.
• Encryption: Suitable encryption can defend against some attacks. However, en-
cryption devices are expensive, often slow, hard to administer, and uncommon
in the civilian sector. There are different ways to apply encryption; each has its
strengths and weaknesses. A comprehensive treatment of encryption is beyond
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the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, encrypted messages can contain malicious
information that cannot be detected by the current intelligent firewall. Message
encryption is a problem, especially for network-based intrusion systems. Encryp-
tion makes the practice of looking for particular patterns in packet bodies futile.
Useful analysis can be performed only after the message has been decrypted on
the target host, and this often occurs within a specific application. Driven by com-
mercial and defence needs, greater emphasis needs to be placed on host-based or
application-based intrusion systems that have the ability to view message content
even if the message is encrypted in transit. However, IPSec provides a mechanism,
encapsulating security payload, which can be used to hide both the contents and
addresses of network packets between firewalls. This renders the actual source,
destination, and contents of the packet opaque while they are in transit between
firewalls.
• Network Planning/Configuration/Optimisation: Janus does not have logi-
cal configuration tools to make sure the configuration does not contain any logical
errors. The logic should cover the current network environment and its configu-
ration. Therefore, the tool will have to support a planning or optimising network
configuration avoiding logical flaws.
• Denial of Service attack: To deal with denial of service attacks, network
anomaly detection and traffic classification are future add-ons to Janus. This
requires research such as the comparison of attack traffic with legitimate traf-
fic, classifying network-based application response, and identifying network traffic
patterns.
• Internet Worms: Email classification of Janus cannot fully protect against In-
ternet Worms, if a worm looks like legitimate traffic. To overcome this, Janus will
have to cooperate with network Intrusion detection systems. In addition, to pro-
tect systems from Internet worms, firewall access and filtering, attack identification
and analysis, and identification of network traffic patterns are required.
• Janus VirusDetector: SOM’s ability to gather likelihood data together gave us
benefit to visualize and to detect virus-infected files. Since virus codes could not
hide their own features through SOM projection, it was great advantage how virus
codes affected the whole file projection, and through this projection, we could see
virus masks without knowing any virus-signature knowledge. Then VirusDetector
implementation presented how to detect the virus masks, and what kind of process
was taken to build VirusDetector. In addition, several results of visualization and
detection, and the evaluation of VirusDetector were presented. Without virus-
signature knowledge, about 84 % of detection ratio with 30 % of false positive is
encouraging. Still much of experiments are necessary to improve VirusDetector,
and macro virus detection part would be a future work.
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’It’s a dangerous business, Frodo, going out of your door,’
he used to say.
’You step into the Road, and if you don’t keep your feet,
there is no knowing where you might be swept off to.’
- The Lord of The Rings, J.R.R. Tolkien
Appendix A
TCP Runtime Verification Model
SDL Specification
Figure A.1: Process StateTransition of the TCP Protocol State Machine in SDL
SYSTEM StateMachine ;
NEWTYPE TCPFlags
LITERALS SYN, ACK, FIN, RST,
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Figure A.2: Process StateTransition of the TCP Protocol State Machine in SDL
SYNACK, /* SYNACK = SYN + ACK */
ACKFIN, /* ACKFIN = ACK + FIN*/
FFF;
ENDNEWTYPE;
SIGNAL Packet(Integer, Integer, TCPFlags); /*tcp id, tcp seq, flags*/
SIGNAL ROP(Integer, TCPFlags); /* Result of Packet, tcp id, flags */
CHANNEL channelout
NODELAY FROM tcpstate TO ENV WITH ROP ;
ENDCHANNEL;
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Figure A.3: Process StateTransition of the TCP Protocol State Machine in SDL
CHANNEL channelin
NODELAY FROM ENV TO tcpstate WITH Packet ;
ENDCHANNEL;
BLOCK tcpstate REFERENCED;
ENDSYSTEM;
PROCESS<<SYSTEM StateMachine/BLOCK TCPState>> StateTransition ;
NEWTYPE PacketInfo
STRUCT
ip Integer;
seq Integer;
flag TCPFlags;
OPERATORS
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Unexpected: Integer, TCPFlags -¿ PacketInfo;
SanityCheck: Integer, Integer -¿ PacketInfo;
ENDNEWTYPE;
DCL pkt PacketInfo;
DCL tcp id, tcp seq, tcp seq per id Integer := 0;
DCL tcp flag TCPFlags;
DCL cur process PId; /* current process */
Timer t;
START;
NEXTSTATE Listen ;
STATE syn rcvd ;
INPUT Packet(tcp id, tcp seq, tcp flag) ;
TASK pkt := SanityCheck(tcp id, tcp seq) ;
DECISION tcp flag ;
( RST ):
NEXTSTATE Listen ;
ELSE:
OUTPUT ROP(tcp id, SYNACK) to SENDER ;
NEXTSTATE ack wait ;
ENDDECISION;
ENDSTATE;
STATE Listen ;
INPUT Packet(tcp id, tcp seq, tcp flag ) ;
TASK cur process := SENDER ;
TASK pkt := SanityCheck(tcp id, tcp seq) ;
DECISION tcp flag ;
( SYN ):
OUTPUT ROP(tcp id, SYNACK) to SENDER ;
NEXTSTATE syn rcvd ;
ELSE:
TASK pkt := Unexpected(tcp id, tcp flag) ;
NEXTSTATE - ;
ENDDECISION;
ENDSTATE;
STATE Listen ;
INPUT NONE;
SET(NOW + 120.0, t) ;
NEXTSTATE - ;
ENDSTATE;
STATE close wait 1 ;
INPUT NONE;
OUTPUT ROP(tcp id, ACK) to SENDER ;
NEXTSTATE closed ;
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ENDSTATE;
STATE established ;
INPUT Packet(tcp id, tcp seq, tcp flag) ;
TASK pkt := SanityCheck(tcp id, tcp seq) ;
DECISION tcp flag ;
( RST ):
NEXTSTATE closed ;
( SYN ):
NEXTSTATE closed ;
( FIN ):
OUTPUT ROP(tcp id, ACK) to SENDER ;
NEXTSTATE close wait 2 ;
ELSE:
TASK pkt := Unexpected(tcp id, tcp flag) ;
NEXTSTATE - ;
ENDDECISION;
ENDSTATE;
STATE ack wait ;
INPUT Packet(tcp id, tcp seq, tcp flag) ;
TASK pkt := SanityCheck(tcp id, tcp seq) ;
DECISION tcp flag ;
( FIN ):
OUTPUT ROP(tcp id, ACK) to SENDER ;
NEXTSTATE closing ;
( ACKFIN ):
NEXTSTATE close wait 2 ;
( ACK ):
NEXTSTATE established ;
ELSE:
TASK pkt := Unexpected(tcp id, tcp flag) ;
NEXTSTATE - ;
ENDDECISION;
ENDSTATE;
STATE close wait 2 ;
INPUT Packet(tcp id, tcp seq, tcp flag) ;
TASK pkt := SanityCheck(tcp id, tcp seq) ;
DECISION tcp flag ;
( ACK ):
NEXTSTATE closed ;
ELSE:
TASK pkt := Unexpected(tcp id, tcp flag) ;
NEXTSTATE - ;
ENDDECISION;
ENDSTATE;
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STATE closed ;
INPUT NONE;
OUTPUT ROP(tcp id, FFF) to SENDER ;
STOP;
ENDSTATE;
STATE closing ;
INPUT Packet(tcp id, tcp seq, tcp flag) ;
TASK pkt := SanityCheck(tcp id, tcp seq) ;
DECISION tcp flag ;
( ACK ):
NEXTSTATE close wait 1 ;
ELSE:
TASK pkt := Unexpected(tcp id, tcp flag) ;
NEXTSTATE - ;
ENDDECISION;
ENDSTATE;
ENDPROCESS;
BLOCK<<SYSTEM StateMachine>> TCPState ;
SIGNALROUTE sr2
FROM statetransition TO ENV WITH ROP ;
SIGNALROUTE sr1
FROM ENV TO statetransition WITH Packet ;
PROCESS statetransition REFERENCED;
CONNECT ChannelIn AND sr1;
CONNECT ChannelOut AND sr2;
ENDBLOCK;
Appendix B
Background of Packet
Classification and Filtering
B.1 Packet Filtering
Packet filtering is a special case of packet classification. Packet classification determines
what class a packet belongs to, based on the fields in its header and a set of classification
rules. The class of the packet determines what action should be performed on it. The
packet filter checks each incoming and outgoing packet, and makes sure that the destina-
tions and sources of the packets are trustworthy. Any packet from a source or to a des-
tination that is not trustworthy, is prevented from passing through the network. Packet
filters work by looking up a rulebase which lists sources and destinations that should be
allowed, and those that should be blocked. Packet filters uses a rulebase to determine
whether to forward or discard a packet. However, rule lookup time can increase network
latency significantly [Cheswick and Bellovin(1994)]. Rule lookup latency can especially
be a problem if the rulebase is large, since the resulting latency can reduce response time
unacceptably. Furthermore, in high-speed networks rule lookup can be a bottleneck and
reduce network throughput substantially [Ellermann and Benecke(1998)].
Although the ability to filter and detect packet is worthy for firewalls, performance can-
not be ignored. Thus, both hardware and software-based packet filter researches exist.
Software-based packet filters are especially prone to the latency problem [Newman(1999)].
There are three reasons for this. Firstly, some filters simply search the rulebase sequen-
tially from beginning to end; this is very inefficient as it is possible to optimise the search
using specialised data structures and algorithms. Secondly, the filtering code runs on a
general-purpose CPU. Hence, no matter how effectively the data structures and algo-
rithms are optimised, there is a limit to the performance that can be achieved. Thirdly,
software solutions suffer from a high overhead. For example, several layers of hardware
and software have to be traversed during rule lookup: the packet must be transferred
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from the physical cable to the network card, through the protocol stack and to the fil-
tering software, and back to the network again, traversing many buffers and buses in the
process. Other overheads result from operating system tasks such as interrupt handling.
Hardware-based packet filters using application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) 1
can decrease lookup times significantly, compared to software-based filters. The lookup
algorithms can be implemented on the ASICs making them extremely fast. Also, most of
the overhead that software suffers is eliminated, because the hardware can be integrated
directly into the network, resulting in fewer layers to traverse during lookups. This is
the case with Fore Systems’ ASIC-based gigabit Ethernet switches, which are reportedly
1000 times faster than software filters [Newman(1999)]. However, there are two problems
with hardware-based filters. Firstly, they are expensive, making the resulting solution
viable only for large corporations. A second disadvantage of filter ASICs is that the
algorithms hardwired into the ASICs cannot be modified once manufactured. Changing
an ASIC design is time consuming and has high non-recurring engineering (NRE) costs
[Salcic and Smailagic(1997)]. However, there is a possible solution for the problem of
rule lookup latency using field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). FPGAs are a form
of programmable logic that can be used to create custom hardware. Using FPGAs, it
should be possible to develop a high-speed, hardware-based packet filter. FPGAs are also
a kind of ASIC, but are becoming much cheaper than other ASICs and are replacing them
in many areas. For example, a major FPGA manufacturer, Xilinx Inc., has introduced
the Spartan family of FPGAs specifically to replace other ASICs [Xilinux(2001)]. FPGAs
can also be cheaply and quickly reprogrammed/reconfigured, making it easy to change
an existing solution [Salcic and Smailagic(1997)].
Although software implementation are unlikely to ever match the speed of hardware
implementations, many packet filters in use are software-based, and this justifies the
efforts made in software-based improvements. Software-based efforts at improving packet
filtering include designing various alternative internal representations of access lists that
facilitate faster lookup. This research adopts a software-based approach.
B.1.1 Packet filter rules
The security policy for a packet filter is specified by a set of rules. Each rule has the
structure: if condition then action, where the condition defines a logical statement based
on fields within the packet header, and the action specifies whether a packet matching
that rule should be accepted or rejected. A set of rules is known as an access control
list, or simply, access list [Ballew(1997)]. Semantically, the rules of an access list are
considered sequentially, so the condition of the first rule that matches a packet will
1 Two ICs that might or might not be considered ASICs are a controller chip for a PC and a chip for
a modem. Both of these examples are specific to an application but are sold to many different system
vendors. ASICs such as these are sometimes called application-specific standard products (ASSPs).
Appendix B Background of Packet Classification and Filtering 139
determine the action to be taken.
This format for representing security policies has both advantages and disadvantages.
The simplicity of its structure makes individual rules easy to specify. By specifying
source or destination addresses as well as ports in the condition of a rule, it is fairly
easy to define security policies that allow access for specific services on specific hosts
[Cheswick and Bellovin(1994)]. However, the semantics of access lists results in the order
in which rules appear in the list being extremely significant, the interaction between the
rules in an access list can make the interpretation of what types of packets it accepts
difficult [Oppliger(1998)].
For this reason, packet-filtering implementations traditionally represent access lists in-
ternally as a linear list of rules that is a direct translation of the original access list. The
decision-making process that determines whether a particular packet passing through
the packet filter should be accepted or rejected is called lookup and is closely tied to
the semantics of access lists. During lookup, the rules of the access list are applied se-
quentially to the packet until a matching rule is found, at which point the corresponding
action is taken. If no rule matches, the default rule is applied, which is usually to reject
all packets. In general, no context is kept, so this lookup process must be repeated for
every packet [Cheswick and Bellovin(1994)].
Packet filter rules consist of two parts: an action and an associated condition [Oppliger(1998)].
The action specifies whether to deny or permit the packet. The condition specifies the
selection criteria that the packet should meet in order for the action to be taken on it.
The selection criteria could include, the source of the packet, its destination and/or its
protocol type.
The rule description language is specific to a particular system. For example, a typical
CISCO access rule might be like Table B.1:
Table B.1: An general form and an example of a CISCO access rule.
list# action protocol src-addr src-mask dest-addr dest-mask port-range
101 permit tcp 20.9.17.8 0.0.0.0 121.11.27.20 0.0.0.0 range 21 25
Where,
• list-number is the number of the access list to which the rule belongs. There could
be several access lists on the system.
• action specifies whether to permit or deny the packet.
140 Appendix B Background of Packet Classification and Filtering
• src-addr and dest-addr are four segment dotted-decimal IP addresses of the source
and destination of the packet, respectively.
• src-mask and dest-mask act like wild cards and specify which bits of the source
and destination addresses to ignore and which to match. They allow the admin-
istrator to specify several possible matching addresses. For example, a source ad-
dress of 134.21.54.111 with mask 0.0.0.0, indicates that the packet’s source address
should match exactly. On the other hand, a mask of 0.0.255.255 indicates that
any packet’s source address that has the prefix 134.21, for example, 134.21.53.114
will match.
• port-range gives the range of port addresses allowed.
The list of packet filter rules are searched sequentially to determine one that applies to
a given packet. Hence, the ordering of the rules matters.
B.1.2 Theoretical Bounds on Packet Classification
In general, packet classification algorithms trade off space for time, or vice versa. Tra-
ditional packet filters use a sequential algorithm to classify packets. The algorithm has
linear time complexity in the number of rules and constant space requirements 2. This
is considered very efficient in terms of space, but not extremely efficient in terms of
time. On the other hand, by pre-computing the matching rule for all 2S possible inputs,
where S is the number of bits of interest in the packet header, in a table, the lookup
time is constant. However, the memory requirements grow exponentially with S result-
ing in unreasonable memory requirement even when S is relatively small. Thus, the real
challenge lies in finding a solution that is efficient in terms of both space and time.
B.2 Related Work on Packet Classification & Filtering
Packet classification is the problem of finding the least cost rule that matches a packet.
In the case of packet filtering as a means of access control, the cost of a rule can be
thought of as its position in the access list. This section presents software- and hardware-
based classification and internal rule representations proposed by previous research work
in these areas. Especially, software-based methods address table-driven methods and
specialised data structure for packet classification and filtering.
2Space complexity measures the amount of extra storage required by the algorithm, not including
the storage required for the representation of the input, which in this case is the access list.
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B.2.1 Table-driven Methods
Table-driven methods are characterized by algorithms that preprocess the filters into
some tabular representation. In some cases, hashing is used to improve performance.
Table-driven methods tend to be sensitive to the type of data that they receive; they rely
on the structure and redundancy found in typical access lists, so that access lists with
similar looking rules result in better performance than access lists with arbitrary rules.
Data that is not well behaved may cause either poor memory or time performance.
B.2.1.1 Tuple Space Search
Tuple Space Search (TSS) is a general packet classification, however, the research focused
on 5-dimensional filters for the experiments; IP source, IP destination, protocol type,
source port number, and destination port number. TSS defines a tuple T as a vector
of K lengths; K is the number of fields for filtering. For example, [8, 16, 8, 0, 16] is
a 5-dimensional tuple, whose IP source field is an 8-bit prefix, IP destination field is a
16-bit prefix, and so on. A filter F belongs or maps to tuple T if the ith field of F is
specified to exactly T[i] bits. For example, 2-dimensional filters F1 = (01∗, 111∗) and
F2 = (11∗, 010∗) both map to the tuple [2, 3].
Tuples require all fields of a filter to be specified as a length. While IP addresses are
always specified using prefixes, port numbers are not. Port numbers are usually specified
using ranges, e.g., [0, 1024]. TSS gets around this requirement by using nesting level
and RangeId each to simulate prefix length and prefix of IP addresses. For example, we
have three ranges; F1 = (0, 65535), F2 = (0, 1023), F3 = (1024, 65535). F1 has nesting
level of 0 and RangeId of 0. F2 and F3 are nested from F1, thus their nesting level is 1,
and they receive RangeId of 0 and 1, respectively.
With the get around explained above, each filter can now be mapped to a particular
tuple T in a hash table Hashtable(T ) with the concatenated prefix-es and RangeId-es
as its hash key. Probing a tuple T involves concatenating the required number of bits
from the packet P as specified by T and then doing a hash in Hashtable(T ). Searching
for a matched filter for a given packet P is performed by linearly probes all the tuple
in the tuple set. If more than one matching filters were found, TSS picks the least cost
filter. The search cost is proportional to m, the number of distinct tuples, which can be
up to N , the number of filters in database. However, the previous observation showed
that N tends to be much larger than m. Update cost (inserting and deleting a filter)
for tuple space search is also small, only one hash access. Thus, we can say that tuple
space search performs much better than linear search.
Srinivasan et al [V. Srinivasan and Varghese(1999)] shows several improvements for the
basic tuple space search ; Tuple Pruning and Rectangle Search. Tuple Pruning is mo-
tivated by the observation that in real filter databases there is no address D has more
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than 6 matching prefixes. If a 2-dimensional filter is formed from that database, then
if we first find the longest destination match and the longest source match, there are
only at most 6 x 6 = 36 possible tuples that are compatible with the individual desti-
nation and source matches. This is very small compared to the maximum number of
possible tuples for IP source-destination pair, which is 36 x 36 = 1024. For instance,
consider a 2-dimensional filter database for source S and destination D addresses. Sup-
pose D = 1010∗, and all the filters whose destination is a prefix of D belong to tuples [1,
4], [1, 1], and [2, 3]. Then, the tuple list of D contains these 3 tuples. Similarly, suppose
S = 0010∗, and all filters whose source is a prefix of S belong to tuples [2, 4], [1, 1], and
[2, 5]. Searching for the matching filter for a packet P computes the longest matching
prefix PD and PS for destination and source addresses of P . The next step is to take
the tuple lists stored with PD and PS, find their common intersection, and probe into
that intersection. If PD = D and PS = S as above, the intersection list only includes
[1, 1], thus we only probe into one tuple.
Rectangle Search is an improvement from the basic tuple space search for 2-D filter
database. Rectangle Search works to cut the search time by using precomputation and
markers. Search time is now down from W 2 hash accesses of basic tuple space search
into 2W accesses, W is the bit width of address. Srinvasan et al also shows that this
algorithm is optimal for 2-D filter database. When a filter is added to the database, it
leaves a marker at all the tuples to its left in its row. So a filter in the tuple [i, j] leaves
a marker in tuples [i, j − 1], [i, j − 3], ...[i, 1]. Each filter or marker also precomputes
the least cost filter matching it from among the tuples above it in its column. That is,
a filter or marker in tuple [i, j] precomputes the least cost filter matching it from the
tuples [i− 1, j], [i − 2, j], ..., [1, j]. This is the marking and precomputation strategy for
rectangle search.
Figure B.1: Illustration of markers and precomputation
Figure B.1 shows an example of precomputation and markers, using two filters F and Z.
The marker F2 precomputes the best matching filter among the entries in the column
above it, which in this example is Z. The search strategy for this algorithm starts by
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probing the lower-left tuple namely, [W, 1]. At each tuple, if the probe returns a match,
the search moves to the next tuple in the right. If there is no match, the search moves
up one row in the same column (see Figure B.2.). When a match is found, it is an
indication that there is a filter on the right of the current tuple, thus it is not necessary
to probe into the tuples above the current one. However, in case of no match, then there
is no filter in the tuples on the right, therefore the search can eliminate the tuples on
that row. The search terminates when we reach the rightmost column or the first row.
Figure B.2: Illustration of search strategy
B.2.1.2 Multi-dimensional Range Matching
Multi-dimensional range matching [Lakshman and Stiliadis(1998)] is a technique that
solves the classification problem as the intersection of a number of simpler problems.
Given n as the number of rules and k as the dimensionality of the filter, the lookup
algorithm is actually linear in n. However, it makes use of bit-parallelism - the time
taken for a single bit operation is the same as the time taken for a word operation, so
multiple bit operations can be executed in parallel at no extra cost - to reduce the actual
lookup time.
The classification algorithm is a geometric algorithm that views the rules encompassing
a rectangular area in k dimensions, the packets as points in the k-dimensional space, and
the lookup algorithm as finding the least cost rectangle that contains the point since the
rectangles may overlap. The preprocessing part of the algorithm projects the edges of
the rectangles to their corresponding axes, cutting each axis into a number of intervals.
In the worst case, there may be 2n + 1 intervals in each dimension. For each interval
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in each dimension, a bitmap is created that has its ith bit set if and only if rectangle i
overlaps with that interval.
The lookup algorithm then works as follows. When a packet arrives, the intervals that
contain this point are located for each axis. Then the bitmaps for those intervals are
ANDed bitwise, and the first bit that is set in the resulting bitmap corresponds to the
least cost rectangle. This is due to the fact that the rectangles are numbered based
on their priorities, in the order that the rules appear in the access list. While this
algorithm is an improvement on the traditional linear algorithm, its strength lies in
hardware implementations that can perform much more of the processing in parallel.
B.2.1.3 Scalable High Speed IP Routing Lookup
Waldvogel et al [Marcel Waldvogel and Plattner(1997)] describes a new algorithm for
best matching prefix using binary search on hash tables organized by prefix lengths.
There are three significant ideas of this algorithm; using hashing to check whether an
address D matches any prefix of a particular length, binary search to reduce the number
of searches from linear to logarithmic, and precomputation to prevent backtracking in
case of failures in the binary search of range.
Hashing idea is to look for all prefixes of a certain length L using hashing and use
multiple hashes to find the best matching prefix, starting with the largest value of L
and working backward. For example, consider a routing table of four prefix entries, each
with prefix length of 4, 8, 8 and 10. Each of the entries would be stored in a hash table
that corresponds to its prefix length (Figure B.3). The hash tables are stored as a sorted
array, so for this example, the array has three entries.
Figure B.3: Hash tables for prefix lengths
Searching for address D, we walk through each hash table in that array starting from
the largest value l, i.e., 10 on the example, extracting the first l bits of D to get its prefix
of D. We then search the hash table using that prefix as the key. If we find a prefix, then
we have found the best matching prefix (BMP) and the search terminates; otherwise, if
we find nothing, we move to the next entry of the array.
To illustrate the binary search strategy, suppose we have three prefixes P1 = 0, P2 =
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00, P3 = 111. Storing the prefixes in hash tables and sorting the array, we have Figure
B.4(b). If we search for 111, binary search (a) would start at the middle of the hash
table and search for 11 in the hash table containing P2. This search would fail and have
no pointer that it should search in the longer prefix tables to find the BMP. To correct
the search, we need to put the marker for prefix P3 in this table, thus the lookup for 11
would succeed and binary search would know that it should search for a match in the
longer prefix table.
Figure B.4: Binary search on hash tables
Figure B.5: Binary search on trie levels
The hash tables containing prefixes and markers can be thought as a trie where each hash
table is a level of a trie that corresponds to nodes of a certain prefix length (see Figure
B.5). Binary search in this trie starts on the median level of the trie and depending on
the result of hash lookup on that level, the search will continue to the level of shorter
or longer prefix length.
A naive implementation of this algorithm will take linear time. While Markers can point
to the BMP, they can also cause the search to follow false leads, which may fail. When
this happens, we would have to modify the binary search to backtrack and search the
upper half of the level of failure, and that would lead to linear time. To avoid the
backtracking problem, we need to use precomputation when inserting markers. Suppose
we insert a marker M to the hash table, M would have to record the best matching
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prefix of the marker (M.bmp). With this variable, now the binary search remembers the
value of M.bmp whenever a lookup produces a match. If the search in the lower half
produces a failure, search procedure does not need to backtrack, since it remembers the
best matching prefix from M.bmp.
B.2.2 Specialised Data Structures
Classification algorithms that use specialised data structures to represent the access
lists internally tend to be less sensitive to the types of lists they encounter compared
to the table-driven methods. Data structures used to represent access lists are often
graph-based and tend to perform quite well in practice.
B.2.2.1 Grid of Tries
A trie is a binary branching tree whose edges are labelled either 0 or 1, and so the path
from the root to a particular node corresponds to the unique bit sequence of the node
[Cheung and McCanne(1999)]. Tries are associated with routing algorithms that match
routing table rules according to the destination address of the packet. This structure has
been extended to support matching on two fields instead of just one with a grid of tries
[Venkatachary Srinivasan and Waldvogel(1998)]. Essentially, after the trie for the first
field has been constructed, tries for the second field are constructed off relevant nodes in
the original trie. This final data structure behaves somewhat like an automaton scanning
one bit of the input at a time and never backtracking. Unfortunately, this scheme does
not extend to multi-dimensional filters, since it implicitly builds longest prefix matching
into the structure and has the constraint that the specified bits in each prefix must be
contiguous and start matching from the start of the input string. So while this structure
is useful for applications such as multicast forwarding, it is not very useful for general
packet filtering applications.
B.2.2.2 Expression Trees
The earliest work on packet classification demultiplexing used expression trees to repre-
sent the rules [J. Mogul and Accetta(1987)]. This data structure was a natural choice
due to the stack-based implementation used. An expression tree is a binary tree that
has Boolean predicates at its leaf nodes and Boolean operations, e.g., AND and OR,
at its internal nodes. The value of the expression is given by performing an in-order
traversal of the tree. One of the major problems with this approach is that it does not
maintain state, meaning that the packet may need to be parsed several times to evaluate
the expression, resulting in redundant computations. The original implementation using
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this data structure is called CSPF (CMU / Stanford Packet Filter) and has lookup times
that grow linearly with the number of rules.
B.2.2.3 Binary Directed Acyclic Graphs
CSPF is the Berkeley packet filter (BPF) [McCanne and Jacobson(1993)] that improves
on the original design by using control flow graphs (CFGs) to represent the rules instead
of expression trees. CFGs are directed, acyclic graphs whose nodes represent Boolean
predicates such as destination = foo, and edges represent control transfers (one edge is
traversed if the corresponding predicate is true; the other edge is traversed if it is false).
Unlike expression trees, the CFG model allows state information to be implicitly built
into the data structure, which avoids recomputing identical predicates. Various optimi-
sations have been applied to the original CFGs that further attempt to reduce redundant
computations which has the effect of reducing both the lookup times and memory re-
quirements [M. L. Bailey and Sarkar(1994)] [A. Begel and Graham(1999)] [M. Yuhara and Moss(1994)].
Although these packet filters perform much better than the original CSPF, no theoretical
results have been published to describe time or memory requirements in general.
Baboescu and Varghese [Baboescu and Varghese(2001)] describe a scheme called Aggre-
gate Bit Vector (ABV). The aim of the scheme is to provide scalable packet classification,
e.g., 100,000 rules, to handle large filters while also providing efficient classification times
on generic CPUs. The scheme is an extension of the bit vector search algorithm (BV)
described in [Lakshman and Stiliadis(1998)]. The first optimisation of the BV scheme
consists of minimizing the number of unused bits in the bit vectors, by taking advantage
of the observation that the number of rules overlapping in a filter is likely to be small.
This is technique referred to as aggregation. Secondly, to take full advantage of using
aggregation the order of the rules is rearranged. However, again due to the issues of
overlapping rules, it is not possible. Modifying the BV scheme to first find all matches
and then computing the lowest cost match make this possible. Both the BV scheme and
the ABV scheme solve a more general packet classification problem.
B.2.2.4 Decision Graphs
Decision graphs used to classify packets consist of nodes that represent a test of a vari-
able’s value. The branches of the node represent the path taken depending on the current
value of the variable. They may represent one value or a range of values. They differ
from the types of graphs discussed previously in that a node may have more than two
children and can thus have complex expressions at the nodes, rather than just Boolean
predicates. In one implementation of such a graph, the graph is constructed in a number
of layers corresponding to the dimensionality of the filter, so each layer corresponds to
the test of one field in the packet header [D. Decasper and Plattner(1998)]. Because
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of this, the depth of the graph is same as the number of fields filtered on and thus the
lookup time is roughly linear in number of fields and independent of the number of rules.
However, no results are given regarding the memory requirements of this scheme.
B.2.2.5 Hierarchical Intelligent Cuttings
Another technique called HiCuts [Gupta and McKeown(1999b)] builds a decision graph
in a similar way, except that each leaf stores a number of filter rules rather than just
the single matching rule or rule number. The lookup algorithm traverses the decision
graph, which is typically quite shallow, to a leaf node and then performs a linear search
through the list of rules stored at the leaf node. The depth, shape and decisions to be
made at each node greatly affect the performance of the resulting decision graph and so
the algorithm is heavily guided by heuristics. During the construction of the graph, the
partition that leads to the uniform distribution of the rules across the nodes is chosen.
When the number of rules at a node drops below a certain threshold, the node is not
partitioned any further. Experimental work on access lists ranging from 100 to 1700
rules in size with 4 fields and the above threshold set to 8, measured a worst case lookup
requiring 12 memory accesses and a linear search on 8 rules. No analytical results are
given.
Gupta and McKeown [Gupta and McKeown(1999b)] uses heuristics to solve k-dimensional
packet classification problem. Their approach focuses on the practical implementation
of classification with real-life filter database. The approach, called HiCuts (hierarchical
intelligent cuttings), attempts to partition the search space in each dimension, guided
by simple heuristics that exploit the structure of filter database.
The HiCuts algorithm builds a decision-tree data structure by carefully preprocessing
the filter database. Each time a packet arrives, the classification algorithm traverses the
decision tree to find a leaf node, which stores a small number of rules. A linear search
of these rules produces the matching filter.
Figure B.6 illustrates the geometrical representation of a two-dimensional filter database.
Figure B.7 shows a possible tree for the database.
All these heuristics are combined to create the best decision tree for the filter database
and tuning parameters for these heuristics would possibly create different trees.
B.2.2.6 Binary Decision Diagram
Hazelhurst [Hazelhurst(1999)] presents the idea of transforming firewall packet filters into
Boolean expressions that are represented as BDDs. The paper describes an algorithm
for transforming a CISCO firewall filter into a BDD, including the handling of issues
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Figure B.6: Geometrical representation of seven filters
Figure B.7: A possible tree for filters in Figure B.6
with overlapping rules. The main use of BDDs in this paper is for a tool that can be used
analysing and test filters. A later paper by Hazelhurst et al.[S. Hazelhurst and Sinnappan(2000)]
focus on using the BDD structures for performing packet classification. The conclusion
is that BDDs can improve the lookup latency on systems using dedicated hardware such
as FPGAs, while they do not perform well on generic CPUs.
Attar and Hayelhurst [Attar and Hazelhurst(2002)] use N-ary decision diagrams for im-
proving the lookup performance. The experimental results show that the lookup time
can be significantly improved by using this method, however at the price of increased
memory usage. Furthermore, the idea of using MTBDDs to handle the more general
packet classification is suggested.
Most software approaches involve improving the data representations for rule storage and
the rule search algorithms. Software approaches suffer from two inherent limitations.
Firstly, the filter runs sequentially on a general-purpose processor. Hence, there is a limit
to performance no matter how well the data structures and algorithms are optimised.
Secondly, software solutions suffer from high overheads. For instance, several layers
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of hardware and software have to be traversed during filtering: the packet must be
transferred from the physical cable to the network card, through the protocol stack
and to the filtering software, and back to the network again, traversing many buffers
and buses in the process. Other overheads result from operating system tasks such as
interrupt handling. Hardware approaches, attempt to overcome these limitations.
B.2.3 Hardware-based Classification
A simple hardware approach is to use multiple general purpose processors to filter several
packets at a time [Benecke(1999)]. However, this only increases filtering throughput, and
does not decrease the lookup time itself. Furthermore, using multiple processors would
increase the cost of the filter.
Many manufacturers have used custom hardware to reduce lookup latency. Their ap-
proaches essentially consist of embedding the lookup algorithms in application specific
integrated circuits (ASICs). For example, Fore Systems Inc. produces Ethernet switches
that execute a microcode version of CheckPoint’s Firewall-1 software on ASICs 3. This
allows aggregate data rates of up to 20 Gbits per second, as opposed to the 50- to
100 Mbits per second speeds of other filters [Newman(1999)]. Juniper Networks also
produces the Internet Processor II ASIC that reportedly has filtering rates of 20 mil-
lion packets per second, whereas software filters reportedly approach a limit of 200,000
packets per second [Lear(2000)]. Unfortunately, these high speeds are matched by the
high cost of the filters, making ASIC-based packet filters a viable option only for large
corporations.
Another approach that has been tried, is the use of content addressable memory (CAM)
[Neale(1999)]. CAM allows the contents of memory locations to be searched in parallel
given an input key value. Hence, if the rulebase is stored in CAM, a rule whose condition
matches the fields in a given packet can quickly be found. However, CAMs are too
small, too expensive, and consume too much power for classification on many fields
[Gupta and McKeown(1999a)].
FPGAs have also been used in packet filtering applications. McHenry et al.[John T. McHenry and Cocks(1997)]
used an FPGA for packet filtering in ATM networks. Their approach involves using a
combination of a dedicated personal computer (the firewall control processor, FCP) and
an FPGA-based firewall inline processor (FIP). The FCP performs the usual rule lookup
and authentication associated with a firewall, and the FIP acts as ATM cell forwarder
between the transmitter and the sender. When an ATM transmission begins, the FCP
authenticates the connection and if it is authorised, it instructs the FIP to forward the
ATM cells that make up the transmission. If the transmission is not authorised, the FCP
3Hardware developers do not release details of the internal operation of the ASICs, possibly for
commercial reasons. Hence, it is not clear how the ASICs execute the microcode, for instance, whether
in parallel or sequentially.
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instruct the FIP to discard the cells and hence the transmission does not take place.
Due to the way ATM works, only the first cell needs to authenticated by the FCP, after
that, the other cells can pass through the FIP without intervention from the FCP.
Lakshman and Stiliadis [Lakshman and Stiliadis(1998)], and Bailey et al.[M. L. Bailey and Sarkar(1994)]
also describe FPGA implementations. In these approaches, some representation of the
rulebase is stored in RAM, either within the FPGA [M. L. Bailey and Sarkar(1994)] or
on RAM chips [Lakshman and Stiliadis(1998)] and an FPGA is used to implement an
algorithm to perform rule lookup on the RAM.
Appendix C
Virus Detection Result by Janus
VirusDetector
All the test results of VirusDetector are listed here. Tested files were either Win9x or
Win32 executable files. The tables are listed as encrypted parasitic viruses, polymorphic
viruses and parasitic viruses.
Table C.1: Win9x Encrypted Parasitic Virus Detection Result by VirusDetector
Encrypted Win9x Virus Total Number: 30, Error number: 1, False negative: 0.03 (3%)
Date indicates the virus’s detected & caught date in form MM-DD-YY.
Virus names are also the names of the test files. Size unit is byte.
Virus Name Size Date Detection Virus Name Size Date Detection
Bumble.1736 8192 3-1-04 O Bumble.1738 8192 11-22-03 O
Iced.1344 44032 9-6-01 O Iced.1376 8192 11-22-03 O
Iced.1412 8192 11-22-03 O Iced.1617 8192 3-1-04 O
Iced.2112 8192 3-1-04 O Mad.2736.a 32768 10-4-04 O
Mad.2736.b 32768 10-4-04 O Mad.2736.c 32768 1-7-02 O
Mad.2736.d 32768 1-7-02 O Mad.2806 32768 1-19-98 O
Nathan.3276 7372 9-2-02 O Nathan.3520.a 12288 3-10-04 O
Nathan.3520.b 16384 9-9-01 O Nathan.3792 185552 10-23-99 O
Obsolete.1419 5003 3-1-04 O PoshKill.1398 8192 4-21-01 O
PoshKill.1406 8192 3-17-03 O PoshKill.1426 8192 8-20-01 O
PoshKill.1445.a 8192 3-10-04 O PoshKill.1445.b 8192 11-22-03 O
Priest.1419 4096 8-9-99 O Priest.1454 4096 3-1-04 O
Priest.1478 9728 6-10-00 X Priest.1486 9728 10-4-01 O
Priest.1495 9728 8-18-01 O Priest.1521 9728 3-1-04 O
Shoerec 321536 8-12-01 O Tip.2475 10752 11-22-03 O
Voodoo.1537 61441 11-22-03 O Werther.1224 6344 12-31-01 O
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Table C.2: Win32 Encrypted Parasitic Virus Detection Result by VirusDetector
Encrypted Win32 Virus Total Number: 30, Error number: 4, False negative: 0.13 (13%)
Date indicates the virus’s detected & caught date in form MM-DD-YY.
Virus names are also the names of the test files. Size unit is byte.
Virus Name Size Date Detection Virus Name Size Date Detection
Ditto.1488 6096 3-1-04 O Ditto.1492 12288 11-22-03 O
Ditto.1539 8192 10-1-00 O Gloria.2820 16384 11-22-03 X
Gloria.2928 16384 3-1-04 O Gloria.2963 12288 10-1-00 O
Idele.2104 8192 7-8-03 O Idele.2108 8192 3-1-04 O
Idele.2160 8192 11-12-03 O IhSix.3048 8192 11-22-03 O
Infinite.1661 8192 3-1-04 O Levi.2961 12288 5-16-01 O
Levi.3040 7188 11-22-03 O Levi.3090 12288 11-22-03 O
Levi.3137 35941 11-22-03 O Levi.3205 12288 3-1-04 X
Levi.3240 16384 8-17-02 O Levi.3244 16384 11-22-03 X
Levi.3432 16384 11-22-03 O Mix.1852 4096 5-30-00 O
Niko.5178 65611 11-22-03 X Santana.1104 81920 12-4-01 O
Savior.1680 8192 1-8-01 O Savior.1696 12288 5-18-01 O
Savior.1740 12288 3-28-02 O Savior.1828 20480 8-6-01 O
Savior.1832 12288 3-1-04 O Savior.1904 12288 12-4-01 O
Undertaker.4887 12288 11-22-03 O Undertaker.5036.a 12288 11-22-03 O
Table C.3: Win9x Polymorphic Virus Detection Result by VirusDetector
Win9x Polymorphic Virus Total Number: 15, Error number: 2, False negative: 0.13
(13%)
Date indicates the virus’s detected & caught date in form MM-DD-YY.
Virus names are also the names of the test files. Size unit is byte.
Virus Name Size Date Detection Virus Name Size Date Detection
Begemot 8192 3-1-04 O Darkmil.5086 12288 3-1-04 X
Darkmil.5090 74210 7-2-03 O Fiasko.2500.a 8192 11-22-03 O
Fiasko.2500.b 12935 3-1-04 O Fiasko.2508 8192 3-1-04 O
Invir.7051 9728 3-1-04 O Luna.2636 8192 4-24-02 O
Luna.2757.a 62213 3-10-04 O Luna.2757.b 12288 1-1-80 O
Marburg.a 493789 3-10-04 O Marburg.b 28381 11-22-03 X
Matrix.3597 35916 2-14-03 O Merinos.1763 9216 3-1-04 O
Merinos.1849 8192 11-22-03 O
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Table C.4: Win32 Polymorphic Virus Detection Result by VirusDetector
Encrypted Win32 Virus Total Number: 50, Error number: 21, False negative: 0.42
(42%)
Date indicates the virus’s detected & caught date in form MM-DD-YY.
Virus names are also the names of the test files. Size unit is byte.
Virus Name Size Date Detection Virus Name Size Date Detection
Andras.7300 14238 7-27-02 O AOC.2044 8192 11-28-99 O
AOC.2045 8192 11-26-99 O AOC.3657 16384 3-1-04 O
AOC.3833 16384 3-1-04 O AOC.3860 20480 2-10-03 X
AOC.3864 20480 2-10-03 O Champ 12288 2-10-03 O
Champ.5430 12288 10-6-02 O Champ.5464 12288 2-10-03 O
Champ.5477 12288 10-6-02 O Champ.5495 6144 2-10-03 X
Champ.5521 12288 2-10-03 X Champ.5536 12288 2-10-03 X
Champ.5714 12288 2-10-03 O Champ.5722 16384 2-10-03 X
Chop.3808 64049 8-29-01 X Crypto 49152 3-1-04 X
Crypto.a 28672 11-22-03 X Crypto.b 32768 11-22-03 O
Crypto.c 32768 11-22-03 O Driller 94208 3-1-04 O
Harrier 108544 11-22-03 X Hatred.a 16384 3-10-04 O
Hatred.d 16384 10-29-02 O Kriz.3660 415232 7-27-02 X
Kriz.3740 764928 10-4-04 X Kriz.3863 475136 10-4-04 X
Kriz.4029 12288 3-1-04 O Kriz.4037 12288 8-19-01 O
Kriz.4050 479232 11-22-03 X Kriz.4057 12288 8-19-01 X
Kriz.4075 12288 11-22-03 O Kriz.4099 12288 11-22-03 X
Kriz.4233 8192 7-15-01 X Kriz.4271 57344 10-4-04 O
Prizm.4428 8704 9-4-02 X RainSong.3874 8192 11-22-03 O
RainSong.3891 61509 3-1-04 O RainSong.3910 8192 12-5-01 X
RainSong.3956 12288 10-4-04 X RainSong.4198 8192 3-12-02 O
RainSong.4266 12288 10-4-04 X Thorin.11932 16384 3-1-04 O
Thorin.b 16384 3-1-04 O Thorin.c 16384 10-23-99 O
Thorin.d 16384 7-14-99 O Thorin.e 16384 10-23-99 O
Vampiro.7018 18432 3-1-04 X Vampiro.a 16896 3-10-04 O
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Table C.5: Win9x Virus Detection Result by VirusDetector
Win9x Virus Total Number: 291, Error number: 26, False negative: 0.09 (approx. 9%)
Date indicates the virus’s detected & caught date in form MM-DD-YY.
Virus names are also the names of the test files. Size unit is byte.
Virus Name Size Date Detection Virus Name Size Date Detection
Altar.797 8192 6-19-99 O Altar.884 4096 10-4-02 O
Altar.910 4096 10-24-99 O Antic.695 7863 9-2-02 O
Anxiety.1358 152778 3-1-04 O Anxiety.1397 49736 3-1-04 O
Anxiety.1399 8192 3-21-98 O Anxiety.1399.b 49736 3-1-04 O
Anxiety.1422 5684 11-22-03 O Anxiety.1451 29213 2-21-01 O
Anxiety.1486 8192 1-24-98 O Anxiety.1517 8192 11-22-03 O
Anxiety.1586 42590 11-22-03 O Anxiety.1596 49736 3-11-98 O
Anxiety.1823 8192 3-1-04 O Anxiety.1823.b 6196 7-2-03 O
Anxiety.2471 8192 11-22-03 O Apop.1086 8192 7-17-02 O
Argos.310 4096 9-2-02 O Argos.328 4096 3-1-04 O
Argos.335 4096 9-24-02 O Argos.402 4096 6-30-99 O
Arianne.1022.a 4606 3-10-04 O Arianne.1022.b 94112 11-22-03 O
Arianne.1052 8192 5-16-02 O Atom.4790 64182 5-8-02 X
Babylonia.11036 33734 3-1-04 X Babylonia.attach 5984 5-16-02 O
Babylonia.Plugin.Dropper 12606 11-22-03 X Babylonia.Plugin.Greetz 621 11-22-03 X
Babylonia.Plugin.IrcWorm 1707 11-22-03 O Babylonia.Plugin.Poll 1041 11-22-03 O
Begemot 8192 3-1-04 O BlackBat.2615 8192 5-31-01 O
BlackBat.2787 8192 11-22-03 O BlackBat.2795 8192 11-22-03 O
BlackBat.2840 8192 5-27-01 X BlackBat.2841.a 8192 3-10-04 O
BlackBat.2841.b 8192 5-31-01 X BlackBat.2988 8192 11-22-03 O
Bodgy.3230 97438 4-15-03 X Bonk.1232 19632 11-22-03 O
Bonk.1243 9460 3-1-04 O Boza.2220 24576 11-22-03 X
Boza.A 12408 9-2-99 O Boza.C 16384 9-10-99 O
Boza.a 12408 3-17-96 O Boza.b 7994 11-22-03 O
Boza.c 16384 3-1-04 O Boza.d 16384 11-22-03 O
Boza.e 16384 11-22-03 O Bumble.1736 8192 3-1-04 O
Bumble.1738 8192 11-22-03 O Butool.910 14222 9-2-02 O
Buzum.1828 6310 3-1-04 O ByteSV.Thorn.886 20480 11-22-03 O
Caw.1262 205550 11-22-03 O Caw.1335 5943 3-1-04 O
Caw.1416 55964 11-22-03 O Caw.1419 54667 11-22-03 X
Caw.1457 6065 11-22-03 O Caw.1458 8192 10-5-02 O
Caw.1525 24576 11-22-03 O Caw.1531 8192 11-2-01 O
Caw.1557 180224 12-31-00 O Chimera.1542 35846 11-22-03 O
CIH 19536 7-8-02 O CIH.v1.2 19536 9-12-99 O
CIH.v1.3 36864 9-3-99 O CIH.v1.4 4608 9-22-99 O
CIH.1003.b 4608 3-1-04 O CIH.1010.b 37394 11-22-03 O
CIH.1016 34304 9-2-02 O CIH.1019.c 4896 3-1-04 O
CIH.1024 1553 3-1-04 O CIH.1026 1555 3-1-04 O
CIH.1031 4096 9-2-02 O CIH.1035 1564 3-1-04 O
CIH.1040 159744 3-1-04 O CIH.1042 53248 3-1-04 O
CIH.1048 20480 9-2-02 O CIH.1049 65536 9-2-02 O
CIH.1103 2144 11-22-03 O CIH.1106 153088 11-27-02 O
CIH.1122 1651 9-2-02 O CIH.1129 1658 3-1-04 X
CIH.1142 16384 6-19-98 O CIH.1230 1759 3-1-04 O
CIH.1262 1778 3-1-04 O CIH.1297 1826 11-22-03 O
CIH.1363 59392 3-1-04 X CIH.2563 24576 9-2-02 X
CIH.2690 94208 9-2-02 X CIH.816.a 59392 9-2-02 X
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Table C.6: Win9x Virus Detection Result by VirusDetector (Cont.)
Win9x Virus Total Number: 291, Error number: 26, False negative: 0.09 (approx. 9%)
Date indicates the virus’s detected & caught date in form MM-DD-YY.
Virus names are also the names of the test files. Size unit is byte.
Virus Name Size Date Detection Virus Name Size Date Detection
CIH.816.b 5120 9-2-02 O CIH.862 1903 5-10-02 O
CIH.876 20480 9-2-02 X CIH.913 20480 9-2-02 O
CIH.937 20480 9-2-02 O CIH.973 1502 3-1-04 O
CIH.corrupted 188478 1-10-02 O CIH.dam 1090318 1-1-03 X
CIH-II.776 53248 9-2-02 O CIH-II.882 20480 9-29-02 O
CIH.intended 2426 8-31-99 O CIH-Killer.1373 9053 3-1-04 O
CIH.src 301056 3-1-04 X Companion.4096 4096 3-1-04 O
Croman 16384 9-2-02 X Dado 332817 3-1-04 X
Darkmil.5086 12288 3-1-04 X Darkmil.5090 74210 7-2-03 O
DarkSide.1105 8192 4-6-02 O DarkSide.1371 8192 3-1-04 O
DarkSide.1491 9728 10-4-04 O Dead.1086 8192 9-29-02 O
Dead.4172 11392 9-2-02 O Dead.4316 16796 5-16-02 O
Dead.4388 11608 9-2-02 O Demo.8192 8192 11-22-03 O
Dodo.1022 8192 9-2-02 O Dupator.1503 110592 1-29-04 O
Eak 103424 12-19-02 X Esmeralda.807 4955 7-15-01 O
Etymo.1308 7168 3-1-04 O Evil.953.a 60345 11-22-03 X
Evil.953.b 4096 9-24-02 O Evil.962 8192 3-1-04 O
Evil.962.b 35266 11-22-03 O Evil.962.c 4096 8-26-01 O
Federal 8192 9-2-02 O Fiasko.2500.a 8192 11-22-03 O
Fiasko.2500.b 12935 3-1-04 O Fiasko.2508 8192 3-1-04 O
Filth.1030 4096 3-1-04 O Flee.835 8192 11-22-03 O
Fono.15327 24064 3-1-04 X Fono.Trojan 263 5-16-02 O
Frone.864 69632 5-16-02 X Frone.951 8192 9-2-02 O
FYS.1728 8192 7-15-01 O Gara.640 8192 11-22-03 O
Gara.842.a 8192 3-10-04 O Gara.842.b 8192 11-22-03 O
Gara.917 8192 12-4-01 O Harry.a 8192 3-10-04 O
Harry.b 8192 6-2-97 O Hooy.8192 32768 3-28-00 O
Horn.1851 6322 3-1-04 O Horn.1862 6334 11-22-03 O
Horn.2223 6695 11-22-03 O Horn.2245 6719 3-1-04 O
HPS.5124 26563 3-1-04 X I13.a 8192 11-22-03 O
I13.b 12288 3-1-04 O I13.c 8192 3-1-04 O
I13.d 12288 11-22-03 X I13.e 8192 11-22-03 O
I13.f 8192 10-4-02 O Iced.1344 44032 9-6-01 O
Iced.1376 8192 11-22-03 O Iced.1412 8192 11-22-03 O
Iced.1617 8192 3-1-04 O Iced.2112 8192 3-1-04 O
Icer.541 4096 11-22-03 O Icer.619 192512 1-13-04 O
ILMX.1291 53248 3-1-04 O Invir.7051 9728 3-1-04 O
Jacky.1440 4646 3-1-04 O Jacky.1443 8192 11-22-03 O
Javel.512 1529 3-1-04 O Julus.1904.a 8192 11-22-03 O
Julus.1904.b 8192 10-4-04 O Julus.1929.a 8192 11-22-03 O
Julus.1929.b 8192 1-23-03 O Julus.2702.a 12288 11-22-03 O
Julus.2702.b 8192 8-29-01 O Julus.2777 12288 11-22-03 O
K32.1012 5108 11-22-03 O K32.2929 8192 10-4-02 O
K32.3030 9174 3-1-04 O K32.Roma.2929 9643 12-9-00 O
Kaze 20480 8-8-02 O Kurgan.10240 14336 9-2-02 O
Lizard.1967 7099 3-1-04 O Lizard.2381 2957 3-1-04 O
Lizard.2869 3715 3-1-04 O Lizard.5150 5150 10-4-04 O
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Table C.7: Win9x Virus Detection Result by VirusDetector (Cont.)
Win9x Virus Total Number: 291, Error number: 26, False negative: 0.09 (approx. 9%)
Date indicates the virus’s detected & caught date in form MM-DD-YY.
Virus names are also the names of the test files. Size unit is byte.
Virus Name Size Date Detection Virus Name Size Date Detection
Lorez.1766.a 8192 3-10-04 O Lorez.1766.b 8192 6-28-01 O
LoveSong.998 61440 12-4-01 O Lud.Hill.401 8192 3-1-04 O
Lud.Jadis.3567 9216 3-1-04 O Lud.Jadis.3579 9216 11-22-03 O
Lud.Jez.676 8192 3-1-04 O Lud.Jez.682 8192 11-22-03 O
Lud.Yel.1886 22141 10-4-04 O Luna.2636 8192 4-24-02 O
Luna.2757.a 62213 3-10-04 O Luna.2757.b 12288 1-1-80 O
Mad.2736.a 32768 10-4-04 O Mad.2736.b 32768 10-4-04 O
Mad.2736.c 32768 1-7-02 O Mad.2736.d 32768 1-7-02 O
Mad.2806 32768 1-19-98 O Marburg.a 493789 3-10-04 O
Marburg.b 28381 11-22-03 X MarkJ.826 8192 3-1-04 O
Matrix.3597 35916 2-14-03 O Memorial 35515 2-7-98 O
Merinos.1763 9216 3-1-04 O Merinos.1849 8192 11-22-03 O
MMort.1335 8192 11-22-03 O MMort.1340 8192 11-22-03 O
MMort.1348 8192 3-1-04 O MMort.1366 8192 10-23-99 O
Molly.680 8192 5-16-02 O Molly.722 8192 3-1-04 O
MrKlunky.a 6943 3-10-04 O MrKlunky.b 6779 7-2-03 X
MSpawn.4608 8897 11-22-03 O Murkry.383 4096 5-15-02 O
Murkry.398.a 59392 11-22-03 O Murkry.398.b 4096 9-24-02 O
Murkry.399 4096 3-1-04 O Murkry.441 26624 9-24-02 O
Nathan.3276 7372 9-2-02 O Nathan.3520.a 12288 3-10-04 O
Nathan.3520.b 16384 9-9-01 O Nathan.3792 185552 10-23-99 O
Noise.414 57344 3-1-04 O Obsolete.1419 5003 3-1-04 O
Onerin.371 4096 1-9-02 O Onerin.383 4096 1-9-02 O
Opa.1103 45056 5-8-01 O Opa.1149 45056 7-15-01 O
Padania.1335 8192 3-1-04 O Paik.1908 8192 5-14-01 O
PoshKill.1398 8192 4-21-01 O PoshKill.1406 8192 3-17-03 O
PoshKill.1426 8192 8-20-01 O PoshKill.1445.a 8192 3-10-04 O
PoshKill.1445.b 8192 11-22-03 O Powerful.1592 6144 3-1-04 X
Powerful.1773 6144 3-1-04 O Powerful.1901 12288 7-12-01 O
Priest.1419 4096 8-9-99 O Priest.1454 4096 3-1-04 O
Priest.1478 9728 6-10-00 X Priest.1486 9728 10-4-01 O
Priest.1495 9728 8-18-01 O Priest.1521 9728 3-1-04 O
Prizm.4428 8704 9-4-02 X Puma.1024 4096 3-1-04 O
Regix.4096.a 8192 3-10-04 O Sanat.3151 16384 3-1-04 X
Shoerec 321536 8-12-01 O Sign.2028 8192 1-8-01 O
Smash.10262 16384 8-16-01 X SST.952 4096 3-1-04 O
Tecata.1761 66029 10-4-04 O Tenrobot.b 49152 5-14-03 X
Tip.2475 10752 11-22-03 O Titanic.3214 7822 8-16-01 O
Uwaga.3237 8192 11-22-03 O Vivic 8192 8-17-02 O
Voodoo.1537 61441 11-22-03 O Werther.1224 6344 12-31-01 O
Whal.a 8192 1-24-01 O Whyg.1193 8192 6-24-01 O
Yabran.3132 4608 3-1-04 O Yobe 20480 3-1-04 O
Youd.1388 8192 11-22-03 O Yoyo.653 4096 3-1-04 O
Zerg.3849 8192 3-1-04 O Zofo.848 20480 3-1-04 O
Zoual 147456 10-18-02 X
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Table C.8: Win32 Virus Detection Result by VirusDetector.
Win32 Virus Total Number: 499
Error number: 103, False negative: 0.2064 (approx. 21%)
Date indicates the virus’s detected & caught date in form MM-DD-YY.
Virus names are also the names of the test files. Size unit is Byte.
Virus Name Size Date Detection Virus Name Size Date Detection
Adson.1559 8192 7-26-02 O Adson.1734 20480 11-22-03 O
Aidlot 8192 10-4-04 O Akez 32768 4-27-02 O
Aliser.7825 12288 3-6-03 O Aliser.7897 8192 6-8-03 O
Aliser.8381 8192 6-8-03 O Alma.2414 10606 3-1-04 O
Alma.37195 45387 11-22-03 X Alma.37274 40960 4-19-02 X
Alma.5319 13511 3-1-04 X Andras.7300 14238 7-27-02 O
AOC.2044 8192 11-28-99 O AOC.2045 8192 11-26-99 O
AOC.3657 16384 3-1-04 O AOC.3833 16384 3-1-04 O
AOC.3860 20480 2-10-03 X AOC.3864 20480 2-10-03 O
Apathy.5378 8192 3-1-04 O Apparition 96239 12-22-99 O
Apparition.a 542861 3-10-04 X Apparition.b 167707 6-5-98 X
Arianne.1052 6684 3-11-02 O Aris 331785 3-1-04 X
Arrow.a 2048 10-5-04 O Artelad.2173 23040 12-31-00 O
Asorl.a 32269 3-10-04 X AutoWorm.3072 3072 3-1-04 O
Awfull.2376 3072 9-9-03 O Awfull.3571 4096 3-1-04 O
Bakaver.a 24576 10-6-03 O Banaw.2157 8192 11-22-03 O
Barum.1536 5632 8-31-02 O Bee 24576 3-1-04 O
Beef.2110 57344 3-1-04 O Belial.2537 8192 11-22-03 O
Belial.2609 254513 3-9-02 X Belial.a 4096 3-10-04 O
Belial.b 4096 2-23-02 O Belial.c 4096 11-22-03 O
Belial.d 4096 9-24-02 O Belod.a 8192 3-12-02 O
Belod.b 8192 8-21-02 O Belod.c 8192 3-14-02 O
Bender.1363 3584 12-31-01 O Bika.1906 8192 12-31-01 O
BingHe 296643 10-11-02 X Blackcat.2537 8192 9-9-03 O
Blakan.2016 8192 12-31-01 O Blateroz 8192 9-2-02 O
Blueballs.4117 16384 11-22-03 X Bobep 8192 8-25-03 O
Bogus.4096 38400 10-13-99 O Bolzano.2122 36864 2-10-03 O
Bolzano.2664 15135 2-10-03 O Bolzano.2676 15183 2-10-03 O
Bolzano.2716 13521 2-10-03 O Bolzano.3100 15277 2-10-03 O
Bolzano.3120 15331 2-10-03 O Bolzano.3148 15373 2-10-03 O
Bolzano.3164 15409 2-10-03 O Bolzano.3192 15457 3-1-04 O
Bolzano.3628 16095 3-1-04 O Bolzano.3904 16251 2-10-03 O
Bolzano.5572 28237 2-10-03 O Butter 96665 9-2-02 X
Cabanas.a 7171 5-7-04 X Cabanas.b 7171 3-1-04 O
Cabanas.Debug 95748 10-4-04 O Cabanas.e 16384 7-8-03 O
Cabanas.MsgBox 39996 10-4-04 X Cabanas.Release 49152 1-26-99 O
CabInfector 4096 3-1-04 O Cecile 28672 12-31-01 X
Cefet.3157 7253 9-2-02 O Cerebrus.1482 8192 3-1-04 O
Champ 12288 2-10-03 O Champ.5430 12288 10-6-02 O
Champ.5464 12288 2-10-03 O Champ.5477 12288 10-6-02 O
Champ.5495 6144 2-10-03 X Champ.5521 12288 2-10-03 X
Champ.5536 12288 2-10-03 X Champ.5714 12288 2-10-03 O
Champ.5722 16384 2-10-03 X Chatter 22528 1-13-03 O
Chop.3808 64049 8-29-01 X Cornad 4096 6-22-03 O
Crosser 102400 12-6-03 X Crypto 49152 3-1-04 X
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Table C.9: Win32 Virus Detection Result by VirusDetector (Cont.),
Win32 Virus Total Number: 499
Error number: 103, False negative: 0.2064 (approx. 21%)
Date indicates the virus’s detected & caught date in form MM-DD-YY.
Virus names are also the names of the test files. Size unit is Byte.
Virus Name Size Date Detection Virus Name Size Date Detection
Crypto.a 28672 11-22-03 X Crypto.b 32768 11-22-03 O
Crypto.c 32768 11-22-03 O Damm.1624 24576 3-1-04 O
Damm.1628 4096 5-16-02 O Damm.1647.a 12288 11-22-03 O
Datus 105472 5-16-02 X Delikon 16384 1-6-04 O
Devir 24576 10-4-04 O Dictator.2304 10496 11-22-03 X
Dislex 135239 3-1-04 X Ditex 212992 4-17-02 O
Ditto.1488 6096 3-1-04 O Ditto.1492 12288 11-22-03 O
Ditto.1539 8192 10-1-00 O Donny.a 8192 3-10-04 O
Donut 12800 3-1-04 O Dream.4916 69632 3-1-04 O
Driller 94208 3-1-04 O Drivalon.1876 3072 7-8-03 O
Dudra.5632 12288 7-7-01 O Eclipse.a 8192 3-10-04 O
Eclipse.b 6644 3-15-01 O Eclipse.c 8192 8-18-99 O
Egolet.a 4096 3-10-04 O Egolet.b 4096 7-7-02 O
Elerad 8192 2-2-02 X Emotion.a 4608 3-10-04 O
Emotion.b 8192 11-30-00 O Emotion.c 8192 2-10-03 O
Emotion.d 8192 2-10-03 O Emotion.gen 8192 9-20-01 O
Enar 89088 3-1-04 O Enumiacs.6656 6656 11-22-03 O
Enumiacs.8192.a 274 10-4-04 O Fighter.a 6656 11-22-03 O
Fighter.b 8192 1-29-04 X Flechal 69632 3-1-04 O
Fosforo.a 8192 3-10-04 O Fosforo.b 8192 10-24-02 O
Fosforo.c 8192 12-31-01 X Fosforo.d 8192 3-5-03 X
Freebid 14066 8-27-02 O FunLove.4070 69635 3-7-04 O
Gaybar 55493 2-9-04 O gen 8192 9-3-02 O
Genu.a 8192 11-22-03 O Genu.b 8192 11-22-03 O
Genu.c 5619 8-18-02 O Genu.d 8192 7-26-02 O
Ghost.1667 8192 3-1-04 O Ginra.3334 8966 8-31-02 O
Ginra.3413 8192 9-2-02 O Ginra.3570 8192 5-18-02 O
Ginra.3657 8192 10-4-04 O Ginseng 4096 8-24-02 O
Giri.4919 185143 11-22-03 O Giri.4970 13162 3-9-02 O
Giri.5209 12288 3-28-01 X Gloria.2820 16384 11-22-03 X
Gloria.2928 16384 3-1-04 O Gloria.2963 12288 10-1-00 O
Glyn 8192 3-1-04 O Gobi.a 4096 10-23-02 O
Godog 12288 3-1-04 O Golsys.14292 55252 8-30-02 X
Grenp.2804 4608 11-22-03 O Halen.2593 8192 3-1-04 O
Halen.2618 22743 7-27-02 O Halen.2619 8192 7-12-02 O
Haless.1127 31744 10-4-04 X Harrier 108544 11-22-03 X
Hatred.a 16384 3-10-04 O Hatred.d 16384 10-29-02 O
Hawey 5595 7-12-03 O Heretic.1986 8192 3-1-04 O
Hezhi 152064 9-2-02 O Hidrag.a 36352 8-24-01 X
Highway.a 8192 11-22-03 O Highway.b 48177 3-9-02 O
HIV 175 2-10-03 X HIV.6340 12288 11-22-03 O
HIV.6382 12288 11-22-03 O HIV.6386 12288 10-4-04 X
HIV.6680 12288 3-1-04 X HLL.Fugo 55808 7-6-04 X
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Table C.10: Win32 Virus Detection Result by VirusDetector (Cont.),
Win32 Virus Total Number: 499
Error number: 103, False negative: 0.2064 (approx. 21%)
Date indicates the virus’s detected & caught date in form MM-DD-YY.
Virus names are also the names of the test files. Size unit is Byte.
Virus Name Size Date Detection Virus Name Size Date Detection
HLLP.BadBy 329728 11-22-03 X HLLP.Bora.11264 11264 5-8-02 X
HLLP.Clay 60416 11-22-03 O HLLP.Delvi 46080 3-11-02 X
HLLP.Famer 22528 1-18-03 X HLLP.Freefall 36352 6-15-02 X
HLLP.Gezad 28672 7-8-03 O HLLP.Givin 34820 10-4-04 O
HLLP.Gosus 69590 8-17-02 O HLLP.Gotem 22016 11-25-02 X
HLLP.Hetis 38400 2-27-02 O HLLP.Imel 34816 8-30-02 O
HLLP.Karabah 190988 11-22-03 O HLLP.Kiro 79632 4-9-04 X
HLLP.Lassa.40960 40960 5-8-02 O HLLP.Mincer 173315 4-19-02 X
HLLP.MTV 68096 11-22-03 X HLLP.Nilob 24576 7-14-00 O
HLLP.Pres 124936 9-2-02 X HLLP.Semisoft 59904 12-4-99 O
HLLP.Shodi.c 98318 4-9-04 X HLLP.Sloc 104448 8-31-02 O
HLLP.Sneak 34816 3-1-04 O HLLP.Thembe 130322 3-1-04 X
HLLP.Unzi 24576 3-25-02 O HLLP.Winfig 33280 11-22-03 O
HLLP.Yai 341211 11-14-99 X Htrip.a 8192 12-4-01 O
Htrip.b 8192 11-22-03 O Htrip.c 8192 12-4-01 O
Idele.2104 8192 7-8-03 O Idele.2108 8192 3-1-04 O
Idele.2160 8192 11-12-03 O IhSix.3048 8192 11-22-03 O
IKX 4096 3-1-04 O Infinite.1661 8192 3-1-04 O
Infis.4608 4608 3-1-04 O Initx 210432 10-4-04 X
Insom.1972.a 5120 4-23-04 O InvictusDLL.099 4096 11-22-03 O
InvictusDLL.102 8704 9-15-01 X InvictusDLL.a 8192 3-10-04 X
InvictusDLL.b 8192 8-17-01 X InvictusDLL.c 8704 9-10-01 X
InvictusDLL.d 56466 5-5-99 X Ipamor.a 65536 3-10-04 X
Ipamor.c 38913 5-15-03 X Ipamor.d 35840 5-15-03 X
Ivaz 4096 11-22-03 O Jater 4096 3-1-04 O
Jethro.5657 17433 3-1-04 O Junkcomp 65536 12-30-02 X
Kala.7620 65536 12-30-01 X Kanban.a 3072 3-10-04 O
Keisan.a 8192 6-2-03 O Keisan.b 8192 6-2-03 O
Keisan.c 8192 6-2-03 O Keisan.d 8192 6-2-03 O
Keisan.e 8192 6-2-03 O Ketan 4096 3-1-04 O
Kiltex 155648 3-1-04 O Klinge 8192 3-1-04 O
KME 36864 3-1-04 O KMKY 24576 8-6-01 X
Knight.2350 6958 12-4-01 O Koru 65536 5-15-98 O
Kriz.3660 415232 7-27-02 X Kriz.3740 764928 10-4-04 X
Kriz.3863 475136 10-4-04 X Kriz.4029 12288 3-1-04 O
Kriz.4037 12288 8-19-01 O Kriz.4050 479232 11-22-03 X
Kriz.4057 12288 8-19-01 X Kriz.4075 12288 11-22-03 O
Kriz.4099 12288 11-22-03 X Kriz.4233 8192 7-15-01 X
Kriz.4271 57344 10-4-04 O Kuto.2058 10250 8-31-02 X
Lad.1916 61440 9-2-02 X Ladmar.2004 57344 9-1-02 O
Lamebyte 8192 4-30-03 O Lames.4096 8192 1-3-98 O
Lamewin.1751 3584 8-3-02 O Lamewin.1813 3584 4-15-02 O
Lamzan 8192 5-18-03 O Lanky.3153 12288 5-1-02 O
LazyMin.31 96768 4-9-04 X Legacy 19968 3-1-04 O
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Table C.11: Win32 Virus Detection Result by VirusDetector (Cont.),
Win32 Virus Total Number: 499
Error number: 103, False negative: 0.2064 (approx. 21%)
Date indicates the virus’s detected & caught date in form MM-DD-YY.
Virus names are also the names of the test files. Size unit is Byte.
Virus Name Size Date Detection Virus Name Size Date Detection
Levi.2961 12288 5-16-01 O Levi.3040 7188 11-22-03 O
Levi.3090 12288 11-22-03 O Levi.3137 35941 11-22-03 O
Levi.3205 12288 3-1-04 X Levi.3240 16384 8-17-02 O
Levi.3244 16384 11-22-03 X Levi.3432 16384 11-22-03 O
Lom 341504 11-22-03 O Lykov.a 9338 6-9-03 X
Magic.1590 8264 3-1-04 O Magic.1922 8192 9-2-02 O
Magic.3038 12288 11-22-03 X Magic.3078 12288 8-17-02 O
Magic.3082 8192 3-1-04 O Mark.919 2048 6-30-03 O
Matrix.750 4096 11-22-03 O Matrix.844 4096 4-18-02 O
Matrix.LS.1820 8192 8-26-01 O Matrix.LS.1885 8192 11-22-03 O
Matrix.Zelda.a 4096 3-10-04 O Matrix.Zelda.b 8192 11-22-03 O
Matrix.Zelda.c 8192 3-16-01 O Matyas.644 45700 11-22-03 X
Maya.4106 4188 12-7-99 X Maya.4108 8192 11-22-03 X
Maya.4113 12800 3-1-04 X Maya.4114 8192 11-22-03 O
Maya.4161 8192 3-1-04 O Maya.4206 8192 10-4-02 O
Maya.4254 8192 3-1-04 O Maya.4608 8192 10-4-04 X
Melder 46080 6-27-03 O Minit.b 10752 4-27-04 X
MircNew 25088 10-5-02 O Mix.1852 4096 5-30-00 O
Mockoder.1120 4192 8-31-02 O Mogul.6800 12288 3-1-04 X
Mogul.6806 12288 3-25-01 O Mogul.6845 57344 11-22-03 O
Mogul.7189 12288 3-25-01 X Mooder.a 8192 4-3-02 O
Mooder.d 8192 4-6-02 O Mooder.f 14452 8-19-03 X
Mooder.g 8192 4-7-03 O Mooder.i 8192 5-1-03 O
Mooder.j 8192 5-1-03 O Morgoth.2560 2560 11-22-03 O
Mystery.2560 130544 12-8-01 O NDie.2168 182504 11-22-03 O
NDie.2343 182725 11-22-03 O Neoval 14335 5-18-03 O
NGVCK.gen 3584 10-5-04 O Nicolam 57344 4-27-03 O
Niko.5178 65611 11-22-03 X Noise.410 57344 3-10-02 O
Opdoc.1204 123448 6-28-03 O Opdoc.1248 9440 6-24-03 X
Oporto.3076 37950 10-4-04 O Padic 8192 3-1-04 O
Paradise.2116 8192 9-29-02 O Paradise.2168 8192 9-22-02 O
Parvo 80093 3-1-04 O Peana 8192 3-1-04 O
Perrun.a 11780 3-10-04 O Perrun.b 5636 7-11-02 O
PGPME 86016 3-1-04 X Pilsen.4096 4096 3-1-04 O
Positon.4668 8192 7-15-02 X Qozah.1386 4096 1-21-99 O
Qozah.3361 8192 12-4-01 O Qozah.3365 8192 3-1-04 O
Qozah.3370 8192 8-2-99 X RainSong.3874 8192 11-22-03 O
RainSong.3891 61509 3-1-04 O RainSong.3910 8192 12-5-01 X
RainSong.3956 12288 10-4-04 X RainSong.4198 8192 3-12-02 O
RainSong.4266 12288 10-4-04 X Ramdile 18801 3-1-04 X
Razenya 8192 10-25-03 O Redart.2796 380972 8-172000 X
Redemption.a 16384 3-10-04 O Redemption.b 16384 3-1-04 O
Redemption.c 7171 6-15-98 O Refer.2939 36352 3-1-04 O
RemEx 224256 3-1-04 X Revaz 8192 3-1-04 O
Appendix C Virus Detection Result by Janus VirusDetector 163
Table C.12: Win32 Virus Detection Result by VirusDetector (Cont.),
Win32 Virus Total Number: 499
Error number: 103, False negative: 0.2064 (approx. 21%)
Date indicates the virus’s detected & caught date in form MM-DD-YY.
Virus names are also the names of the test files. Size unit is Byte.
Virus Name Size Date Detection Virus Name Size Date Detection
Rever 32768 3-1-04 X Rhapsody.2602 221 10-4-04 O
Rhapsody.2619 8192 3-1-04 O Riccy.a 32768 3-10-04 O
Riccy.b 172032 10-28-01 O Riccy.c 24576 11-22-03 O
Rigel.6468 106496 11-22-03 X Rikenar.1480 8192 9-9-98 O
Rivanon 3584 6-26-03 O Rufoll.1432 2560 2-11-02 O
Rutern.5244 9340 11-5-03 O Ryex 8192 3-1-04 O
Sadon.900 8192 3-1-04 O Sandman.4096 4096 7-4-02 O
Sankei.1062 8192 8-28-03 O Sankei.1409 8192 6-8-03 O
Sankei.1455 8192 8-28-03 O Sankei.1493 8192 6-8-03 O
Sankei.1766 8192 6-8-03 O Sankei.1983 8192 6-8-03 O
Sankei.3001 8192 6-8-03 O Sankei.3077 8192 6-8-03 O
Sankei.3480 8192 6-8-03 O Sankei.3514 8192 8-6-03 O
Sankei.3580 8192 6-8-03 X Sankei.3586 8192 6-8-03 O
Sankei.3621 8192 8-6-03 O Sankei.4085 8192 2-8-04 O
Santana.1104 81920 12-4-01 O Savior.1680 8192 1-8-01 O
Savior.1696 12288 5-18-01 O Savior.1740 12288 3-28-02 O
Savior.1828 20480 8-6-01 O Savior.1832 12288 3-1-04 O
Savior.1904 12288 12-4-01 O Saynob.2406 5120 5-15-03 O
Segax.1136 8192 3-1-04 O Segax.1137 8192 3-3-03 O
Segax.1160 8192 7-12-01 O Sentinel.a 16384 3-10-04 X
Senummy.1838 8192 10-2-03 O Seppuku.1606 8192 9-2-02 O
Seppuku.2763 30208 5-8-02 O Seppuku.2764 30208 3-1-04 O
Seppuku.4827 102400 9-22-02 O Seppuku.6834 12288 7-12-02 O
Seppuku.6972 12288 9-1-01 O Seppuku.6973 12288 7-12-02 O
Seppuku.9728 12288 12-4-01 O Shan.1842 4096 4-27-02 O
Shown.538 4096 4-6-02 O Shown.539.a 4096 3-10-04 O
Shown.540.b 4096 5-19-03 O Silcer 17920 3-1-04 X
Slaman.a 24576 6-28-03 O Slaman.i 24576 7-13-04 O
Small.1144 2560 1-4-01 O Small.1368 53248 5-5-02 O
Small.1388 8192 9-2-02 O Small.139 94208 7-17-02 O
Small.1393 8192 1-2-02 O Small.1416 16699 8-7-02 O
Small.1424 8192 1-2-02 O Small.1468 8192 4-6-03 O
Small.1700 4286 8-5-02 O Small.2218 96526 9-2-02 X
Small.2280 96588 12-31-00 X Small.2560 8192 4-25-03 O
Smog.b 12288 10-2-03 O Spelac.1008 4096 11-17-02 O
Spreder 595924 5-9-03 X Staro.1538 8192 3-1-04 O
Stepar.b 39936 5-2-03 X Stepar.dr 19456 1-1-04 X
Stepar.e 65536 5-5-99 X Stepar.f 150528 8-23-01 X
Stepar.g 137216 8-23-01 O Stepar.j 139264 8-23-01 O
Sugin 147456 9-19-02 O Suns.3912 20468 9-2-02 O
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Table C.13: Win32 Virus Detection Result by VirusDetector (Cont.),
Win32 Virus Total Number: 499
Error number: 103, False negative: 0.2064 (approx. 21%)
Date indicates the virus’s detected & caught date in form MM-DD-YY.
Virus names are also the names of the test files. Size unit is Byte.
Virus Name Size Date Detection Virus Name Size Date Detection
SWOG.based 4096 6-13-02 O Taek.1275 6144 7-27-02 O
Tapan.3882 12288 12-31-01 O Team.a 4096 3-10-04 O
Team.b 4096 8-30-02 O Team.c 4096 9-22-02 O
Team.d 4096 9-14-02 O TeddyBear 2560 3-1-04 O
Tenta.2045 10240 5-9-02 O Test.1334 67072 9-2-02 O
This31.16896 51202 5-8-01 O Thorin.11932 16384 3-1-04 O
Thorin.b 16384 3-1-04 O Thorin.c 16384 10-23-99 O
Thorin.d 16384 7-14-99 O Thorin.e 16384 10-23-99 O
Tolone 12288 2-9-03 X Ultratt 332 9-19-01 X
Ultratt.8152 12288 3-1-04 X Ultratt.8167 12288 10-4-02 O
Undertaker.4887 12288 11-22-03 O Undertaker.5036.a 12288 11-22-03 O
Usem.a 16384 7-11-02 O Usem.b 16384 7-11-02 X
Vampiro.7018 18432 3-1-04 X Vampiro.a 16896 3-10-04 O
VbFrm 28672 7-26-02 O VCell.3041 8192 3-31-01 O
VCell.3468 8192 8-29-01 O VCell.3504 8192 3-1-04 O
VChain 110592 3-1-04 O Velost.1186 8192 9-19-02 O
Velost.1233 84394 4-9-04 O Velost.1241 56963 4-22-04 X
Vorcan 8192 10-4-04 O Vulcano 12288 3-1-04 O
Wabrex.a 8192 3-10-04 O Weird.10240 9216 3-1-04 O
Weird.c 83968 10-7-00 O Weird.d 20480 11-22-03 O
Wide.8225 16896 7-30-02 X Wide.b 12288 8-31-02 O
Wide.c 12288 8-8-02 X Wolf.b 4096 2-27-02 O
Wolf.c 8192 10-4-04 O Xorala 306176 3-7-04 O
Xoro.4092 6140 5-16-02 O Yasw.1000 4096 11-22-03 O
Yasw.924 4096 12-29-00 O Yerg.9412 28672 5-25-02 O
Yerg.9571 16384 11-22-03 O Younga.4434 83527 5-20-01 X
Zaka.a 2809 11-1-04 X Zawex.3196 32768 9-22-02 X
ZHymn.a 88064 4-5-01 O ZHymn.b 90112 8-23-01 O
ZHymn.Host 10752 3-1-04 O ZMist 86016 3-1-04 O
ZMist.d.dr 28672 3-1-04 X ZMist.dr 28672 10-4-04 X
Zombie 19131 3-1-04 O Zomby.17920 17920 11-22-03 O
ZPerm.a 99840 3-10-04 O ZPerm.a2 73728 11-13-00 O
ZPerm.b 70144 3-1-04 O ZPerm.b2 139264 11-22-03 X
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Table C.14: Normal Executable Program’s Virus Check Result by VirusDetector
Normal Executable File’s Total Number: 80
Error number: 24, False positive: 0.3 (approx. 30%).
If the result of detection is marked X, VirusDetector says this file is a virus-infected file,
which means incorrect detection.
Filename Detection Filename Detection
dxwebsetup.exe divx311.exe
awsepersonal.exe DVD2DIVXVCD trial.exe
paulp en1.exe adrenalin2.0.1.exe
GOMPLAYER14.exe sdvd190.exe
csdl13.exe HwpViewer.exe
SSHSecureShellClient-3.2.9.exe DivX505Bundle.exe
klcodec220b.exe SwansMP24a-WCP.exe
DivXPro511GAINBundle.exe NATEON.exe X
WinPcap 3 1 beta 3.exe ducp708 type3 free.exe
wmpcdcs8.exe Acrobat.exe
iTunes.exe pccmain.exe
sicstusc.exe Tra.exe
acrodist.exe java.exe X
PCcpfw.exe sicstus.exe
Trialmsg.exe X Ad-Aware.exe
javaw.exe X PCctool.exe
splfr.exe X tsc.exe
AdobeUpdateManage.exe jpicp132.exe X
Photoshp.exe spmkds.exe
conf.exe policytool.exe X
spmkrs.exe X unregaaw.exe
CSDL.exe kinit.exe X
Powerpnt.exe ssh2.exe
Unwise.exe csdlvw.exe
klist.exe X Quicktimeplayer.exe
Sshclient.exe Wavtoasf.exe
dialog patch.exe X ktab.exe X
ssh-keygen2.exe Winword.exe X
Directcd.exe moviemk.exe X
rmiregistry.exe X Tmntsrv.exe
Winzip32.exe Dreamweaver.exe
msmsgs.exe X Scandisc.exe
Tmoagent.exe Excel.exe
MSohtmed.exe X tmproxy.exe X
iedw.exe orbd.exe
servertool.exe X tmupdito.exe
iexplore.exe X PCClient.exe
sftp2.exe tnameserv.exe X
uninstall.exe X keytool.exe X
rmid.exe X scp2.exe
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